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The Company Store and the Literally Captive 
Market: Consumer Law in Prisons and Jails 
STEPHEN RAHER1 
Abstract: 
The growth of public expense associated with mass incarceration has 
led many carceral systems to push certain costs onto the people who are 
under correctional supervision.  In the case of prisons and jails, this 
frequently takes the form of charges and fees associated with 
telecommunications, food, basic supplies, and access to information.  
Operation of these fee-based businesses (referred to here as “prison 
retail”) is typically outsourced to a private firm.  In recent years, the 
dominant prison retail companies have consolidated into a handful of 
companies, mostly owned by private equity firms. 
This paper explores the practices of prison retailers, and discusses 
potential consumer-law implications.  After an overview of the prison-retail 
industry and a detailed discussion of unfair practices, the paper looks at 
some potential legal protections that may apply under current law.  These 
protections, however, prove to be scattered and often illusory due to 
mandatory arbitration provisions and prohibitions on class adjudication.  
The paper therefore concludes with recommendations on a variety of steps 
that state, local, and federal governments can take to address the problems 
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providing valuable insights about some of the specific practices in the industry, thanks to Art 
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I. Background 
Since the 1970s, the number of people incarcerated in U.S. prisons and 
jails has skyrocketed.  With approximately 2.3 million adults currently held 
in correctional facilities,2 mass incarceration is no longer a fringe issue—it 
impacts families in every community in the nation.  Numerous 
constituencies, from prison guards to utility companies to construction 
firms, profit from the current system of incarceration;3 however, literature 
on profit-seeking in the carceral economy has disproportionately focused on 
companies that construct and manage correctional facilities.4  This 
preoccupation with facility operators ignores the explosion of smaller, 
privately held firms—such as telecommunications providers, technology 
companies, commissary operators, and money transmitters—that have 
sprung up to monetize basic every-day life in prisons and jails.  These 
companies, which I refer to as “prison retailers,” extract money from 
incarcerated people and their families in numerous transactions.  Despite 
the small dollar-amount of most purchases, prison-retail firms can 
command aggregate revenue comparable to private prison operators.5 
Prison retailing finds historical analogs in the commissaries and 
“company stores” that were a key component of the economic peonage 
found on post-bellum plantations and settlements organized around 
extractive industries.6  This prior generation of company stores met its 
 
2.  Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019, PRISON 
POLICY INITIATIVE (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2019.html. 
3.  See generally, Marie Gottschalk, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN 
OF AMERICAN POLITICS 48 (2015).  
4.  This focus on for-profit facility operators (such as CoreCivic (f.k.a. Corrections 
Corporation of America) and the Geo Group (f.k.a. Wackenhut Corrections Corp.) has been 
rightly criticized for over-estimating the political strength of the private prison lobby (in 
terms of influencing substantive criminal justice policy), while ignoring the dominant 
position of publicly-run facilities, both in terms of fiscal outlays and number of people held.  
See Ruth Wilson Gilmore, The Worrying State of the Anti-Prison Movement, SOCIAL JUST. 
BLOG (Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.socialjusticejournal.org/the-worrying-state-of-the-anti-
prison-movement/ (“The long-standing campaign against private prisons is based on the 
fictitious claim that revenues raked in from outsourced contracts explain the origin and 
growth of mass incarceration.”). 
5.  Peter Wagner & Bernadette Rabuy, Following the Money of Mass Incarceration, 
PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/money.html 
(“Private companies that supply goods to the prison commissary or provide telephone 
service for correctional facilities bring in almost as much money ($2.9 billion) as 
governments pay private companies ($3.9 billion) to operate private prisons.”). 
6.  Laura Phillips Sawyer, Contested Meanings of Freedom: Workingmen’s Wages, the 
Company Store System, and the Godcharles v. Wigetnan Decision, 12 J. OF THE GILDED AGE 
& PROGRESSIVE ERA 285 (2013) (overview of company-controlled commissaries in eastern 
U.S. mining communities); JACQUELINE JONES, THE DISPOSSESSED: AMERICA’S UNDERCLASS 
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demise when laborers became more mobile and were able to travel to other 
retailers with more competitive prices.7  In contrast, the modern prison retail 
industry has used the guise of security (unquestioned by legislators or courts) 
to insulate itself from competition which could threaten its profit margins. 
The modern rise of prison retailing can also be situated within the 
historical evolution of the American carceral state.  Penitentiaries began as 
nominally charitable institutions designed to isolate people and train them in 
preparation for an eventual return to the labor force.8  Prison-based labor was 
meant either to support the internal needs of a self-sufficient institution or to 
earn profits on the open market for the financial support of the institution.  
While the idea of the self-sustaining penitentiary was always partially 
mythological, today’s correctional facilities have abandoned any pretense of 
paternalistic self-sufficiency, opting instead for a model of extreme austerity, 
supplemented by the sale of goods and services to those who can afford it.9 
Prisons represent an expansive use of state power, driven by 
policymakers of both major political parties who generally claim to support 
limited government.  The contemporary prison thereby embodies the notion 
of the “antistate state,” developed by geographer Ruth Wilson Gilmore,10 
 
FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO THE PRESENT 136-137 (1993) (discussing ubiquity of company stores 
in a variety of extractive industries); Jack Temple Kirby, Black and White in the Rural South, 
1915-1954, 58 AGRICULTURAL HISTORY 411, 412 (1984) (describing plantation commissaries 
as a method of economic control over sharecroppers of both races, but particularly black 
farmers); William T. Chambers, Pine Woods Region of Southeastern Texas, 10 ECON. 
GEOGRAPHY 302, 307 (July 1934) (describing commissaries in lumber towns). 
7.  Harriet L. Herring, Tracing the Development of Welfare Work in the North Carolina 
Textile Industry, 6 SOCIAL FORCES 591, 596 (1928) (attributing the decline of company stores 
to “[workers] nearness to towns, better roads, and the willingness of small shopkeepers to 
venture into the village trade”). 
8.  David J. Rothman, Perfecting the Prison: United States 1789-1865, in THE OXFORD 
HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY 100, 115-117 
(Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995). 
9.  The model penitentiary’s progression from producing subsistence goods to 
outsourcing the manufacture of such goods to commissary vendors finds yet another parallel 
in historical practice—prior to the Civil War, plantation managers, mindful of the cost of 
providing a minimum level of “furnishings” for their enslaved workforce, tended to produce 
food on the plantation, a practice which ended after the Civil War, when landowners could 
focus on growing cash crops, while purchasing food from third-party producers, and passing 
the costs along to tenant customers.  Forrest McDonald & Grady McWhiney, The South from 
Self-Sufficiency to Peonage: An Interpretation, 85 AM. HIST. REV. 1095, 1116 (1980). 
10.  RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND 
OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA, University of California Press, 245 (2007) (“The 
antistate state depends on ideological and rhetorical dismissal of any agency or capacity that 
‘government’ might use to guarantee social well-being.”); see also Ruth Wilson Gilmore, 
Organized Abandonment and Organized Violence: Devolution and the Police (U. of Calif. 
Santa Cruz, Nov. 9, 2015), at 14:45, available at https://vimeo.com/146450686 (defining the 
antistate state as “The institutional result of rhetorical, but not real, state shrinkage, with its 
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and reflects the concept of “neoliberal penality” promoted by legal theorist 
Bernard Harcourt.11  Regardless of the theoretical framework one uses to 
describe the prison, the ultimate dilemma is the same: The size and extent 
of the nation’s carceral infrastructure has grown dramatically at the same 
time policymakers have delegitimized policies and institutions that were 
designed to protect the health and welfare of the disadvantaged people who 
fill prisons and jails.  As a result, a common mindset in contemporary 
correctional systems is to shift as many costs of basic subsistence as 
possible onto incarcerated people. 
Prison retailing also changes the ways in which the state relates to 
incarcerated people.  While American prisons historically strove to isolate 
people from the outside world and harness their labor for the benefit of the 
institution, by the late twentieth century incarcerated populations no longer 
represented a potentially valuable source of labor, but rather were surplus 
labor to be housed at the state’s expense.12  Seen through this lens, prison 
retailing is properly understood as a mechanism by which a state liability 
(i.e., the subsistence needs of incarcerated people) becomes a potential 
source of revenue for both public agencies and private firms.13  Despite the 
rhetorical support for free markets that is professed by many supporters of 
mass incarceration (particularly on the political right), prison retailing is 
anything but a functioning competitive market.  The industry is comprised 
for the most part of monopoly providers who share financial interests with 
the same agencies that award the monopoly contracts in the first place.14 
No discussion of prison retailing would be complete without 
acknowledgment of the growing movement of incarcerated people and their 
families that has organized to bring public attention to the injustices of the 
industry and seek legislative and judicial relief.  While organizations and 
individuals throughout the country have taken on this important work at 
varying levels of impact, special attention is due to Martha Wright and the 
other co-plaintiffs in the landmark class action Wright v. Corrections 
 
attendant devolution . . . of obligations to more local/state levels, or to non-state agencies.”). 
11.  BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS 41 (2011) (“The punitive 
society we now live in has been made possible by . . . [the] belief that there is a categorical 
difference between the free market, where intervention is inappropriate, and the penal 
sphere, where it is necessary and legitimate.”). 
12.  See Gilmore, supra note 10 at 70-78. 
13.  See Lisa Guenther, Prison Beds and Compensated Man-Days: The Spatio-
Temporal Order of Carceral Neoliberalism, SOCIAL JUSTICE, Issue 148, Spring 2017, at 31, 
42 (The logic of neoliberal penality “does not primarily exploit the labor power of the 
prisoner, nor does it seek to discipline the subject or redeem their soul; rather, it targets 
criminalized populations for their potential to be warehoused.”). 
14. Harcourt, supra note 11 at 185; In many ways, this seeming paradox is neither 
surprising nor unique, given that most American “free markets” are in actuality highly 
structured spaces that are governed by “intricate rules . . . all of which distribute wealth.” 
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Corporation of America.15  This lawsuit, filed in federal court in 2000, 
challenged the rates charged for phone calls from certain privately operated 
prisons.  The plaintiffs consisted both of incarcerated customers and an 
array of family members.  The choice of Martha Wright as lead plaintiff is 
notable in part because her situation was representative of the challenges 
facing countless families: her grandson was incarcerated in a distant prison, 
Wright could effectively communicate only by phone (glaucoma made 
reading letters difficult), and as a retired nurse she struggled to pay for phone 
calls that could cost $25 to $60 each.16  The litigation spanned decades, 
ultimately resulting in a judicial referral to the Federal Communications 
Commission (“FCC”), which in turn took over ten years to issue rules 
capping prison and jail phone rates.17  The experience of the Wright 
petitioners serves as both a model and a cautionary tale.  The broad coalition 
of individuals and organizations that coalesced around the Wright petitioners 
provides a model that can be emulated by others.  But the results are also 
cautionary: the Wright petitioners achieved a substantial victory in front of 
the FCC, only to have the most impactful parts reversed by a change in 
Commission members and a divided appellate court.  Meanwhile, in the years 
that the Wright coalition battled telecommunications carriers, multiple other 
types of businesses arose to exploit incarcerated consumers in new ways. 
This article seeks to provide a broad-based overview of the legal issues 
related to selling goods and services in prisons and jails.  It begins with an 
exploration of the types of goods and services sold in prisons, and the 
companies that dominate the market.  I then discuss specific unfair 
 
15.  Complaint, Wright v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. 00-cv-293-GK (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2000), 
ECF No. 1. 
16.  Colin Lecher, Criminal Charges, THE VERGE (May 11, 2016), https://www.the 
verge.com/a/prison-phone-call-cost-martha-wright-v-corrections-corporation-america.  While 
Wright and her co-plaintiffs were demographically representative of families throughout the 
country, they were unique in other respects: the non-incarcerated plaintiffs were residents of 
the District of Columbia whose relationships with incarcerated loved ones were thrown into 
turmoil in 1997 when Congress closed the D.C. prison system and scattered its residents 
throughout the federal prison system.  The National Capital Revitalization and Self-
Government Improvement Act of 1997 not only transferred responsibility for the D.C. prison 
system to the federal Bureau of Prisons, but also required at least half of the D.C. prison 
population to be placed in privately-operated facilities; Stephen Raher, The Business of 
Punishing: Impediments to Accountability in the Private Corrections Industry, 13 RICHMOND 
J.L. & PUB. INT. 209, 218, n.81 (2010).  The privatization requirement was subsequently 
relaxed and only a few hundred people from the D.C. system were actually held in private 
facilities as of 2010; see Nat’l Capital Revitalization & Self-Gov’t Improvement Act Status 
Report (June 15, 2010) (on file with author). 
17.  For a timeline of the Wright litigation and resulting rulemaking, see Peter Wagner 
& Alexi Jones, “Timeline: The 18-year battle for prison phone justice,” PRISON POL’Y 
INITIATIVE BLOG (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2018/12/17/phone_ 
justice_timeline/.  
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practices, followed by an analysis of existing laws that may provide relief to 
consumers.  The article concludes with policy recommendations for 
addressing and ending the unfair business practices that are prevalent today.  
Readers should bear in mind that prison retailing is a close cousin to other 
financial aspects of neoliberal penality that are beyond the scope of this 
article, such as the proliferation of fees and fines associated with judicial 
proceedings, bail, probation, or supervised release;18 charging incarcerated 
people for medical care;19 or, making people pay for the basic costs of their 
own incarceration (so-called “pay to stay” laws).20 
II. Surveying the Landscape of Prison Retailing 
The prison retail industry has grown in an unplanned, idiosyncratic 
manner.  What started as a niche industry occupied by numerous narrowly-
focused companies is now dominated by a handful of conglomerates owned 
by private equity firms.  To better understand the players and products in 
this economic sector, it is helpful to analyze the four essential components 
that define any prison retail transaction: the end user, the payer, the facility, 
and the vendor. 
A. End Users 
Either incarcerated people or their friends and family can be end users, 
depending on the product or service being sold.  Goods sold through a 
commissary are exclusively sold for use by people inside correctional 
facilities; whereas telecommunications services are sold for the benefit of 
the two parties communicating.  Financial products can be targeted solely at 
an incarcerated person (release cards), or can be used to facilitate a two-
party transaction (money transfers). 
The “customer base” of end users is notable for several prominent 
demographic trends.  People in prisons and jails are disproportionately 
likely to have low pre-incarceration incomes,21 low rates of formal 
 
18.  Neil L. Sobol, Fighting Fines & Fees: Borrowing from Consumer Law to Combat 
Criminal Justice Debt Abuses, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 841 (2017). 
19.  Wendy Sawyer, The steep cost of medical co-pays in prison puts health at risk, 
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE BLOG (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/ 
04/19/copays/. 
20.  Lauren-Brooke Eisen, Charging Inmates Perpetuates Mass Incarceration, 
BRENNAN CENT. FOR JUST. (May 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/ 
charging-inmates-perpetuates-mass-incarceration. 
21.  Bernadette Rabuy & Daniel Kopf, Prisons of Poverty: Uncovering the Pre-
Incarceration Incomes of the Imprisoned, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (July 2015), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/income.html (finding median incomes of incarcerated 
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education,22 high rates of unemployment,23 and high prevalence of mental 
illness.24  One might expect policymakers to be receptive to the idea of 
enhanced protections for a group of consumers with such pronounced 
disadvantages; however, this is not the case when it comes to incarcerated 
people.  Although families and friends of the incarcerated have made 
substantial progress in the last two decades, policy debates on the rights of 
the incarcerated are still dominated by stereotypes and prejudices that stack 
the deck against the establishment of new rights and safeguards.  For 
example, introduction of computer-tablet programs in prison should raise 
questions about unfair pricing of digital products, but some legislators 
inevitably express “disgust” that people are “receiving gifts that will make 
their time served easier.”25 
In some ways, the political mischaracterization of prison retailing 
resembles a new manifestation of the zero-sum fallacy described by 
criminologist Frank Zimring: a belief that “[a]nything that hurts offenders 
by definition helps victims.”26  Not only is the zero-sum construct logically 
faulty, but it in the case of prison retailing, it is factually ill-conceived, 
since it is the family members of incarcerated people who often bear the 
financial punishment of paying for phone calls or commissary items, even 
though families have not been sentenced to any term of punishment. 
B. Payers 
Much of the money spent at prison retailers comes from families and 
friends of the incarcerated, either directly or indirectly.  People typically 
 
men and women to be 52% and 42% (respectively) lower than those of non-incarcerated 
people). 
22.  BECKY PETTIT, INVISIBLE MEN: MASS INCARCERATION AND THE MYTH OF BLACK 
PROGRESS 15-16 (2012) (finding that 52.7% and 61.8% of white and black males, 
respectively, in prisons and jails did not complete high school). 
23.  See Lucius Couloute & Daniel Kopf, Out of Prison & Out of Work: Unemployment 
among Formerly Incarcerated People, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (July 2018), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/outofwork.html (although data is lacking on pre-
incarceration unemployment rates, people released from custody are five times more likely 
to be unemployed than the general U.S. population). 
24.  U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INDICATORS OF MENTAL 
HEALTH PROBLEMS REPORTED BY PRISONERS AND JAIL INMATES, 2011-12, (June 2017),  
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/imhprpji1112.pdf (finding prevalence of serious 
psychological distress among incarcerated people at rates of five times that of the non-
incarcerated population). 
25.  Company Giving Tablets to NY Prisoners Expects to Get $9M from Inmates over 5 
years, NYUP.COM (Feb. 15, 2018), http://s.newyorkupstate.com/oIgNXak (quoting New 
York Assemblyman Clifford W. Crouch (R-Bainbridge)). 
26.  Frank Zimring, The New Politics of Criminal Justice: Of Three Strikes, Truth-in-
Sentencing, and Megan’s Laws, 4 PERSP. ON CRIME AND JUST. 1 (2001). 
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enter prison with little or no money and earn shockingly low wages while 
incarcerated, to the extent they are employed at all.27  Historically, this 
meant limited opportunities to purchase goods or services inside 
correctional facilities, due to the lack of a viable customer base.  But the 
rising prevalence and falling price of electronic payments have made it 
increasingly feasible to collect payments (even in small amounts) from non-
incarcerated payers.  Throughout this article, I use the phrase “family” or 
“family member” as shorthand for a non-incarcerated payer.  Such payers 
can also be friends, attorneys, or anyone who wants to communicate with 
an incarcerated correspondent, although most commonly the payer is a 
spouse, parent, sibling, or child of an incarcerated loved one. 
Direct payments can take several forms.  In the case of 
telecommunications, the family member can be a party to the transaction 
being purchased—for example, as the recipient of a collect call.  Families 
can also purchase some tangible goods through prison commissaries, 
although these purchases are sometimes limited to bundled “care 
packages.”28  Alternatively, family can pay for specific services by sending 
an advance payment that is held by the vendor. 
Indirect purchasing entails a family member transferring money to an 
incarcerated recipient who then uses the funds to make subsequent 
purchases.  The funds are held by the correctional facility in a pooled 
deposit account, typically referred to as an “inmate trust account.”29  Once 
the money is in the trust account, the recipient can usually use it for any 
purpose not prohibited by prison regulations.  Assuming that the transferor 
trusts the recipient to manage his or her own funds, transfers to trust 
accounts have the benefit of versatility—the money in a trust account can 
be used for a variety of purposes, and is not restricted to one specific 
service or vendor, in contrast to customer prepayments where money is 
locked into a specific vendor and/or service, and is usually nonrefundable 
and subject to arbitrary expiration provisions. 
The benefit of trust-fund versatility is offset in many jurisdictions by 
mandatory deductions from trust accounts to cover fines, victim restitution, or 
costs of confinement.30  These deductions can have the effect of steering payers 
 
27.  Wendy Sawyer, How much do incarcerated people earn in each state? PRISON 
POLICY INITIATIVE BLOG (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/04/10/ 
wages/ (national survey finding hourly wages of 14¢ to $1.41 for incarcerated workers). 
28.  Taylor Elizabeth Eldridge, The Big Business of Prisoner Care Packages: Inside the 
Booming Market for Food in Pouches, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 2018, at 28-30 (profiling 
major sellers of prison care packages). 
29.  Raher, infra note 69.  
30.  See, e.g., 3 Michael B. Mushlin, Rights of Prisoners § 16:20 (5th ed. rev. 2018) 
(discussing attachment of financial assets held by incarcerated people); Deductions from 
Pennsylvania prisoner’s trust account require notice, PRISON POL’Y NEWS v.29, n.11 (Nov. 
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to economically inefficient transactions, such as prepaid phone accounts or care 
packages, in an effort to avoid loss of funds through mandatory deductions. 
C. Facilities 
Correctional facilities play two significant roles in prison retailing.  
First, and most obviously, the facility selects the vendors who sell goods 
and services, usually under a long-term contract that grants the vendor the 
exclusive right to sell certain items in the facility.  Second, the facility may 
receive compensation under the contract, thus making correctional agencies 
financially interested in prison-retail revenues. 
Any discussion of facilities must begin with an important distinction 
that is often overlooked in the popular press: prisons and jails are 
remarkably different in both their operations and demographics.  Prison 
systems are limited in number (fifty state departments of corrections, plus 
the federal Bureau of Prisons) and are typically large enough to command 
certain economies of scale and employ experienced procurement staff.31  In 
contrast, the nation’s jails consist of a sprawling patchwork of facilities run 
by approximately 2,850 different jurisdictions.32  Many jails are small with 
limited resources—over one-third of people in jail are held in facilities with 
total populations of less than five hundred.33  In addition, the majority of 
people in jails (76%) have not been convicted of a crime.34 
The size of a correctional system is usually reported in terms of daily 
population—a snapshot of population on a given day.  This metric disguises 
population turnover, most notably the significant amount of “jail churn.”  
State prison systems hold approximately 1.3 million people on any given 
day, compared to 612,000 people held in local jails;35 however, six to nine 
million individuals are sent to jail every year, compared to roughly 600,000 
 
2018) (discussing Pennsylvania law); Or. Rev. Stat. § 423.105 (mandatory deductions of 10-
15% from all trust account deposits); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-18.5-106 (mandatory deductions 
of at least 20% from all trust account deposits). 
31.  U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2014, (Sept. 
2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p14.pdf (the smallest state prison system (North 
Dakota) housed approximately 1,700 people in 2014, but two-thirds of the states ran prison 
systems with populations over 10,000).   
32.  U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, JAIL INMATES IN 2016, (Feb. 
2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji16.pdf. 
33.  Id. 
34.  Sawyer & Wagner, supra note 2.  The 76% figure is calculated based on the 
number of people confined in jails on behalf of local jurisdictions (approximately 731,000), 
but excluding the roughly 120,000 people held in jails on behalf of federal agencies.  If one 
were to include the latter category, then the percentage of non-convicted people in jails 
would drop to 63%. 
35.  Id. 
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prison admissions.36  In the eyes of a prison-retail firm, the numerous 
people entering or leaving jails, and the family members with whom they 
communicate, add up to a broad and lucrative pool of captive customers. 
Many facilities have a financial interest in prison retailing because they 
receive consideration from vendors.  Such consideration can come in the 
form of a “site commission” (a predetermined percentage of sales revenue) 
or other types of monetary or in-kind payments.  Defenders of the prison-
retail sector often attempt to justify vendors’ monopolist privileges by 
arguing that prices are subject to market competition when facilities solicit 
and evaluate bids.37  Although this theory is becoming increasingly dubious 
in light of industry consolidation, it was never on strong ground to begin 
with, because a facility’s interest in increasing its commission revenue 
operates to drive end-user prices higher. 
After conducting an extensive economic review of the inmate calling 
service (“ICS”) industry as part of the Wright rulemaking, the FCC found 
that competition in the procurement process did not result in competitive or 
fair rates for end users.38  Shortly before the Commission revived its 
previously moribund ICS rulemaking in 2012, a nationwide survey of 
prison phone contracts found commission rates of up to 60%, with an 
average nationwide rate of 42%.39  Based on a review of confidential carrier 
financial data, the FCC determined that governments collected site-
commission revenue of over $460 million in 2013.40  In 2015, after years of 
study, the FCC sought to rein in commissions by declaring that such 
payments to facilities were not recoverable costs for purposes of ICS rate 
setting.41  Although this regulation was eventually invalidated by an 
 
36.  Id. at n.2 and accompanying text (discussing jail churn); U.S. Dept. of Justice, 
supra note 31, tbl. 8. 
37.  See Reply Comments of Stephen A. Raher at 5, n.21, In the Matter of Rates for 
Interstate Inmate Calling Services (2013), (No. 12-375), available at https://www.fcc. 
gov/ecfs/filing/6017320127 (GTL, Securus, and CenturyLink presented this argument in the 
FCC’s 2013 rulemaking).  
38.  Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking [hereinafter “First 
Report & Order”] at 14128-29, In the Matter of Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, 
¶ 40, 28 FCC Rcd. (2013) (No. 12-375) (“While the process of awarding contracts to provide 
ICS may include competitive bidding, such competition in many instances benefits 
correctional facilities, not necessarily ICS consumers—inmates and their family and friends 
who pay the ICS rates, who are not parties to the agreements, and whose interest in just and 
reasonable rates is not necessarily represented in bidding or negotiation.”). 
39.  John E. Dannenberg, Nationwide PLN Survey Examines Prison Phone Contracts, 
Kickbacks, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, Apr. 2011, at 1-3. 
40.  Second Report and Order and Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
[hereinafter “Second Report & Order”] at 12821, In the Matter of Rates for Interstate Inmate 
Calling Services, ¶ 122, 30 FCC Rcd. (2015) (No. 12-375). 
41.  Id. at 12819 (“After carefully considering the evidence in the record, we affirm our 
previous finding that site commissions do not constitute a legitimate cost to the providers of 
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appellate court, in the interim, the industry quickly discovered new ways of 
providing valuable consideration to facilities without invoking the formal 
label of a site commission.42  One trend in new compensation structures is 
for a vendor to avoid commissions expressed as a percentage of sales, and 
instead negotiate a fixed lump-sum or recurring payment to the facility 
based on anticipated revenue.43  Securus’s 2016 financial statements 
indicate that the company was obligated to make over $84 million in such 
guaranteed payments to facilities over the following five years.44 
As facilities explore new ways to profit from prison retailing, the 
number and type of potential conflicts-of-interest has dramatically 
increased.  For example, when facilities receive commissions from an 
electronic messaging system,45 they may boost commission revenue by 
either banning postal mail46 or implementing policies that make mail 
cumbersome and impractical.47  Or if a facility receives a commission from 
 
providing ICS.”). 
42. Peter Wagner & Alexi Jones, On kickbacks and commissions in the prison and jail 
phone market, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE BLOG (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.prison 
policy.org/blog/2019/02/11/kickbacks-and-commissions/ (sub rosa commissions can be 
labeled as a signing bonus, administrative fee, in-kind services rendered to the facility for no 
cost, equipment rent, or contributions to electoral campaigns or professional associations). 
43.  See Pearson v. Hodgson, 2018 WL 6697682, No. 18-cv-11130-IT, (D. Mass. Dec. 
20, 2018) (2011 contract between Securus and county jail provided 47% site commission, 
but was amended in 2015 to replace commission with a flat $820,000 payment to county in 
exchange for a four-year extension of the contract). 
44.  Securus Technologies Holdings, Inc. and Subsidiaries, “Consolidated Financial 
Report: December 31, 2016” at 26 (RSM US, LLP, independent auditor) (Feb. 28, 2017) (on 
file with author). 
45.  Stephen Raher, You’ve Got Mail: The Promise of Cyber Communication in Prisons 
and the Need for Regulation, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, at 11-12 (Jan. 2016), https://www. 
prisonpolicy.org/messaging/report.html (discussing common commission structures). 
46.  See PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, Protecting Letters from Home, https://www.prison 
policy.org/postcards/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2019) (Jails in at least thirteen states have banned 
all incoming mail except for postcards). 
47.  Some facilities have striven to make mail slower and less personal by requiring all 
incoming mail to be scanned and either reprinted or distributed electronically through 
tablets), often citing dubious security concerns.  See, e.g., Samantha Melamed, ‘I Feel 
Hopeless’: Families Call New Pa. Prison Mail Policy Devastating, PITTSBURG POST-
GAZETTE (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.post-gazette.com/news/politics-state/2018/10/17/sci-
pennsylvania-prison-mail-policy-families-devastating/stories/201810170130 (new policy of 
scanning and reprinting incoming mail, based on allegations of drug smuggling, results in 
“missing pages, misdirected letters, weekslong delays, and copies so poor as to be 
illegible”); Katie Meyer, Pennsylvania Prison Officials Change Mail Handling after Drug-
Related Illnesses, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/ 
05/644973472/pennsylvania-prison-officials-ban-inmate-mail-in-response-to-drug-related-
illnes (discussing questionable evidence of drug-smuggling through the mail); Charlotte 
County Jail Introduces Inmates to New Communication Tablets, WINK (Dec. 4, 2017), 
https://www.winknews.com/2017/12/04/charlotte-county-jail-introduces-inmates-new-comm 
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a tablet-based e-book program, it might prohibit books from being sent to 
incarcerated people through the mail.48  Such conflicts will only become 
more pronounced as the prevalence of prison retailing grows. 
D. Vendors 
The final component of any prison retail transaction is the company that 
sells goods or services, and reaps the profits therefrom.  Historically, these 
firms were niche companies that focused on a particular product, such as 
telephone service.  These legacy companies have largely been absorbed by 
and consolidated into conglomerates that sell a variety of products pursuant to 
bundled contracts with facilities. Most of these new conglomerates (see Table 
1) are owned by private equity firms.49  This ownership structure is not 
surprising given that prison-retail firms tend to have attributes that are highly 
prized in the private-equity world.  Specifically, prison retailers enjoy high 
barriers to entry (long-term exclusive contracts with facilities, high capital 
requirements in the form of network build-outs, and increasing use of 
patents), dependable revenue streams (incarcerated customers and their 
families will prioritize paying for essential items like phone calls or basic 
hygiene items), and the potential for substantial revenue growth (as facilities 
become more receptive to allowing new fee-based services, like tablets).  The 
following sections describe the basic contours of four major subsectors of 
prison retailing: telecommunications, commissary sales, financial services, 




unication-tablets/ (incoming mail to be scanned and distributed electronically on tablets). 
48.  Samantha Melamed, One Review of Pa. Prisons’ Pricey Ebooks: “Books That Are 
Available For Free, That Nobody Wants Anyway,” PHILA. INQUIRER (Sept. 21, 2018), 
http://www.philly.com/philly/news/pennsylvania-department-corrections-books-through-
bars-philly-new-jim-crow-malcolm-x-20180921.html?__vfz=medium%3Dsharebar.  The 
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections receives a 30.5% commission on all e-book sales.  
Contract Between Commw. of Penn. Dept. of Corr. and Global Tel*Link, Contract No. 
AGR-346 [hereinafter “Pennsylvania-GTL Contract”], appx. D (Cost Matrix, revised Dec. 
14, 2012) (on file with author). 
49.  There are a few publicly available data points that paint a rough picture of 
Securus’s value.  When Platinum Equity purchased Securus in 2017, it told regulators that it 
had arranged a loan of “up to an aggregate principal amount of $2.6 billion” to fund the 
transaction.  See Letter to Connecticut Public Utilities Regulatory Authority from Raechel K. 
Kummer (counsel for Abry) and Catrina C. Kohn (counsel for Platinum Equity), Dkt. No. 
00-12-20 (Jun. 15, 2017) (on file with author) (one of several identical disclosures filed with 
state public utility commissions concerning the Securus acquisition).  In 2019, a Securus 
executive testified that during that transaction, “the valuation of [Securus] . . . was north of a 
billion dollars, but I don’t know by how much.”  Transcript of Motions Hearing, at 1469:3-6, 
U.S. v. Carter, No. 16-20032-JAR (D. Kan. Oct. 9, 2018), ECF 673. 
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Table 1. Dominant Prison Retail Firms 









American Securities (purchased 
GTL in 2011, from Veritas & 
Goldman Sachs Direct, which 






JPay (correctional banking) 
Satellite Tracking of People 
(non-prison electronic 
monitoring) 
Cara Clinicals (electronic 
health records) 
Platinum Equity (purchased 
Securus in 2017 from Abry 
Partners, which acquired the 













Commissary Unknown Unknown 
1. Telecommunications 
Any discussion of prison retailing must begin with telecommunications, 
given the comparatively long history of the ICS industry.  Since the mid-
twentieth century ascendance of the public switched telephone network, 
incarcerated people have typically had three options for communication: 
letters, in-person visitation, and telephone calls.50  These different channels 
have historically been insulated from naked rent-seeking.  Postal rates are 
set to cover the broad costs of the postal network with its universal service 
mandate.51  In-person visiting often entails outlays of time and money on 
the part of the visitor, but does not produce significant revenue for facilities 
or private sector firms.  Finally, telephone rates were, until comparatively 
recently, set by state and federal agencies who oversaw the highly regulated 
industry dominated by the Bell System and smaller independent operators.52  
Phone pricing changed gradually but dramatically following the break-up of 
the Bell System and the subsequent passage of the Telecommunications Act 
 
50.  Stephen Raher, Phoning Home: Prison Telecommunications in a Deregulatory 
Age, in 2 PRISON PRIVATIZATION: THE MANY FACETS OF A CONTROVERSIAL INDUSTRY 215, 
219-220 (Byron E. Price & John C. Morris, eds., 2012). 
51. Richard B. Kielbowicz, Preserving Universal Postal Service As A Communication 
Safety Net: A Policy History and Proposal, 30 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 383, 400-411 (2006). 
52.  Raher, Supra note 50, at 217-218. 
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of 1996, which led to a proliferation of new companies in the ICS space, 
attracted by the prospects of high call volumes and unchecked rates.53 
The contemporary ICS industry is dominated by two non-facilities-
based telecommunications carriers that use VoIP-based platforms operating 
on lines leased from local exchange carriers.  These companies—Securus 
and GTL—have collectively absorbed dozens of competitors since the 
1990s.54  The FCC determined that Securus, GTL, and a third company, 
Telmate, controlled 85% of the ICS telephone market (measured by 
revenue) in 2013.55  In 2017, GTL acquired Telmate.56 
Securus and GTL are aggressively pursuing new revenue sources, both 
in terms of emerging telecommunications technology and non-telecom 
businesses.  As for the former category, so-called “video visitation” and 
electronic messaging are the latest newcomers.  Video visitation allows 
incarcerated customers to communicate in real-time video with callers in 
the free world.  Although this technology holds great promise, in that it 
allows for audio-visual communication across great distances, these 
benefits have been overshadowed by high rates and the efforts of some 
providers to couple video visitation with prohibitions on in-person 
visiting.57  Electronic messaging allows for the exchange of written 
messages (sometimes two-ways, other times only on an incoming basis) and 
sometimes photographs—a service somewhat like email, but without many 
of the technical features that free-world users have come to take for granted.  
Like video visitation, electronic messaging is potentially beneficial 
technology, but is known for high prices and unfair terms (such as stingy 
character limits on messages).58 
2. Commissary 
Commissaries generally make money by acting as the only authorized 
vendor of items that are necessary for a minimally comfortable existence, but 
which are not provided by prison facilities.  Commissary inventories are typically 
comprised of food (to supplement meager cafeteria meals), healthcare items, 
 
53.  Id. at 218. 
54.  Peter Wagner & Alexi Jones, State of Phone Justice, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE 
(Feb. 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/phones/state_of_phone_justice.html (text and 
graphic accompanying notes 20 and 21). 
55.  Second Report & Order, supra note 40 at ¶ 76. 
56.  Peter Wagner, Prison Phone Giant GTL Gets Bigger, Again, PRISON POL’Y 
INITIATIVE BLOG (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/08/28/merger/. 
57.  Bernadette Rabuy & Peter Wagner, Screening Out Family Time: The For-Profit 
Video Visitation Industry in Prisons and Jails, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (Jan. 2015), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/visitation/report.html. 
58.  Raher, supra note 45. 
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hygiene products, letter-writing supplies, religious items, and basic staples of 
everyday life like eating utensils, extension cords, and cleaning supplies. 
The size of the prison commissary industry is difficult to estimate, but 
likely exceeds $1.6 billion in annual revenue.59  Average purchases per 
customer vary widely across correctional facilities (due to different 
regulations concerning allowable property and fluctuations in prices), but 
are often $600 to $900 annually.60  While there are likely more commissary 
operators in the field than telecommunications firms, there has still been a 
wave of consolidation,61 with two companies dominating the commissary 
market—Union Supply Group, Inc.62 and private-equity owned Keefe 
Group.  Unlike the ICS subsector, there seem to be a greater number of 
small fringe competitors in the commissary space, perhaps because of lower 
capital requirements. 
3. Money Transmitters, Correctional Banking, and Release Cards 
As previously discussed, incarcerated people rely largely on family 
members for the funds necessary to purchase goods and services inside.  
This structure has led to the proliferation of companies that profit from 
facilitating such transfers.  Money transfers come in two varieties: transfers 
to inmate trust accounts, and direct payments for goods or services. 
Inmate trust account is a term of art (specific terminology varies by 
jurisdiction) describing a deposit account held by a governmental entity for the 
benefit of an incarcerated person.63  Historically, inmate trust accounting has 
 
59.  Stephen Raher, The Company Store: A Deeper Look at Prison Commissaries, n.3, 
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (May 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/commis 
sary.html. 
60.  Id. 
61.  Stephen Raher, Paging Anti-trust Lawyers: Prison Commissary Giants Prepare to 
Merge, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE BLOG (July 5, 2016), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/ 
2016/07/05/commissary-merger/. 
62.  According to Union Supply Group’s website (https://www.unionsupply.com/), the 
company was founded in 1991.  The company thus appears to be unrelated to the similarly 
named Union Supply Company, which was (ironically), a large company-store operator that 
lasted well into the twentieth century, operating over 100 stores in the coal and coke 
industries in the eastern U.S.  John A. Enman, Coal Company Store Prices Questioned: A 
Case Study of the Union Supply Company, 1905-1906, 41 PENN. HIST: A JOURNAL OF MID-
ATLANTIC STUDIES 52, 53-54 (1974). 
63.  See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 5008 (Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation 
Secretary “shall deposit any funds of inmates in his or her possession in trust with the 
Treasurer”); Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 501.014 (“The department shall take possession of all 
money that an inmate has on the inmate’s person or that is received with the inmate when the 
inmate arrives at a facility to be admitted to the custody of the department and all money the 
inmate receives at the department during confinement and shall credit the money to an 
account created for the inmate.”); see also N.Y. Correct. Law § 187(3) (statute establishes 
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been a mundane subspecialty of government fiscal administration: agencies 
collected funds in the possession of people who come into custody, received 
deposits (i.e., wages earned during incarceration or money orders sent by 
families), issued checks or money orders for miscellaneous purchases, and 
ensured that account balances were disbursed to the accountholder upon his or 
her release from custody.  Now, many agencies wish to outsource the 
management of such accounts, often bundling the straightforward tasks of trust 
fund accounting with other “correctional banking” services. 
Traditionally, a family member would deposit funds to an trust account 
by sending a money order to the facility.  While this funding method 
requires time for mailing, it has the benefit of allowing transferors to choose 
among a variety of money-order issuers operating in a competitive market.64  
Contractors that hold correctional banking contracts tend to steer transferors 
away from low-cost money orders, in favor of an array of electronic or in-
person payments, all of which carry high fees.65 
As prison retailing opportunities grow, controlling access to the trust 
account begins to look more like an essential facility.  Incarcerated people 
are increasingly expected to spend money on various goods and services.  
But to engage in such transactions incarcerated customers often rely on 
family members to transfer money into their trust account.  Placing 
exclusive access to trust account deposits in the hands of one firm 
resembles a bottleneck monopoly,66 hurting both family members and 
prison retailers who are not affiliated with the bottleneck provider. 
The other common type of money transfer is a payment directly to a 
vendor.  These payments may be contemporaneous payments for goods or 
 
trust accounting system, but only for wages earned). 
64.  See U.S. POSTAL SERV., OFC. OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, No. RARC-WP-16-007, 
MODERNIZING THE POSTAL MONEY ORDER,8-10 (2016) (summarizing the market of money-
order issuers). 
65.  Oddly, automated clearing house (“ACH”) transfer is the one common payment 
channel that is hardly ever an option for trust-fund transfers.  Given the strong security and 
low costs associated with ACH transfers, the lack of an ACH option is surprising, although it 
could be the result of vendors’ desire to avoid security-related investments that are required 
of online ACH originators.  See Nat’l Automated Clearinghouse Ass’n, Operating Rule § 
2.5.17.4 (2018) (additional warranties required for online ACH origination).  While vendors 
that accept payment cards are likely expected, directly or indirectly, to comply with the 
Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards, these rules are largely focused on 
protecting confidential payment information in possession of a merchant, or during 
transmission; see generally, “PCI Security Standards Council, Requirements and Security 
Assessment Procedures,” ver. 3.2.1 (May 2018), https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/ 
documents/PCI_DSS_v3-2-1.pdf.  In contrast, ACH security requirements are more focused 
on identity verification and fraud detection. 
66.  See generally James McAndrews, Antitrust Issues in Payment Systems: 
Bottlenecks, Access, and Essential Facilities, FED. RESERVE BAN OF PHILADELPHIA: BUSINESS 
REVIEW 3 (Sept. 1995). 
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services; but, companies are increasingly encouraging customers to prepay, 
often subject to confusing and abusive terms of service.  While prepayments 
are most common in the telecommunications subsector, commissary 
companies have also begun experimenting with prepayment options, possibly 
as a way to boost frequent small-dollar purchases of digital content.  
Although Keefe Group prominently states that its prepaid option is not the 
same as a trust-account deposit, Access Corrections does not,67 leaving the 
possibility that some customers may use Access’s prepayment option under 
the mistaken assumption that they are sending money to a trust account. 
The final financial transaction associated with a term of incarceration 
comes when a facility owes money to a person upon his or her release.  
Typically this money consists of the final balance of an inmate trust 
account, although in the case of jails, it could simply be a refund of money 
that the releasee had in their possession at the time of arrest.  The “release 
card” is a specialized payment product that has arisen to facilitate this type 
of disbursement.  Release cards are open loop prepaid debit cards (typically 
branded as a MasterCard) which facilities use to make required payments to 
people upon their release.  While there is nothing per se impermissible 
about making such payments via prepaid debit card, problems arise when 
facilities are unwilling to cover the costs of such a system.  Under most 
release-card contracts, the correctional agency pays nothing and the card 
issuer makes money by charging cardholders a panoply of exorbitant fees.68  
Making matters worse, most facilities that utilize release cards do not give 
people an option to receive release payments via a different method. 
Correctional banking is big business.  A rough extrapolation based on a 
small dataset (from four states) suggests that the principal amount of fund 
transfers to people in state prison systems could be around $1 billion a 
year.69  Another indicator of the profits that can be extracted from 
correctional banking comes from Securus’s 2015 acquisition of JPay.  
There is no public evidence of how much Securus paid, but a later 
transaction provides a clue.  When private equity firm Platinum Equity 
acquired Securus in 2017, Securus disclosed its outstanding liability on an 
earnout provision related to its purchase of JPay.  Specifically, the 
disclosure suggests that by 2017, Securus would likely owe JPay’s founder 
 
67.  See Union Supply Group Prepayment Ad, CALIFORNIAINMATEPACKAGE.COM, 
http://www.californiainmatepackage.com (last visited Oct. 19, 2019). 
68.  Stephen Raher, Proposed Amendments To Regulation E: Curb Exploitation Of 
People Released From Custody, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 18, 2015), https://static. 
prisonpolicy.org/releasecards/CFPB-comment.pdf.  
69. Stephen Raher, The multi-million dollar market of sending money to an 
incarcerated loved one, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE BLOG (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www. 
prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/01/18/money-transfer/. 
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and other original owners about $20 million under the earnout clause (of 
course, this is on top of whatever money the founders received in 2015 
when the sale actually closed).70 
4. Tablets: The New Frontier 
The newest products to gain traction in the prison retail market are 
specialized computer tablets that provide communications, education, and 
entertainment functions, typically operating on a closed wireless network, but 
never with internet connectivity.71  Reviewers have found these tablets to be the 
technological equivalent of already-obsolete early-model handheld devices.72  
But tablets promise to help correctional staff by managing populations that 
suffer from chronic boredom.73  At the same time, the devices help prison 
retailers dramatically expand revenue opportunities.  Some tablet programs, 
particularly in prison systems, provide tablets to users for free, but most 
features and content can only be accessed for a fee.74  Such fees tend to greatly 
exceed free-world prices, and there is no obvious cost-based reason for such 
pricing.  In facilities where tablets are not provided for “free,” customers must 
either purchase a tablet (prices can range from $40 to $160) or pay a rental fee 
that can range anywhere from $5 to $150 per month.75 
 
70.  Stock Purchase Agreement between Securus Investment Holdings, LLC, Connect 
Acquisition Corp., and SCRS Acquisition Corp. § 6.3 (Apr. 29, 2017) (on file with author). 
71.  As a general rule, incarcerated people are entirely unable to access the internet, 
either as a matter of agency policy or state law.  See generally, Titia A. Holtz, Reaching out 
from behind Bars: The Constitutionality of Laws Barring Prisoners from the Internet, 67 
BROOK. L.REV. 855, 859-866 (2001-02) (surveying laws prohibiting internet access in 
correctional facilities). 
72.  Jason Koebler, A Clear Plastic Tablet for Prisoners: The Motherboard Review, 
VICE (Dec. 15, 2014), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/pgav3m/a-clear-plastic-
tablet-for-prisoners-the-motherboard-review (“Technology in prisons is dismal, and the JP4 
[JPay tablet] looks and feels like a Game Boy Advance.  It’s clunky and it’s old and it’s not 
at all that intuitive to use.  But when your options are limited, I suppose you’ll take whatever 
you can get.”). 
73.  Inspire Tablet Program Facility Benefits, GLOBAL TEL LINK, http://www.gtl. 
net/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/GTL-Facility_Benifits.pdf. (Without citing any evidence, 
GTL claims that its tablets produce “[s]ignificant decreases in inmate-on-inmate assaults, 
inmate-on-officer assaults, and rule and behavior code violations.”)  
74. See generally, Wanda Bertram & Peter Wagner, How to spot the hidden costs in a 
‘no-cost’ tablet contract, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE BLOG (July 24, 2018), https://www. 
prisonpolicy.org/blog/2018/07/24/no-cost-contract/. 
75.  See infra text accompanying note 108, tablet pricing varies widely by facility and 
vendor.  Some examples are: GTL’s $147 price tag for tablets in the Pennsylvania prison system.  
See infra note 142, JPay’s tablet prices have been reported as ranging from $40 to $160.  See infra 
note 143, Union Supply Group sells a tablet for $159. As for rented tablets, Securus’s website lists 
eighteen county jails and one state prison system that allow month-to-month rentals, at prices 
ranging from $5 to $30 per month.  SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, INC,Order the SecureView Tablet 
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Prison tablet programs are nearly universal in their offering of video 
games.  No one has articulated the troublesome dynamic of encouraging 
video-game usage among incarcerated populations more persuasively than 
an unnamed resident of the Colorado Department of Corrections who told 
Denver’s Westword newspaper: 
The average prisoner will play games and music 8-10 hours a 
day, just like any kid in America.  Only they aren’t kids; they are 
men and women who need rehabilitation and education.  This buys 
a lot of safety for prison staff, but what a waste of time for the 
prisoners.  If they provided education, it would be marvelous. 
Prisoners might just learn something useful and not come back.76 
There is also something unsettling about promoting a product that could 
plausibly lead to addiction and dependency77 among a population with 
disproportionate rates of substance abuse.78 
Tablets do have potential to assist in educational programming, but 
only if adequate resources are invested in content and instruction.  
Technology by itself is not a solution.  Although tablet providers are eager 
to hype educational uses, evidence of actual effective, salient, and high-
quality content is lacking.  To the extent that facilities are providing 
educational technology without also investing in instructors and curriculum, 
the educational potential will never be realized because unsupported 
technology cannot effectively substitute for socially-mediated pedagogy. 
To illustrate the confusion about educational offerings, one need only 
visit JPay’s main webpage for family members, which includes a prominent 
banner ad touting the educational promise of its JP5 tablet.  Following the 
link, however, reveals that the tablet only provides access to an educational 
platform; content and instruction are apparently the responsibilities of 
others.79  Following yet another link brings the user to the webpage for 
JPay’s education program, which features stock images of graduation 
ceremonies, an emotionally manipulative video advertisement, vague 
 
for your loved one, https://www.securustablet. com/#/plans/start (last visited Dec. 2, 2018).  See 
infra text accompanying note 117, the jail in Knox County, Tennessee, rents tablets for $4.99 per 
day, which can result in a monthly rate of approximately $150. 
76.  Alan Prendergast, Colorado prisoners getting ‘free’ electronic tablets—with a 
catch, WESTWORD (Feb. 15, 2017), http://www.westword.com/news/colorado-prisoners-
getting-free-electronic-tablets-with-a-catch-8795689. 
77.  Management of Substance Abuse: Gaming Behaviour, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Sept. 
2018), http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/activities/gaming_disorders/en/. 
78.  U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 2017-2009, Drug Use, 
Dependence, and Abuse Among State Prisoners and Jail Inmates (Jun. 2017) (58% and 63% 
of residents of state prisons and jails, respectively, meet diagnostic criteria for drug 
dependence or abuse, compared to 5% of the general population). 
79.  Education, JPAY, INC., https://www.jpay.com/education.aspx (last visited Nov. 27, 
2018).  
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statements about innovation and “leading-edge technology,” but absolutely 
no discussion of how facilities have obtained content and instruction, which 
facilities use the platform, or whether anyone has documented outcomes.80 
The versatility of tablets is both their major selling point and a wellspring 
of potential conflicts of interest.  When a facility stands to financially profit 
from tablet usage, the opportunities for mischief are numerous: in-person visits 
can be prohibited in favor of video visitation;81 prison libraries or donated 
books can be cut off and replaced with e-books for purchase; postal mail can be 
restricted in order to increase electronic messaging usage;82 and educational 
programs can be curtailed to redirect students to online-only courses.83 
III. Unfair Industry Practices 
Prison retailing is not only built on a generally inequitable business 
premise, but current industry leaders also use specific practices that are 
unfair, deceptive, or abusive.  Some problems (such as price gouging) are a 
direct result of vendors’ unchecked monopoly powers, while other issues 
(such as oppressive contract terms) are similar to problems commonly 
confronted by consumers in other settings.  Prison retailers employ some 
practices that are potentially unlawful, while others are unseemly but legal.  
It can sometimes be difficult, however, to pin down company practices due 
to the pervasive lack of transparency that characterizes the entire 
correctional sector.84  Bureaucratic hostility to transparency can result in 
information asymmetry that causes some consumers to spend money 
without fully understanding the terms of the transaction.  Others who do 
 
80.  Id.  
81.  Matt Lakin, Point, Click, But No Touch: Debate Shapes up over Video Visitation at 
Knox Jail, (Nov. 24, 2018), KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL, https://www.knoxnews.com/stor 
y/news/crime/2018/11/25/jail-video-visitation-knox-county-face-face/2027042002/ (county 
jail received $79,000 over four years in commissions from video visitation after prohibiting 
in-person visits); Steve Horn & Iris Wagner, Washington State: Jail Phone Rates Increase as 
Video Replaces In-person Visits, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 2018), at 1. 
82.  PRISON POL’Y INITATIVE, supra notes 46 and 47. 
83.  Although the author did not find any documented cases of online fee-based courses 
replacing in-person instruction, as a general matter, total prison spending on education 
decreased on a nationwide basis by 6% between 2009 and 2012.  Lois M. Davis, et al., 
Correctional Education in the United States: How Effective Is it, and How Can We Move the 
Field Forward, RAND CORP. (2014), at 3. 
84.  John Gibbons & Nicholas Katzenbach (co-chairs), Confronting Confinement: A 
Report of the Commission on Safety & Abuse in America’s Prisons, Vera Institute of Justice 
(June 2006), at 102. (“The prevailing view of correctional facilities as shrouded and 
unknowable reflects the shortage of meaningful and reliable data about health and safety, 
violence and victimization; ignorance about what information is available; and the difficulty 
of accessing and interpreting much of the data that corrections departments collect but do not 
widely disseminate or explain.”). 
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understand the vendor’s terms are nonetheless unable to avoid them. 
Of the unfair practices that are publicly known, most are highly structured 
and clearly intentional, bespeaking corporate cultures dominated by greed.  
When plaintiffs challenging ICS rates and practices in Illinois referenced the 
greed of the industry, Circuit Judge Richard Posner dismissed the 
characterization by remarking that the prison system is “said to be motivated by 
greed, but greed that is institutional rather than personal.  Far from being mere 
agents of the phone companies, the prisons are in the driver’s seat, because it is 
they who control access to the literally captive market constituted by the 
inmates.”85  On the one hand, Posner is correct in pointing out the power 
exercised by correctional agencies, and his framing of the issue seems to be a 
defense of public budgeting decisions—a normative matter that many would 
agree is subject to judicial review only for the limited purpose of ensuring 
compliance with applicable constitutional or statutory requirements.  
Nonetheless, this pat formulation ignores the very real greed on the part of 
private equity companies that have built a business model based on using the 
coercive power of the state to extract revenue from poor people in the form of 
exorbitant prices for phone calls or junk food.86  Of course, greed is not 
necessarily illegal.  It can, however, motivate companies to use particular 
practices that are unlawful.  This section discusses common types of unfair 
practices, while the subsequent section explores potential legal remedies. 
A. Masquerading as Cream: Inflated Prices and  
Inefficient Payment Systems 
Things are seldom what they seem 
Skim milk masquerades as cream 
                    —H.M.S. Pinnafore, act II, scene 187 
 
The leading complaints from prison-retail customers focus on high 
prices and payment mechanisms that are inefficient, confusing, or otherwise 
 
85.  Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558, 566 (7th Cir. 2001). 
86.  See Raher, infra note 174, at 13. It is difficult to overstate the disadvantage that the 
public has in not being able to gain a clear picture of vendor finances.  Securus, for example, 
markets itself to facilities as a “partner” that puts facilities ahead of its own profits, as 
supposedly evidenced by Securus’s below-market EBITDA. While Securus’s healthy 
EBITDA ratio of 27.9% may be lower than some publicly traded telecommunications 
carriers, Securus’s audited financial statements provide no detail on how much the company 
pays to its parent, Platinum Equity, in monitoring fees.  This is a critical piece of 
information, since monitoring fees can be substantial, and are arguably equity dividends 
disguised as expenses.  See Eileen Appelbaum & Rosemary Batt, Fees, Fees, and More 
Fees: How Private Equity Abuses Its Limited Partners and U.S. Taxpayers, CTR. FOR ECON. 
& POL’Y RESEARCH (May 2016), at 26-29. 
87.  W.S. Gilbert, H.M.S. Pinafore, or The Lass That Loved A Sailor (1878).  
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unfair.  Although prison retailers are likely to make vague claims of 
security in response to such complaints, these arguments often do not hold 
up under scrutiny and it is difficult to see prison-retail prices as anything 
other than premium rates charged for inexpensive, run-of-the mill goods or 
services.  Moreover, while vendors are quick to point out security features 
which add to their costs, they conveniently gloss over expenses incurred by 
free-world retailers that are inapplicable in a prison setting (such as 
advertising and operating a brick-and-mortar retail network). 
The factual record concerning ICS prices is particularly robust thanks to 
the multiyear rulemaking conducted by the FCC.  The Commission’s 
involvement with the industry dates back to 1993, when ICS carriers asked the 
FCC to deregulate payphone rates in correctional facilities.  The FCC 
ultimately granted the request mere days before the entire telecommunications 
industry changed with the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.88  
As part of Congress’s sweeping reorganization of wireline phone service, 
section 276 of the 1996 Act directed the FCC to ensure that payphone operators 
were “fairly compensated,” while also classifying all “inmate telephone service 
in correctional institutions” as per se “payphone service.”89  Armed with this 
provision, ICS carriers quickly took aim at a handful of states that had set caps 
on intrastate calling rates in prisons and jails.  In 1996, a coalition of ICS 
carriers petitioned the FCC to preempt state regulation of intrastate ICS rates, 
citing the newly enacted § 276, but the FCC declined the request.90  The next 
major move regarding ICS regulation came when incarcerated people and their 
families went on the offensive, filing the landmark Wright class action.91  After 
months of motion practice, the district court referred the matter to the FCC 
under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,92 but the Commission waited nearly 
ten years before commencing a rulemaking proceeding.93 
In 2015, when the FCC issued interim rate caps on ICS calls, it required 
carriers to submit detailed accounting data itemizing the functional 
expenses of providing service to incarcerated customers.94  At the outset of 
the Wright rulemaking, the Commission had discovered rates ranging up to 
$1.15 per minute.95  Upon reviewing the expense data collected under the 
 
88.  110 Stat. 56 (1996); Raher, supra note 50, at 231.  
89. 47 U.S.C. § 276(b)(1)(1996); 47 U.S.C. § 276(d)(1996) 
90.  Raher, supra note 50, at 232-233. 
91.  See Complaint, supra note 15, Lecher, supra note 16, and supra note 17. 
92.  Wright v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. 00-cv-293-GK (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 2001), ECF No. 
94 (order dismissing case under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction); ECF No. 105 (order 
modifying order of dismissal, and staying case pending FCC rulemaking). 
93.  Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, 78 Fed. Reg. 4369 (Jan. 22, 2013) (to 
be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 64). 
94.  First Report & Order, supra note 38, at 6 ¶ 124-126 and 28 FCC Rcd. at 14171-72. 
95.  Id. at ¶ 35 and 28 FCC Rec. at 14126.  
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interim rule, the FCC concluded in 2015 that permanent rate caps of 11¢ 
per minute would allow ICS providers to cover their costs and be fairly 
compensated.96  The final 2015 rules also allowed carriers to charge some 
ancillary fees in addition to the per-minute rate, but the type and amount of 
such fees were strictly limited, in an effort to restrain the carriers’ “ability 
and incentive to continue to increase such charges unchecked by 
competitive forces.”97  Importantly, even though the rate caps lowered the 
per-minute revenues collected by carriers, the new rates allowed customers 
to place more calls, thereby offsetting lower per-call profit margins.  In 
mid-2015, Securus told potential investors in a private briefing that the 
interim caps had “neutral to . . . modestly positive EBITDA impact 
including some positive elasticity of demand,” and the company expected 
the same result under the yet-to-be-issued final rate caps.98 
Once the FCC signaled its intent to regulate calling rates, ICS carriers 
focused on identifying new unregulated sources of revenue.99  New 
communications channels and computer tablets offer carriers numerous 
opportunities to charge inflated prices and collect the resulting profits.  
Electronic messaging systems, for example, charge from 5¢ to $1.25 per 
message, with most facilities setting rates around 50¢.100  Messages sent on 
these systems are text-only, and are subject to character limits, ranging from 
1,500 to 6,000 characters.101  Some systems allow family members to attach 
photos or videos, or send e-cards, but these features inevitably cost extra.  
Why should a plain-text message cost 50¢ per message when email is free 
to practically everyone outside of prison?  Vendors typically argue that 
there are costs to running the system.  Setting aside the question of whether 
these costs should be borne by correctional systems instead of families, 
there is no compelling evidence to suggest that end-user prices are 
reasonably related to vendor costs.  Messaging prices typically hover 
around the cost of a first-class postage stamp (JPay even goes so far as to 
denominate its prices in numbers of “stamps”),102 yet postal rates are set to 
 
96.  Second Report & Order, supra note 40, at ¶ 58 and 30 FCC Rcd. at 12792 (The 
FCC imposed an 11¢-per-minute rate cap on calls from prisons, while using a three-tiered 
system of higher per-minute rates for calls from jails (varying based on facility population).  
In justifying the rate caps, the FCC stated that even the lowest rate cap of 11¢ “is greater 
than the average per minute cost of each of the more efficient reporting providers.”). 
97.  Id. at 12838-40. 
98.  SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, INC., “Public Lender Presentation” at 25 (Apr. 15, 2015), 
published as appx. 1 to Comments of Prison Policy Initiative, In the Matter of Rates for 
Interstate Inmate Calling Services, WC Docket No. 12-375 (Mar. 10, 2016), available at 
https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/filing/60001498735. 
99.  Kearney & Merrill, see infra note 245. 
100.  Raher, supra note 45, at 13-14. 
101.  Id. at 20. 
102.  JPay, Electronic Message Pricing of Arkansas Correctional Facility of Colorado 
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cover the costs of a universal system of delivering mail to every address in 
the country—an expense structure totally unrelated to the cost of running a 
closed proprietary text messaging platform.103 
Inflated prices are also evident in sales of electronic music and books.  
Under a 2016 contract with the Colorado Department of Corrections (since 
cancelled), GTL was allowed to charge up to $19.99 per month for a digital 
music subscription.104  This price, which is twice the rate for free-world 
services like Spotify or Google Play, is difficult to justify when one 
considers that GTL’s music catalog appears to be about one-tenth the size 
of Spotify or Apple.105  In 2014, the Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections awarded a contract to GTL to operate a tablet program, 
including an e-book feature.  After the program started, the Department 
attempted to prohibit people from receiving purchased or donated books 
from any other source.106  Although the book ban was quickly repealed,107 
the e-book program is still in place, with prices that consistently exceed 
free-world prices by a wide margin.  The Pennsylvania program does not 
provide free tablets, so a customer must first purchase a tablet for $147 plus 
tax.108  After that substantial outlay, the customer must still purchase e-
books from a list of roughly 8,800 titles.109  An analysis of fifty randomly 
selected titles indicates that GTL charges $3 to $6 for public-domain titles 
that are available for free as Kindle e-books on Amazon.com; remaining 
titles are priced at an average rate of 130% over the Kindle price.110 
 
State Prison System, https://www.jpay.com/Facility-Details/Colorado-State-Prison-System/ 
Arkansas-Valley-Correctional-Facility.aspx (last visited Oct. 19, 2019). 
103.  Id. at 14-15. 
104.  See generally, Stephen Raher, The Wireless Prison: How Colorado’s Tablet 
Computer Program Misses Opportunity and Monetizes the Poor, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE 
BLOG (July 6, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/07/06/tablets/. 
105.  Id. 
106.  Wanda Bertram, Philadelphia Inquirer exposes Pennsylvania’s complicity in 
cutting off incarcerated people’s access to books, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE BLOG (Sept. 21, 
2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2018/09/21/pennsylvania-ebooks/. 
107.  Samantha Malamed, Under Pressure, Pa. Prisons Repeal Restrictive Book Policy, 
PHILA. INQUIRER (Nov. 2, 2018), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/pennsylvania-book-
ban-doc-books-through-bars-wetzel-20181102.html. 
108.  PENN. DEPT. OF CORR., Tablets, https://www.cor.pa.gov/Inmates/Pages/ 
Tablets.aspx (last visited Nov. 29, 2018). 
109.  PENN. DEPT. OF CORR., GTL E-book Availability List, https://www.cor.pa.gov/ 
Inmates/Documents/master-ebook-list.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2018). 
110.  Using a randomized process, the author selected fifty titles from the GTL e-book 
list and searched for Kindle versions on Amazon.com.  Four titles were discarded from the 
sample because they were not available on Amazon, and an additional title was discarded 
because it existed in multiple editions.  Of the forty-five titles that are available from both 
sources, eight are public domain works which are available for free on Amazon, but for 
which GTL charges $2.99 (three titles) or $5.99 (four titles).  The remaining thirty-seven 
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Finally, fees charged for sending money to a trust account are reliably 
high, without any readily apparent cost-based justification.  Neither Access 
Corrections nor TouchPay (owned by GTL) publish their fees, but JPay 
routinely charges fees that equate to 20%-35% for smaller deposits.111  
When a plaintiff incarcerated in Kansas challenged deposit fees, that state’s 
supreme court noted that the plaintiff’s mother incurred monthly fees of 
$11.40 to deposit $45 into his trust account (a 25% markup).112 
Non-cost-based pricing also appears in the form of “premium” add-ons.  
For example, Securus charges one “stamp” to send a text-only electronic 
message.113  Before sending a message, a family member must decide 
whether to prepay (one additional stamp) for their loved-one’s reply—if no 
reply is sent, then this additional amount is simply wasted.  The family 
member may also attach up to five photographs, for an additional stamp.  
Assuming Securus is economically rational, the typical 50¢ base price for a 
text-only message would be adequate to cover the overhead of operating the 
electronic messaging network.  Thus, the marginal cost of adding photos to 
a message would consist of the additional storage capacity necessary to 
hold the additional files.  Assuming that a customer attaches the maximum 
five photographs, at the maximum allowed size (3 megabytes per photo), 
this would require Securus to store 15 megabytes of data, which entails 
storage costs of less than one-tenth of a cent.114  Even if one were to add 
some additional amount to allow Securus to recoup the cost of developing 
or licensing the software to receive and transmit such digital files, it is hard 
to imagine a situation where such recovery would justify charging 50¢ to 
send five digital photos.  But in facilities that have implemented mandatory 
mail-scanning policies,115 such electronic systems are the only practical way 
for family members to share pictures with their loved ones. 
 
works were available for an average price of $9.40 from Amazon versus an average of 
$17.15 from GTL.  GTL’s prices exceeded Amazon’s by an average of 130%, ranging from 
a low premium of 30% ($20.99 for a book sold on Amazon for $15.99) to a high of 808% 
($8.99 for a book sold on Amazon for 99¢). 
111.  See Typical JPay Fee Schedule, Eastern Or. Correctional Institution of Or. Dept. 
of Corrections, https://www.jpay.com/PAvail.aspx (last visited Oct. 19, 2019). 
112.  Matson v. Kan. Dept. of Corr., 301 Kan. 654, 659-60 (2015). 
113.  SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, eMessaging, https://securustech.net/emessaging (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2019). 
114.  Andy Klein, Hard Drive Cost Per Gigabyte, Backblaze (July 11, 2017), Pricing 
information was obtained from Andy Klein, “Hard Drive Cost Per Gigabyte,” 
https://www.backblaze.com/blog/hard-drive-cost-per-gigabyte/.  Pricing from Seagate of 
$49.99 for a 1 terabyte drive, yielding a cost of 5¢ per gigabyte.  Given the maximum 
attachment size of 15 MB (or 0.015 GB), Securus’s approximate marginal cost is calculated 
as follows: 5¢ x 0.015GB = 0.075¢.https://www.backblaze.com/blog/hard-drive-cost-per-
gigabyte/  
115.  See supra note 47. 
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Sometimes vendors are able to charge customers premium prices for the 
privilege of avoiding problems that are created by the vendor itself.  For 
example, Securus provides video visitation and electronic messaging in the 
Knox County, Tennessee jail, but customers often complain about having to 
wait in line for a fifteen minute session at a kiosk in a crowded unit.  To 
avoid the hassle and lack of privacy that comes with using a shared kiosk, 
customers can access the same features on an individual tablet, for which 
they must pay $4.99 per day plus regular messaging fees.116 
In addition to prices that are unjustly high, consumers are also confronted 
by confusing or inefficient payment options which can hinder informed 
decision-making.  To begin, the number of potential payment options can be 
bewildering, because vendors often encourage customers to make advance 
payments for specific types of services.  But even if one vendor operates a 
facility’s phone system and electronic messaging system, prepayment for one 
type of communication often cannot be later redirected to a different service 
offered by the same vendor.  For example, depending on the type of service 
someone is seeking to purchase, a relative of someone in the Colorado prison 
system must choose between five different payment options, which differ in 
terms of transaction fees and refund provisions (see Figure 1). 
Even if a consumer can decipher payment options, the associated 
terms can make it nearly impossible to determine what payment method is 
the most economically rational.  To the extent that processing fees are 
high, one might assume that making fewer prepayments in larger amounts 
is the most rational course.  But this type of prepayment can be 
disadvantageous when vendor terms and conditions provide for forfeiture 
of prepaid amounts in various situations.  For example, Securus—like all 
electronic messaging providers—requires prepayment for messages.  Not 
only are such prepayments non-refundable, but they also expire 180 days 
after the date of purchase.117  Given that people in prison can lose access 
to electronic messaging as a disciplinary measure, it is not hard to imagine 
situations where family members could prepay for a large quantity of 
electronic messages, only to lose the money when their relative is subject 
to disciplinary sanctions.  Securus allows refunds for video visitation 
sessions in some limited circumstances, but the refund is only issued in 
the form of an account credit, which itself expires after 90 days.118  
Anecdotal evidence also indicates that prepayment forfeiture can be a 
problem when a correctional facility changes ICS carriers without a 
 
116.  Lakin, supra note 81. 
117.  SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Friends and Family Terms and Conditions, (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2018) [http://www.webcitation.org/74KHOK53W] (hereinafter “Securus 
T&C) (Emessaging Terms §§6 and 9).  
118.  Id.  
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provision for transfer of prepaid balances. 
Prison-retail vendors price their products as if they are selling cream, 
when in fact they are trafficking in skim milk.  In normal markets, such 
behavior is mitigated by competition and consumer choice, but not so inside 
prison walls. 
B. What Law Applies? 
When evaluating the rights and remedies of a party to a commercial 
transaction, the first task is to determine what law applies.  In the case of 
prison retailing, this poses some unique challenges, beginning with 
incarcerated people’s pervasive lack of access to even basic transactional 
information.  To the extent that a contract is exclusively available on the 
internet, an incarcerated customer is simply unable to access the document; 
on the other hand, if the customer agrees to “browser wrap” terms and 
conditions displayed on a kiosk or tablet, she may well be unable to save, 
study, or share this text with a friend or advisor, for lack of email or a 
printer.  Prison-retail customers also face challenges that are common to 
many consumers in non-prison settings, such as dense terms written in 
impossibly small print.  In fact, when formerly incarcerated people in 
Georgia filed a class action complaint challenging the legality of release 
cards, the court declined to rule on the enforceability of the cardholder 
agreement until the card-issuer filed a reformatted version in typeface that 
was large enough for the court to read.119 
Once a customer determines the terms of the contract governing a 
purchase, the next analytical step is to compare the provisions of the 
consumer-facing contract to the terms of the contract between the vendor 
and the correctional facility.  The facility-vendor contract often contains 
more detail and is typically a negotiated agreement, in contrast to the 
adhesive terms presented to end users on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.  In a 
typical telecommunications contract, for example, Securus warrants to a 
county jail that its delivery of video visitation service will be performed in a 
good and workmanlike manner.120  In sharp contrast, family members 
signing up to use the same service are required to assent to terms and 
conditions that purport to disclaim all warranties, express, implied, or 
 
119.  See generally, Regan v. Stored Value Cards, No. 14-cv-1187-AT, (N.D. Ga. May 
29, 2014) (order directing defendants to file a reformatted or retyped version of the 
cardholder agreement in 13-point font).  
120.  E.g., Master Services Agreement between Securus Technologies, Inc. and Fort 
Bend County (Texas) (dated Feb. 6, 2018), Exh. C. at 16 (on file with author) (“[Securus] 
warrants that the services it provides as contemplated by this Schedule [including video 
visitation] will be performed in a good and workmanlike manner consistent with industry 
standards and practices.”). 
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statutory.121  Because end-users are not parties to the facility-vendor 
contracts, these contracts cannot enlarge or diminish consumers’ rights.122  
There is a possibility that unreasonable discrepancies between a vendor-
facility contract and an end-user contract could form the basis for a UDAP 
claim, to the extent that vendors have won monopoly contracts based on 
certain representations or warranties that are ultimately rendered illusory as 
far as the end-user is concerned, due to exculpatory provisions in consumer-
facing contracts. 
Finally, in the telecommunications context, it is important to determine 
whether a given service is covered by a publicly-filed tariff.  Not only do 
tariffs provide important information about terms of service, but a true tariff 
may implicate the filed-rate doctrine.  This doctrine “is a court-created rule 
to bar suits against regulated utilities involving allegations concerning the 
reasonableness” of rates contained in a filed tariff.123  Although some courts 
have dismissed ICS litigation under the filed-rate doctrine, it does not 
insulate carriers from every type of claim.  For example, a retroactive claim 
for money damages is likely to fail, but a claim for injunctive relief may 
well survive a motion to dismiss.124  Even though the doctrine is usually 
invoked defensively by carriers, the possibility remains that ICS users may 
sometimes be able to use the doctrine offensively.  Because website terms 
and conditions are so exculpatory, a tariff reviewed and approved by a 
 
121.  Securus T&C, supra note 117, General Terms § 8(A) (service “is provided on an 
‘as is’ and ‘as available’ basis. Securus and its suppliers, licensors, and other related parties, 
and their respective officers, agents, representatives, and employees expressly disclaim all 
warranties of any kind, whether express, statutory or implied, including, but not limited to, 
the implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, title, accuracy of 
data and non-infringement” (emphasis deleted)). 
122.  See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 313 (1981).  Not only do vendor-facility 
contracts invariably contain express disclaimers of third-party beneficiaries, but common 
law doctrine is particularly hostile to third-party beneficiary status in the context of 
government contracts.   
123.  64 AM. JUR. 2D Public Utilities § 62 (2011). 
124.  The most informative judicial opinion on the filed-rate doctrine as applied to ICS 
carriers is Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2001), in which plaintiffs brought 
claims under § 1983 and the Sherman Antitrust Act, concerning ICS rates and procurement.  
Citing the filed-rate doctrine, the district court dismissed all claims.  Writing for a 
unanimous panel, Judge Posner found that the Sherman Act claims should not have been 
dismissed under the filed-rate doctrine, but that they were nonetheless properly dismissed on 
the merits.  Id. at 563 (“If the plaintiffs in this case wanted to get a rate change, the . . . 
[filed-rate] doctrine . . . would kick in; but they do not, so it does not.  Eventually they want 
a different rate, of course, but at present all they are seeking is to clear the decks—to 
dissolve an arrangement that is preventing the telephone company defendants from 
competing to file tariffs more advantageous to the inmates.”).  See also, Daleure v. Kentucky 
119 F. Supp.2d 683, 690 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (dismissing plaintiffs’ damages claims against 
ICS carriers under the filed-rate doctrine, but allowing claims for injunctive relief under the 
Sherman Act to proceed) 
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regulatory may well provide greater customer relief by, for example, allowing 
claims based on the carrier’s gross negligence, willful neglect, or willful 
misconduct.  Under the filed-rate doctrine, the terms in the tariff would be 
binding, because a carrier cannot “employ or enforce any classifications, 
regulations, or practices . . . except as specified in [a filed tariff].”125 
The larger problem with application of the filed-rate doctrine to ICS 
litigation is that the basic rationale for the doctrine has largely disappeared, 
particularly at the federal level.  The doctrine is grounded in judicial 
deference to the regulatory rate-setting process.  But as jurisdictions 
increasingly deregulate telecommunications rates, tariffs are often not 
reviewed and approved by public utility commissions.  On the federal level, 
tariffs for any type of interstate phone service (in- or outside of prison) are 
no longer required under FCC rule.126  Instead, non-dominant carriers like 
ICS companies must publicly disclose rates and terms (confusingly, some 
providers comply with this obligation by posting a document that they refer 
to as a “tariff” even though it is governed by the FCC’s detariffing order).127  
The posting of rates is meant to allow consumers to make informed 
choices—a concept that is has no relevance in the world of monopoly ICS 
contracts.  When issuing its detariffing rule, the FCC concluded that 
elimination of tariffs would “eliminat[e] the ability of carriers to invoke the 
‘filed-rate’ doctrine,”128 but some have argued that the FCC lacks the 
authority to abolish this judicially-created rule.129  The resulting confusion 
has led some courts to apply the doctrine to ICS rate challenges, even 
though such rates have long been detariffed at the federal level.130  At the 
state level, when the prospect of robust regulation threatens to erode profits, 
ICS carriers have been known to strategically detariff services in order to 
escape regulatory jurisdiction,131 although such efforts are not always 
 
125.  Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Central Ofc. Tel., 524 U.S. 214, 221-222 (1998). 
126.  Second Report and Order, In the Matter of Policy & Rules Concerning the 
Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace, supra note 40, at 20730. 
127.  Id. at 20776. 
128.  Id. at 20762. 
129.  CHARLES H. HELEIN, JONATHAN S. MARASHLIAN, & LOUBNA W. HADDAD, 
Detariffing and the Death of the Filed Tariff Doctrine: Deregulating in the “Self” Interest, 
54 FED. COMM. L.J. 281 (2002). 
130.  E.g., Daleure v. Kentucky, 119 F. Supp.2d 683, 686 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (applying 
the filed-rate doctrine upon finding “State and federal regulatory agencies approved all of 
the . . . rates” challenged in the complaint (emphasis added)).  In contrast, the correct result 
was reached in Antoon v. Sercurus Tech., No. 5:17-cv-5008, 2017 WL 2124466 (W.D. Ark. 
May 15, 2017), where the court denied a motion to dismiss under filed-rate doctrine because 
Securus utilizes VoIP technology and the Arkansas Public Service Commission lacks 
jurisdiction over VoIP services or provider. 
131.  See Complaint, Pearson v. Hodgson, No. 18-cv-11130-IT, at ¶¶ 47-49 (D. Mass. 
May 30, 2018), ECF No. 1-1 (when Massachusetts Dept. of Telecommunications & Cable 
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successful.132  Accordingly, it is only fair to provide reciprocal treatment for 
ratepayers, by eliminating the filed-rate doctrine for detariffed services. 
C. Terms of Service: Carrying a Bad Joke Too Far133 
As alluded to in the previous section, terms and conditions thrust onto 
prison-retail consumers are unfairly one-sided.  While contracts of adhesion 
have become commonplace in all types of consumer transactions, the 
extremity of some prison-retail terms raise questions about what, if 
anything, a customer is actually purchasing.  The terms for Securus’s video 
visitation product begin with a cheerful declaration that the service “allows 
users to avoid the time, expense and hassle of travelling to and from a 
correctional facility,” but a subsequent provision specifies that “Securus 
makes no representations or guarantees about the ability of the service to 
work properly, completely, or at all.”134  All fees are “pre-paid and non-
refundable,” but Securus will, in “limited situations,” consider issuing a 
discretionary refund, although it will not issue refunds “for disconnects 
initiated by the correctional facility, or disconnects due to Internet 
connection or hardware malfunctions.”135  Indeed, the same policy states 
that discretionary refunds will only be issued in situations where “Securus 
cancels a paid Video Visitation session before the session begins,”136 which 
indicates that the company’s policy is to never issue a refund for a 
disconnected session, even if the disconnect was caused by a failure of 
Securus’s own network. 
Unsurprisingly, mandatory arbitration provisions and class-action 
prohibitions are ubiquitous in prison retail terms.  GTL includes a broad 
arbitration and class-action ban in its terms, although it fails to identify an 
arbitral forum,137 thus raising questions about enforceability.  JPay 
 
imposed intrastate ICS rate caps, Securus withdrew its tariff and charged rates in excess of 
the new caps, alleging that its service is delivered via VoIP and therefore exempt from state 
regulation under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 25C, § 6A). 
132.  See In re Securus Tech., Order Denying Withdrawal of Tariff, Dkt. No. TF-2017-
0041 (Iowa Utils. Bd., Feb. 9, 2018) (denying Securus’s motion to withdraw its tariff 
because, even though the company was no longer a “telephone utility” under state law, it 
was still an “alternative operator service company,” which is required to file a tariff under 
state law (see Iowa Code Ann. § 476.91). 
133.  Peter Alces & Jason Hopkins, Carrying A Good Joke Too Far, 83 CHICAGO-KENT 
L. REV. 879 (2008) (borrowing the title of this section from the law review masterful 
analysis of U.C.C. § 4-103(a)).  
134.  Securus T&C, supra note 117, Prod. Terms & Conditions § 6 and Gen’l Terms & 
Conditions § 9. 
135.  Id., Prod. Terms & Conditions § 6. 
136.  Id. 
137.  Global Tel*Link Corp., Terms & Conditions § R. (dated Mar. 30, 2015), 
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publishes separate terms and conditions for its various services and 
products, all of which provide for mandatory arbitration before JAMS.138  
Although prison retailers are not always successful in enforcing arbitration 
agreements, the industry (like others) presumably learns from its missteps 
and engages in ongoing efforts to fashion more ironclad contractual 
provisions.139  The major failure in terms of arbitration provisions has been 
release cards, because courts have largely found that cardholders were 
given no other way to obtain their money, and therefore any agreement to 
arbitrate was not voluntary.140 
As computer tablets and their hefty price tags become more prevalent 
inside correctional facilities, so too does the relevance of consumer 
warranty law.  Prison retailers’ end-user terms and conditions governing the 
sales of goods are replete with questionable provisions.  The most 
noticeable problem is the appallingly short warranty periods covering 
expensive computer tablets.  JPay tablets can cost up to $160,141 but the 
devices are “not warranted to operate without failure” and are covered only 
by a warranty against “material defects in design and manufacture” lasting 
ninety days from the first time of use.142  Commissary company Union 
Supply sells tablets in the California state prison system.  Although Union 
Supply’s warranty period is nominally 180 days, any warranty claims made 
after the ninetieth day require payment of a $50 “non-refundable 
administrative and processing fee” (an amount equal to nearly one-third of 




138.  E.g., JPay, Inc., Payments Terms of Service § 15 (accessed Dec. 6, 2018) 
https://www.jpay.com/LegalAgreementsOut.aspx. 
139.  James v. Global Tel*Link Corp, et al., No. 13-4989, 2016 WL 589676, 4-7 (2016) 
(GTL lost a motion to compel arbitration as to most of the named plaintiffs in a New Jersey 
class action because most of the plaintiffs had created their accounts through GTL’s 
automated interactive voice recognition system, and had not taken any affirmative steps to 
demonstrate acceptance of the arbitration provision.).  
140.  See Reichart v. Keefe Comissary Netowrk, infra notes 314 and infra note 315. 
141.  Victoria Law, Captive Audience: How Companies Make Millions Charging 
Prisoners to Send an Email, WIRED (Aug. 3, 2018) (citing prices ranging from $40 to $160, 
depending on the prison system) https://www.wired.com/story/jpay-securus-prison-email-
charging-millions/.  
142.  JPay, Inc., Player Purchase Terms and Conditions and Warranty Policy § 5 (Dec. 
5, 2017), https://www.jpay.com/LegalAgreementsOut.aspx.  
143.  Union Supply Group, Inc., Rules and Regulations https://californiainmatepack 
age.com/Catalog/MenuCatalogPages/ManageStaticPage.aspx?pageid=Rules (last visted Dec. 
6, 2018) (Union Supply does not publicly reveal prices, but other sources have reported that 
the tablets cost $159 when the program was introduced.); Malik Harris, New Policy Allows 
Prisoner to Purchase Tablets, SAN QUENTIN NEWS (Jan. 1, 2016) https://sanquentinnew 
s.com/new-policy-allows-prisoner-to-purchase-tablets/. 
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the dubious claim that tablets are “customized” goods and therefore buyers 
may not obtain a refund under any circumstances (even if a family member 
mistakenly purchases a tablet for a loved one housed in a facility that does not 
allow tablets)144—a provision that is likely unenforceable as an unreasonable 
restriction on a buyer’s right to inspect and reject purchased goods.145 
In summary, the terms and conditions propagated by prison retailers 
serve as a concrete reminder that no one is protecting the interests of 
consumers in this sector.  Correctional procurement staff appear to be entirely 
uninterested in what terms are imposed on consumers.  Left to their own 
devices, vendors draft terms that are so one-sided it is difficult to call them 
contracts.  While some onerous provisions may well be unenforceable under 
applicable consumer protection statutes, customers are left to figure out this 
legal puzzle on their own; and, of course, a customer’s ability to exercise 
their legal rights may be hindered or extinguished entirely given the frequent 
use of arbitration provisions and class adjudication prohibitions. 
D. Advertising, Privacy, and Consumer Psychology 
Incarceration, for many people, is a prolonged, slow-motion disruption 
of normal life, punctuated by periods of unpredictable violence.  Certain 
aspects of incarceration can be analogized to being trapped in a natural 
disaster: you are cut off from loved ones, physical harm is a constant threat, 
and the future is full of unknowns.  Many areas of the law provide special 
protection for people who must procure critical goods or services in 
stressful situations: price-gouging statutes prevent unfair fuel pricing in a 
natural disaster,146 the Federal Trade Commission prohibits exploitation of 
grieving relatives purchasing funeral services,147 and countless occupations 
(from hearing aid salespeople148 to pawnbrokers149) are subject to wide-
 
144.  Id. (The claim of custom-made status is based on the fact that Union Supply asks 
purchasers to select electronic content during the purchase process, and that content is then 
installed on the device that is shipped.  The legal relevance of this so-called customization is 
unclear.  As a practical matter, the content loading does not have any impact on the seller’s 
ability to re-sell the device, because—according to Union Supply’s own terms of service—
content is loaded onto a removable SD card). 
145.  See U.C.C § 2-513, § 2-601; See U.C.C. § 2-719(1) and cmt. 1 (parties may 
contractually modify remedial provisions of U.C.C. Article 2, but “they must accept the legal 
consequence that there be at least a fair quantum of remedy for breach of the obligations or 
duties outlined in the contract.”).  
146.  Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., Unfair and Deceptive Acts & Practices § 4.3.11.2 (9th 
ed. 2016). 
147.  16 C.F.R., §. 453. 
148.  John C. Williams, Annotation, Validity and Construction of State Statutes 
Regulating Hearing Aid Fitting or Sales, 96 A.L.R.3d 1030 (1979). 
149.  Tracy Bateman Farrell, Annotation, Validity of Statutes, Ordinances, and 
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ranging regulatory systems designed to protect consumers whose ability to 
protect their interests may be impaired.  In the case of prison retailing, 
however, there is a dramatic lack of structural safeguards against 
exploitation. 
Meanwhile, prison retail companies (likely motivated by dual desires to 
increase sales and disguise the greed that shapes their business models) use 
advertising to portray themselves as caring providers who hold the precious 
keys to comfort (commissary items), normalcy (communication with family 
members), or post-incarceration survival (educational opportunities).  The 
industry’s advertising practices raise questions about the unchecked 
power—both persuasive and coercive—of prison retail vendors. 
The simplest type of misleading advertising is a mere promise of hope 
based on incomplete facts.  For example, family members who want to send 
money or an electronic message through JPay must go to the company’s 
homepage, where a prominent banner ad cycles through various messages 
immediately next to the sign-up form. The reference to “educational 
platforms,” accompanied by images of the formal trappings of academia, 
evokes thoughts of intellectual engagement and increased earning potential.  
In actuality, the platforms referenced in the ad consist of “KA Lite” and 
“JPay’s Lantern.”  The ad does not mention the limitations of the two 
platforms.  KA Lite is a collection of open-source videos that JPay has 
acquired, presumably for free, and makes available for “self-guided 
learning.”150  Lantern, meanwhile, is not a universal education program, but 
is simply a platform that each facility can choose to utilize or not.151  While 
JPay has clearly invested in a slick marketing campaign, it does not appear 
to adequately disclose the limitations of its product. 
A series of advertisements by Securus illustrate how marketing can 
raise concerns about consumer privacy.  The campaign, which uses the tag-
line “Connecting to what matters,” features extensive excerpts from what 
appear to be actual video visitation sessions with incarcerated fathers and 
their minor children.152  The videos use unsettling intimate footage, 
featuring men using video visitation to see their children engaged in normal 
 
Regulations Governing Pawn Shops, 16 A.L.R.6th 219 (2006). 
150.  JPay, supra note 79.   
151.  See Jpay, supra notes 79 and accompanying text.  JPay’s education page claims 
that “Tens of thousands of incarcerated students have earned college credits, studied for their 
GEDs, and participated in other educational activities through JPay’s Lantern.”  JPay, supra 
note 79.  The lack of details raises immediate questions about the meaning of this claim, 
along with the imprecise spectrum that encompasses everything from earning college credit 
to “participating in other educational activities.” 
152.  Connected, Securus Technologies, https://www.ispot.tv/ad/AXF1/securus-techno 
logies-connected (2016); Homework, Securus Technologies, https://www.ispot.tv/ad/AxS1 
/securus-technologies-homework (2016).  
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childhood activity like homework or celebrating holidays.153  It is not clear 
whether the people in the ads are actors or actual customers, but given the 
lack of a disclaimer, one would assume the footage depicts actual users.154  
Even though Securus’s privacy policy warns customers that they should 
have no expectation of privacy, the policy only speaks of call content being 
used for law enforcement purposes, with no mention of marketing 
activities.155  To the extent that the individuals in the videos are not actual 
customers, then the lack of a disclaimer likely constitutes a deceptive 
advertising practice, since their reactions do not accurately reflect those of 
real users.  Alternatively, to the extent that the ads do depict actual 
customers, one wonders whether the customers were compensated for use 
of their images, and if so, what they received?  Was separate compensation 
paid to the children in the ads, and were non-incarcerated parents 
consulted?  Even if Securus complied with all applicable laws, the use of 
children in these ads evidences a disturbing willingness to disregard 
customer privacy and exploit the very personal pain that children of 
incarcerated parents frequently experience.156 
Apart from concerns about advertising, Securus’s use of video 
visitation footage of children as part of its Threads database appears to be a 
likely violation of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
(“COPPA”).157  While the application of COPPA to VoIP calls is less than 
clear, the statute almost certainly applies to ICS video visitation services.158  
 
153.  See Securus, Be there Advertisement (Oct. 19, 2019) https://www.ispot.tv/ad/ 
Axgw/securus-technologies-video-visitation-celebrating-christmas.  
154.  The FTC’s advertising endorsement rules require disclosure when actors are used 
to portray customers.  16 C.F.R. § 255.2(c) (“Advertisements presenting endorsements by 
what are represented, directly or by implication, to be ‘actual consumers’ should utilize 
actual consumers . . . or clearly and conspicuously disclose that the persons in such 
advertisements are not actual consumers of the advertised product.”).  Although the 
consumers in the Securus ads do not make any express statements concerning the video 
visitation product, their presence in the advertisements still constitutes an “endorsement” 
under the FTC’s expansive definition.  See 16 C.F.R. § 255.0(b) and example 5. 
155.  See Securus T&C, infra notes 172 and accompanying infra note 174. 
156.  See Children on the Outside: Voicing the Pain and Human Costs of Parental 
Incarceration (Tides Center/Justice Strategies, Brooklyn, N.Y), January 12, 2011, at 5. 
(“Unlike children of the deceased or divorced who tend to benefit from society’s familiarity 
with and acceptance of their loss, children of the incarcerated too often grow up and grieve 
under a cloud of low expectations and amidst a swirling set of assumptions that they will 
fail, that they will themselves resort to a life of crime or that they too will succumb to a life 
of drug addiction.”).  
157.  Pub. L. 105-277, div. C, title XII, 112 Stat. 2681-2728 (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 
6501-6506). 
158.  COPPA applies to “operators of websites,” defined as “any person who operates a 
website on the Internet or an online service and who collects or mtains personal information 
from or about the users of . . . such website or online service . . . where such website or 
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As relevant in this context, COPPA (through its implementing regulations 
promulgated by the FTC) prohibits the “collection, use, or disclosure of 
personal information from children” without the verifiable consent of the 
child’s parent159 (“children” are defined as children under thirteen160).  
“Personal information includes not just contact information but also “[a] 
photograph, video, or audio file where such file contains a child’s image or 
voice.”161  Securus’s description of its Threads product makes it clear that 
video recordings are shared with facilities and agencies throughout the 
country, which—when it comes to recordings of children—seems to be a 
rather clear-cut violation of COPPA.162  Notably, COPPA’s parental 
consent provisions highlight just how abusive Securus’s terms of service 
are.  COPPA covers the “collection” of information, the “use” of 
information (by the website operator who collected the information), and 
the “distribution” of information (to third parties).  The implementing rules 
expressly provide that parents be given “the option to consent to the 
collection and use of the child’s personal information without consenting to 
disclosure of his or her personal information to third parties.”163  Securus 
runs roughshod over this rule, by not offering such an option to parents, but 
rather announcing as a foregone conclusion that video contents will be 
shared with law enforcement. Violations of COPPA’s implementing 
regulations may form the basis for a private cause of action for unfair or 
deceptive trade practices under the FTC Act.164 
Finally, prison retailers are apt to steer vulnerable consumers into 
unneeded or inefficient transactions by leveraging the emotional impulses 
of concerned family members.  For example, family members who use JPay 
may receive automated emails identified as coming from a specific 
incarcerated correspondent  
 
online service is operated for commercial purposes.”  15 U.S.C. § 6501(2). 
159.  16 C.F.R. § 312.5(a)(1). 
160.  Id. § 6501(1). 
161.  16 C.F.R. § 312.2. 
162.  COPPA prohibits unauthorized “disclosure” of children’s information, with 
disclosure defined as “the release of personal information collected from a child in 
identifiable form by an operator for any purpose.”  15 U.S.C. § 6501(4)(A).  While there is a 
law-enforcement exception under the FTC’s rules, that exception is quite narrow and doesn’t 
appear to cover Securus’s usage of children’s video footage.  Specifically, 16 C.F.R. § 
312.5(c)(6)(iv) creates a law-enforcement exception that applies only to the disclosure of 
children’s name “name and online contact information” that is collected for “the purpose 
of . . . provid[ing] information to law enforcement agencies or for an investigation on a 
matter related to public safety; and where such information is not be used [sic] for any other 
purpose.”  The category of “name and online contact information” does not include video or 
audio files containing children’s voices or images.  See 16 C.F.R. § 612.2. 
163.  16 C.F.R. § 312.5(a)(2). 
164.  16 C.F.R. § 312.9. 
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The message, written in the first person, states “I wanted to let you know 
that my Media Account balance is running low. . . . Your support is 
appreciated, and it’s really easy to fund my Media Account.”  Money 
transfer instructions then follow.  Only at the end of the message is there a 
disclaimer (partially cut off on an iPhone 6, which has a healthy screen 
height of 5.43 inches) stating “This email was sent by JPay on behalf of 
your loved one.”  In another example, ICS provider Telmate (which was 
acquired by GTL in 2017), used to allow callers from Alabama jails to 
speak to family members for less than a minute at the beginning of a call, 
after which time a recording interrupted to seek payment.165  The 
receipients of such calls are typically family members who are eager to help 
their loved ones and are therefore likely to hand over their payment 
information without a clear disclosure of costs; yet even those family 
members who took the time to navigate Telmate’s phone menu were given 
a misleading rate disclosure of $2.39 (flat rate for up to 15 minutes) plus 
“applicable taxes and fees,” where the unspecified “taxes and fees” 
apparently totaled $8.94 (or 374% of the base rate), yielding a total cost of 
$11.33 (or 76¢ per minute).166  Similar recordings used by Securus tend to 
stear distraught family members into accepting calling products that include 
a $3 per-call fee that can be avoided, but only by terminating the call (an 
emotionally difficult action) and setting up an account.167 
Communications tactics in the prison-retail setting illustrate how no one 
is monitoring the contents for accuracy and fairness.  In many markets, 
 
165.  Comments of Robin B. Fussell, In the Matter of Rates for Interstate Inmate 
Calling Services, WC Docket No. 12-375 (June 16, 2015), available at https://www. 
fcc.gov/ecfs/filing/60001071303. 
166.  Id. 
167.  Wagner & Jones, supra note 54, at appx. 11. 
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deceptive advertising and product information can be identified and 
addressed by competitors  But in prison, vendors’ communications can 
mislead and manipulate family members unchecked by any countervailing 
market forces. 
E. Data Insecurity 
Given the large amounts of data that prison retailers (particularly 
ICS carriers) collect from customers, data privacy should be front and 
center in policy debates about the rights of the incarcerated and their 
families.  Instead, such issues are rarely discussed and are governed by 
vague provisions buried in one-sided privacy policies.  The reach of “big 
data” should be of particular concern to anyone with direct or even 
indirect involvement in the justice system, because of the numerous 
ways in which police, courts, probation systems, and correctional 
facilities are using data to make decisions about individuals’ lives.  In 
the criminal justice system poorly-planned algorithms can shape 
policing strategies, investigative outcomes, and sentencing decisions in 
ways that too often penalize people either for being poor or for 
maintaining relationships with people who have criminal records.168  
Moreover, expanding the scope and use of big data in criminal justice 
systems increases the chances of intentional or unintentional racial 
discrimination based on proxy data that correlates with race.169 
ICS carriers collect a wealth of information about customers, which 
comes from at least four sources.  First, companies hold payment data, 
both in the form of payment-card information and transaction histories.  
Second, some services require family members to verify their identity by 
uploading copies of government identification documents.170  Third, 
carriers record and store the actual content of communications (phone 
calls, written messages, or video chats) which are transmitted on their 
 
168.  CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES 
INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 98 (2016) (Prison systems “[a]ll too often . . . use 
data to justify the workings of the system but not to question or improve the system.”). 
169.  Anya Prince & Daniel Schwarcz, Proxy Discrimination in the Age of Artificial 
Intelligence and Big Data, IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 35) (on file with 
author) (“[T]he inevitable tendency of [artificial intelligence] to proxy for race when that 
characteristic is genuinely predictive of a facially neutral objective . . . can affirmatively 
reinforce past discrimination.  Proxy discrimination can produce this result because it 
affirmatively harms those who it targets, subjecting them to increased police scrutiny or 
decreased chances of early release from prison.  This, in turn, denies opportunities to and 
increases risk for this population.”) 
170.  Securus’s video visitation system, for example, directs users to upload “a copy of 
your government issued photo ID and a photo of yourself” when creating an account. 
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platforms.171  Finally, some carriers collect geolocation information from 
family members’ cell phones. 
When family members receive calls or initiate electronic 
communications on ICS platforms, they are typically advised by an 
automated system that their communications will be monitored, yet the 
nature and extent of such monitoring is neither transparent nor intuitive.  
Take Securus’s privacy policy regarding its video visitation product, 
which states that family members must consent to call data being 
“accessed, reviewed, analyzed, searched, scrutinized, rendered 
searchable, compiled, assembled, accumulated, stored, used, licensed, 
sublicensed, assigned, sold transferred and distributed” by “Law 
Enforcement.”172  Someone communicating with a loved one in the 
California prison system may reasonably expect the reference to “law 
enforcement” to refer to the California state prison system and probably 
the state police.  Instead, the defined term in Securus’s contract is much 
broader—law enforcement is defined as “personnel involved in the 
correctional industry (federal, state, county and local), investigative 
(public and private), penological or public safety purposes and 
specifically including the Department of Homeland Security and any 
other anti-terrorist agency (federal, state and local).”173  The reason for 
this broad (if grammatically fractured) definition is that Securus offers 
its law enforcement customers a product marketed under the name 
“Threads.”174  Threads aggregates data from correctional facilities 
throughout the country and shares it with other participating facilities.175  
 
171. In addition to communications that are actually initiated on a specific network, 
vendors can also end up capturing and storing communications that were initially sent as 
private communications through the U.S. mail, when facilities hire contractors to scan and 
reprint incoming mail.  See supra, note 47.  Attorneys have expressed particular concern 
about such systems, which can effectively destroy a lawyer’s ability to securely and 
confidentially communicate with incarcerated clients.  See Zuri Davis, Pennsylvania’s New 
$4 Million Prison Mail System Brings Privacy Concerns, HIT & RUN BLOG (Oct. 10, 2018), 
https://reason.com/blog/2018/10/10/pennsylvanias-4-million-prison-mail-scan. 
172.  Securus T&C, supra note 117, Privacy Policy § II(J). 
173.  Id. (emphasis added). 
174.  Securus’s marketing materials and contracts actually refer to the product as 
“THREADS™.”  For ease of readability, and because the name does not appear to be an 
acronym, it is referred to here with the more reader-friendly capitalization “Threads.”  
Securus describes Threads as “[s]ystems that merge big data, voice biometrics, and pattern 
identification, providing early detection and alerts for investigators, attorneys, courts and 
criminal justice systems.”  Securus Technologies, Inc., Response to Request for Proposals 
RFP 18-021 (Fort Bend County, Texas) (Oct. 17, 2017), at 261 (on file with author). 
175.  Master Services Agreement, supra note 120, at 5 (“THREADS™ offers an 
optional ‘community’ feature, which allows member correctional facilities to access and 
analyze corrections communications data from other correctional facilities within the 
community and data imported by other community members.”). 
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Securus markets Threads by proclaiming that “digital evidence is 
everywhere.” 
Securus’s unquenchable thirst for data does not seem to be 
accompanied by a commitment to protect customers’ privacy, as 
highlighted in two separate incidents from recent years.  First, in 2014, 
hackers obtained call records and access to call recordings for over 70 
million phone calls on the Securus system, including privileged calls 
between clients and attorneys.  The details of the data breach were revealed 
in press reports in November 2015.176 
Second, a substantial body of evidence concerning Securus’s recording 
of privileged calls has surfaced in a criminal case in Kansas.  The case 
started with a 2016 federal indictment concerning illegal activity in a 
correctional facility operated by Corrections Corporation of America 
(“CCA”).  During discovery, defense attorneys found that the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office (“USAO”) had obtained recordings of privileged phone 
calls made by their clients.177  The district court appointed a special master 
to investigate the extent of the improper recordings and the government’s 
use of such evidence.178  After cooperating with the special master’s 
investigation for over a year, the USAO reversed course in 2018, and began 
resisting discovery requests and challenging the court’s jurisdiction to 
appoint a master.179  Eventually, the court set the matter for trial and 
received evidence over the course of ten days, ultimately issuing a 
remarkable 188-page opinion.  Among other things, the court found that 
prosecutors’ unorthodox legal reasoning, “coupled with their lack of 
research and investigation about the CCA phone system, led to their 
exploitation of vulnerabilities stemming from CCA’s flawed system of 
recording practices.”180  The opinion explains that calls with defense 
 
176.  Jordan Smith & Micah Lee, Not So Securus, The Intercept (Nov. 11, 2015), 
https://theintercept.com/2015/11/11/securus-hack-prison-phone-company-exposes-thousan ds-of-
calls-lawyers-and-clients/.  
177.  U.S. v. Black, et al., No. 16-CR-20032-JAR, at 1-3 (D. Kan. Jan. 12, 2018) ECF 
No. 372 (memorandum and order on United States’ motion to terminate special master).  The 
caption of this case is somewhat unusual insofar as it began as U.S. v. Black, because the 
first named defendant was Lorenzo Black.  Mr. Black subsequently pleaded guilty and was 
sentenced, at which point the caption became U.S. v. Carter, although the court continues to 
refer to the litigation under the name Black.  See U.S. v. Carter, No. 16-CR-20032-02-JAR, 
2019 WL 3798142, at 4, n.10 (D. Kan. Aug. 13, 2019) Following the court’s lead, this article 
refers to the case as Black, although individual citations use whatever caption happens to 
appear on the particular document cited. 
178.  Memorandum & Order, U.S. v. Carter, No. 16-CR-20032-JAR, 2019 WL 32957, 
at 2-5 (D. Kan. Jan. 25, 2019), ECF No. 713 (describing special master’s appointment and 
investigation). 
179.  U.S. v. Carter, 2019 WL 329573, at 6-8 and 17. 
180.  U.S. v. Carter, 2019 WL 3798142, at 51.  For the court’s discussion of the 
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attorneys were “routinely recorded” despite attorney’s having properly 
requested protection of privileged communications.181  A Securus executive 
testified that it was CCA’s responsibility to program designated attorney 
phone numbers into the calling system (thereby preventing recording), but 
his testimony revealed at least five different ways in which human error 
could prevent this process from working correctly.182  A CCA employee 
testified that he was responsible for entering attorney phone numbers in the 
system, but he “routinely” made errors when doing so.183  As for the USAO, 
the court found that the agency had regularly received privileged recordings 
when investigating all types of criminal case in the district, but had publicly 
claimed that no such practice existed.184 
This case is somewhat narrow in light of its unusual procedural posture 
(the investigation was conducted under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
41(g)),185 but it has led to an extensive number of collateral suits.  At last 
count over 110 defendants had sought relief from their sentences under 28 
U.S.C. § 2255 based on the facts that came to light in this case,186 and civil 
class actions have also been filed by both clients187 and attorneys188 who 
had their calls recorded. 
While the 2014 and 2016 incidents impact parties utilizing Securus’s 
calling products, other incidents have implicated the privacy rights of 
everyone with a cell phone, including people who have never placed or 
received a call involving Securus’s network.  Securus offers (or at least, 
offered until recently189) a free add-on product referred to as “location 
 
USAO’s dubious position concerning waiver of the attorney-client privilege, see Id. at 52. 
181.  Id. at 37. 
182.  Id. at 40. 
183.  Id. 
184.  Id. at 49-50 (based on incomplete data that likely understates the problem, the 
court found that when prosecutors obtained recordings of a defendant’s phone calls, there 
was a greater than one-in-four chance that the responsive recordings included privileged 
attorney calls). 
185.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g) (“A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of 
property . . . may move for the property’s return. . . .  The court must receive evidence on 
any factual issue necessary to decided the motion.”); see also Order, In re United States of 
America, No. 18-3007 (10th Cir. Feb. 26, 2018) (partially granting the U.S. Attorney’s 
petition for mandamus in the Black litigation, and restricting the scope of the District Court’s 
investigation to defendants before the court). 
186.  U.S. v. Carter, 2019 WL 3798142, at 84. 
187.  Huff v. CoreCivic, Inc. f/k/a Corr. Corp. of Am., No. 17-cv-2320-JAR (D. Kan).  
The court certified a class and granted preliminary approval to a settlement on September 26, 
2019.  See ECF No. 146. 
188.  Complaint, Crane v. Corecivic, No. 16-cv-947 SRB (W.D. Mo. Mar. 8, 2018), 
ECF No. 32 (alleging violations of federal and state wiretap statutes). 
189.  It is difficult to ascertain the current status of LBS services in general.  After the 
original story broke, the large wireless carriers made claims of increased privacy protections 
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based services” (“LBS”), which allows law-enforcement staff to obtain 
“a mobile device user’s approximate geographical location.”190  
Securus’s LBS uses data provided by the major wireless carriers, and 
can provide location information for virtually any U.S. cell phone.191  
Although agencies using LBS are supposed to ensure that they have 
proper authorization (such as a warrant or court order) to obtain phone 
location information, Securus’s contract with facilities disclaims any 
responsibility on Securus’s part for ensuring compliance with applicable 
law.192  In 2018, federal prosecutors accused Missouri Sheriff Cory 
Hutcheson of uploading defective or completely irrelevant documents 
(which were apparently not reviewed by a human being) to improperly 
obtain cell-phone information from Securus’s LBS platform.193  The 
indictment alleges that over an approximately three-year period, 
Hutcheson improperly obtained “thousands” of cell-phone locations, 
including for phones used by other law enforcement agents and a state 
judge.  The indictment contained twenty-eight criminal counts, including 
wire fraud, identity theft, and violations of the Telephone Records and 
Privacy Protection Act.  As part of a plea deal, Hutcheson pleaded guilty 
to two charges in April 2019;194 meanwhile, civil litigation against 
Hutcheson is pending in the Eastern District of Missouri, asserting 
claims under § 1983 and for common-law invasion of privacy.195  The 
plaintiffs in the civil case have only named the sheriff as a defendant, 
and it remains unclear whether Securus could be subject to liability for 
mishandling private call information, but there is a suggestion that the 
FCC is conducting an enforcement investigation concerning Securus’s 
use of LBS.196 
 
that now look to have been false.  See Joseph Cox, Sprint to Stop Selling Location Data to 
Third Parties after Motherboard Investigation, Motherboard (Jan. 16, 2019), https://mother 
board.vice.com/en_us/article/qvqgnd/sprint-stop-selling-location-data-tmobile-att-microbilt-
zumigo.  
190.  Master Services Agreement, supra note 118, at 6. 
191.  Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Service Meant to Monitor Inmates’ Calls Could 
Track You, Too, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/10/ 
technology/cellphone-tracking-law-enforcement.html.  
192.  Master Services Agreement, supra note 118, at 6. 
193.  Superseding Indictment, U.S. v. Hutcheson, No. 18-cr-041-JAR (E.D. Mo., Aug. 
17, 2018).  Securus requires users to upload a legal authorization, but the indictment 
indicates that Hutcheson repeatedly uploaded sham documents “including his health 
insurance policy, his auto insurance policy and pages selected from Sheriff training 
materials.”  Id. at ¶ 22.   
194.  Judgment, U.S. v. Hutcheson, No. 18-cr-041-JAR (E.D. Mo., Apr. 29, 2019). 
195.  First Amended Complaint, Cooper v. Hutcheson, No. 17-cv-073-ACL (E.D. Mo. 
Apr. 2, 2019). 
196.  Wright Petitioners’ Reply to Joint Opposition to Petition to Deny, In the Matter of 
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In a new privacy policy published in January 2019, GTL reveals that it 
tracks the geographic location of any cell phone that receives a call on its 
ICS platform, both when the call is connected and for sixty minutes 
afterward.  GTL’s privacy policy misleadingly states that customers can 
“opt out” of this location tracking, but actually the ability to opt out is 
limited to the sixty-minute trailing period.  The only way to opt out of 
location tracking entirely is to not use GTL’s services.197 
Telecommunications companies are not the only prison retailers who 
compile customer data that could be put to other unexpected uses.  
Correctional banking firms amass substantial transactional data that can 
also serve as grist for law-enforcement datasets.  The Federal Bureau of 
Prisons in 2015 proposed an amendment to its commissary regulations that 
would have required family members sending money to consent to the 
Bureau’s “collection, review, use, disclosure, and retention of, all related 
transactional data, including the sender’s personal identification 
information.”198  The rule would have also allowed the same use of data by 
“service providers.”  After advocacy groups objected to the new rule as a 
violation of the Right to Financial Privacy Act (“RFPA”),199 the Bureau 
appears to have abandoned the proposal;200 however, the RFPA provides 
limited protections because it applies only to collection of transactional 
information by the federal government.201  The terms of correctional-
banking privacy policies impart little information about how the vendor will 
use family members’ financial data.  For example, TouchPay (a GTL 
subsidiary) states that it may share customer information with “third 
party . . . service[] providers who provide services . . . on our behalf, such 
as . . . analyzing data.”202  Such open-ended provisions provide no 
 
Joint Application of TKC Holdings, ICSolutions, and Securus Technologies for Grant of 
Authority, WC Dkt. No. 18-193, at 6 (July 30, 2018) (“It is understood that an enforcement 
inquiry is underway to determine whether Securus in fact violated Section 222 of the Act 
and the Commission’s rules related thereto.”). 
197.  Global Tel*Link Corp., Privacy Policy, http://www.gtl.net/privacy-policy-en/at ¶ 
1(D) (last visited Jan. 17, 2019).  
198.  U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., Bureau of Prisons, Proposed Rule, Inmate Commissary 
Account Deposit Procedures, 80 Fed. Reg. 38658, 38660 (July 7, 2015) (proposed 28 C.F.R. 
§ 506.3). 
199.  12 U.S.C. § 3401, et seq.  
200.  See Comments and Petition for Further Rulemaking, RIN 1120-AB56 (Sept. 1, 
2015), available at https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=BOP-2015-
0004-0003&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf.  Although the Bureau of Prisons has 
never formally rescinded the proposed rule, it is now listed as “inactive” on the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs’ Fall 2018 unifed agenda of federal regulatory actions.  
See https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaInactive.  
201.  12 U.S.C. §§ 3401(3), 3402. 
202.  TouchPay Holdings, LLC, Privacy Statement at ¶ 5(B) https://www.gtlfsonline 
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meaningful information on data usage, specifically any usage that may 
make the vendor a data furnisher for purposes of the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act.203 
Perhaps the most troublesome data-related practice by prison retailers is 
a seeming unwillingness to seriously comply with commonly accepted data-
security frameworks.  As Professor William McGeveran has shown in his 
analysis of fourteen leading systems of data security, a generally accepted 
legal duty of data security has begun to emerge from various sources of 
public and private law.204  As companies become more attuned to data 
security, many of these accepted principles become enforceable duties 
through the force of contractual agreements.205  But with correctional 
administrators apparently unconcerned about the security of consumers’ 
data, there does not appear to be growing use of contractual commitments 
to enforce security standards, thus leaving legislative action as the last 
apparent line of defense. 
IV. Potential Sources of Protection 
Most problems facing consumers in the prison retail-sector can be 
traced back to one fundamental shortcoming: on both the state and federal 
levels, no entity has been tasked with protecting the interests of incarcerated 
people or their families.  Such protection could be provided either through 
the procurement process or through ex ante regulation, but neither type of 
reform has happened, usually for lack of political will.  As discussed in this 
section, some laws do provide protections to prison-retail customers, but 
these provisions tend to be piecemeal, outdated, and not created with 
incarcerated people in mind.  Without a regulatory agency specifically 
focused on fairness and equity in the prison retailing sector, advocacy 
groups have been pursuing increasingly sophisticated strategies to fill in the 
gaps in consumer protection.  While litigation and regulatory advocacy 
have produced victories, such efforts are unlikely to result in 
comprehensive protections without laws that are intentionally designed to 
provide ex ante consumer protections to incarcerated people. 
A. Telecommunications Law 
As noted previously, the landmark Wright rulemaking grew out of a 
 
pay.com/portal/includes/privacy.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2019).  
203.  See 15 U.S.C. §1681s-2. 
204.  William McGeveran, The Duty of Data Security 102 MINN. L. REV. 1135, 1178 
(2019).  
205.  Id. at 1172-78.  
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2000 lawsuit challenging ICS rates.206  When referring the matter to the 
FCC under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the district court 
specifically cited two statutory grants of jurisdiction that allowed the 
Commission to address the plaintiffs’ concerns.  First, the court pointed to 
the FCC’s powers over common carriers, contained in title II of the 
Communications Act, specifically the mandate to ensure that carriers’ 
“charges, practices, classifications, and regulations” are “just and 
reasonable.”207  In addition, the court cited the 1996 Act’s payphone 
provision, § 276, which directs the FCC to ensure competition and “fair 
compensation” in the payphone industry while also classifying all “inmate 
telephone service” as payphone service.208 
In 2015, when the FCC issued its final ICS rules, it relied on both title 
II and § 276 for jurisdiction.209  The final rule imposed rate caps on all ICS 
calls (both inter- and intrastate) and capped ancillary fees.210  Significantly, 
the FCC reaffirmed its earlier finding that, for purposes or regulatory 
accounting, site commissions were not a legitimate cost of providing 
communications services.211  Two commissioners dissented from the final 
rule.  Commissioner Michael O’Rielly’s dissent appears to be motivated in 
part by antipathy toward incarcerated people,212 but then-Commissioner 
(now Chairman) Ajit Pai wrote a more analytical dissent that accurately 
presaged the outcome of the ICS industry’s petition for review to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.  Pai’s dissent 
criticized two aspects of the final rule.  First, he expressed doubt that the 
FCC had jurisdiction to regulate intrastate rates and charges.  In making this 
argument, Pai conceded that many of the protections in the rule could be 
validly enacted as to interstate calls under the commission’s title II 
authority, but he found the intrastate rate caps to be insufficiently 
authorized by title II or § 276.213  Pai’s second point of dissent addressed 
the Commission’s calculation of the rates caps, which he argued did not 
allow ICS carriers to recoup their costs.214 
 
206.  See supra note 17. 
207.  Wright v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. 00-cv-293-GK, slip op. at 6-7 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 
2001), ECF No. 94 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 201(b)). 
208.  Id. at 8. 
209.  Second Report & Order, supra note 40 at ¶ 3, n.12 and at 12766. 
210.  Id. at 12769. 
211.  Id. at 12819. 
212.  Id., Dissenting Stmt. of Comm’r Michael O’Rielly, 30 FCC Rcd. at 12971 
(“Despite the intentions of supporters, it is highly probable that the end result of the changes 
in this item will lead to a worse situation for prisoners and convicts, to which I am only so 
sympathetic.”). 
213.  Id. at 12960-64. 
214.  Id. at 12965-69. 
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The FCC issued its final rule in late 2015 and the ICS industry 
immediately petitioned for review in the D.C. Circuit.  On January 31, 
2017, shortly before the court held oral arguments, the FCC General 
Counsel filed a notice with the court citing a change in the Commission’s 
membership, and stating that the new majority had directed counsel to no 
longer defend the Commission’s regulation of intrastate rates or the method 
for calculating the 2015 rate caps.215  Although the Wright Petitioners, 
along with numerous advocacy groups, had intervened in the litigation and 
continued to defend the final rule, the FCC’s partial withdrawal still held 
legal significance, because the majority of the appellate panel concluded 
that the regulatory provisions that the Commission no longer defended were 
not entitled to Chevron deference.216 
A split panel of the D.C. Circuit vacated several parts of the FCC’s 
2015 rules, in an opinion written by Judge Harry Edwards.  The majority 
disagreed that the Commission had broad jurisdiction to regulate intrastate 
rates, and therefore vacated the rate caps and limits on ancillary fees, as 
applied to intrastate calls.217  While the Commission had cited 47 U.S.C. 
§§ 201 and 276 as jurisdictional bases for regulating intrastate rates, the 
majority focused on § 152(b)’s presumption against FCC regulation of 
intrastate communications.  The Commission, of course, had addressed this 
and relied on § 276 when capping intrastate rates.218  The majority 
acknowledged, as it had to, that § 276 allowed the Commission to preempt 
state law; however, the court went on to find that § 276’s requirement that 
payphone providers be “fairly compensated” allowed the Commission to 
require minimal adequate compensation, but did not allow it to limit 
unfairly high compensation.219 
Dissenting, Judge Cornelia Pillard wrote that the meaning of the fair-
compensation provision depended on “whether the word ‘fairly’ implies an 
ability to reduce excesses, as well as bolster deficiencies, in the 
compensation that payphone providers would otherwise receive.”  
Because the FCC had adopted the more expansive meaning after 
developing a thorough record as part of notice-and-comment rulemaking, 
 
215.  See generally, Letter from David M. Gossett, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Global 
Tel*Link v. Fed. Comm’cns Comm’n, No. 15-1461 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 31, 2017),  
216.  Global Tel*Link v. Fed. Comm’cns Comm’n, 866 F.3d 397, 407-08 (D.C. Cir. 
2017).  Although the court issued a subsequent clarifying statement (Id. at 416-19) claiming 
that the intrastate rate regulation and rate-cap methodology would have failed even under 
Chevron review, Judge Pillard’s dissent deftly points out why these provisions can be 
justified as one of several plausible interpretations of the Telecommunications Act, which is 
precisely the type of situation that Chevron is designed to address.  
217.  Id. at 402. 
218.  Second Report & Order, supra note 40, at ¶¶ 108-09.  
219.  Global Tel*Link, 866 F.3d at 408-12.  
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Judge Pillard argued that the Commission’s interpretation was entitled to 
Chevron deference and could be reversed only by the agency through a 
new rulemaking.220 
Although the court was hostile to the Commission’s regulation of 
intrastate matters, the majority echoed one of the more surprising aspects 
of Commissioner Pai’s dissent, finding that the limits on ancillary fees 
associated with interstate calls were proper under the Commission’s title 
II powers.221  The practical problem, however, is how to determine 
whether any given account fee (e.g., a fee for making a prepayment) is 
related to inter- or intrastate calls, if the account is used for both types of 
communications.222 
As for the Commission’s interstate rate caps, the ICS carriers 
challenged the FCC’s methodology, not jurisdiction.  The court was largely 
sympathetic to the ICS industry, finding that the FCC’s exclusion of site 
commissions from recoverable costs was arbitrary and capricious, and 
further finding the use of industry-wide cost averages as a basis for rate 
caps was legally improper.223  Again parting ways with her colleagues, 
Judge Pillard criticized the majority’s finding that site commissions are 
“obviously” costs of providing communications.224  She argued that a 
commission “might, in some sense, be ‘related’ to the provision of 
payphone services . . . but it is not ‘reasonably’ related because acceding to 
such preexisting contractual relationships is inconsistent with the statutory 
scheme [of ‘fair compensation’].”225 
One of the only substantive portions of the D.C. Circuit’s opinion that 
received unanimous approval from the panel was the holding vacating the 
Commission’s rule requiring annual reporting of ICS carriers’ revenues and 
costs related to video visitation services.  The court noted that the 
Commission had not explained how video visitation was a “communication 
by wire or radio,” as required for the exercise of title II jurisdiction.226 
The FCC has not taken steps to issue new rules in the wake of the D.C. 
 
220.  Id. at 420-21. 
221.  Id. at 415 (“Contrary to Petitioners’ contentions, the Order’s imposition of 
ancillary fee caps in connection with interstate calls is justified.  The Commission has 
plenary authority to regulate interstate rates under § 201(b), including ‘practices . . . for and 
in connection with’ interstate calls.”). 
222.  Id. at 415 (upholding FCC’s jurisdiction to limit ancillary fees for interstate calls, 
but remanding because “we cannot discern from the record whether ancillary fees can be 
segregated between interstate and intrastate calls.”); see also Mojica v. Securus Tech., No. 
14-cv-5258, 2018 WL 3212037, *5-6 (W.D. Ark. June 29, 2018) (discussing methodological 
difficulties of allocating fees between inter- and intrastate calls). 
223.  GTL, 866 F.3d at 412-15. 
224.  Id. at 413. 
225.  Id. at 424. 
226.  Id. at 415. 
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Circuit’s ruling.  The Wright class action lawsuit is still open, with the 
parties disagreeing on whether there is an ongoing role for the district 
court.227  As for call rates, the appellate court vacated the rate caps in the 
FCC’s 2015 order, which means interstate ICS rates are now subject to the 
higher rate caps contained in the FCC’s 2013 interim order, and intrastate 
rates are subject only to regulation by state public utilities commissions.228  
In the meantime, ICS carriers have sought to escape intrastate regulation in 
some jurisdictions by citing their use of VoIP technology, which is 
sometimes exempt from state regulation.229  This leads to the possibility of 
wholly unregulated intrastate rates, which is of particular concern in jails, 
where incarcerated people are more likely to have ties to the local area and 
therefore are more likely to make intrastate calls. 
Ironically, the Court of Appeals reinforced the jurisdictional importance 
of intra- and interstate calling at a time when even ICS carriers 
acknowledge that there is no material difference in cost based on the intra/
interstate distinction.230  Moreover, ICS carriers have already lost their fight 
to prohibit families from using VoIP routing to engage in a type of pro-
consumer regulatory arbitrage.231  In 2009, Securus challenged family 
members’ right to route ICS calls to a VoIP number assigned to the same 
local dialing area as a distant prison in order to take advantage of lower 
prices in jurisdictions that have capped intrastate rates.232  The FCC rejected 
Securus’s challenge and some consumers can now use this technology to 
take advantage of any favorable disparities in inter- and intrastate ICS rates.  
Once again, however, the potential salutary effects of VoIP routing 
illustrates the differences between customers in prisons and jails.  The 
family of someone incarcerated for a prolonged period in a distant prison is 
likely to have the time and financial incentive to set up a local-dial VoIP 
number if it allows for significant savings over the long term.  But the 
 
227.  See Joint Status Report, Wright v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. 00-293 (D.D.C., Dec. 
28, 2018), ECT No. 216. 
228.  The 2013 order capped interstate rates at 21¢ per minute for prepaid calls and 25¢ 
for collect calls, and also created “safe harbor” rates of 12¢ and 14¢ (for prepaid and collect 
calls, respectively), which are presumed to be reasonable.  First Report & Order, supra note 
38 at ¶¶ 60 and 73, 28 FCC Rcd. at 14140, 14147. 
229.  See Helien, supra notes 129. 
230.  See Comments of Securus Technologies, Inc., In the Matter of the Amendment of 
ARM 38.5.3401, 38.5.3403, and 38.5.3405, the Adoption of New Rule I and the Repeal of 
ARM 38.5.3414 Pertaining to Operator Service Provider Rules, Montana Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, at 5 (Sept. 19, 2017) (“[The VoIP technology] used by most ICS providers today 
means the ‘distance’ between the origination and termination points of an ICS call has little 
to no effect on the transport costs of an ICS call.”). 
231.  In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Ruling of Securus Tech., WC Docket. 
No. 09-144, Declaratory Ruling & Order, 28 FCC Rcd. 13913 (Sept. 26, 2013). 
232.  Id. at 5-6. 
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family of someone who unexpectedly lands in jail and must make an 
emergency call does not realistically have the ability to leverage such 
technology for their benefit. 
Although the regulatory future of the ICS industry is unclear for a 
variety of reasons, there are three prominent trends that can be gleaned from 
recent experience: statutes that lag behind technology, the ascendency of 
bundled services and cross-subsidies, and the importance of activism. 
1. Technology Has Outpaced the Regulatory Framework 
As is the case in many areas of telecommunications, the law 
governing ICS carriers has not kept pace with technology.  This is most 
notable in the context of § 276, a statute of diminishing relevance outside 
of correctional facilities, as payphones disappear from the landscape.233  
The disconnect between statutory language and technological reality 
becomes even more prominent as ICS carriers rely increasingly on 
emerging technologies like video visitation and electronic messaging to 
drive revenue.  While legislation clarifying the FCC’s powers over these 
new services would be welcome, the Commission need not wait for 
congressional action, since existing law already provides sufficient 
regulatory jurisdiction.  There are strong arguments in favor of regulating 
non-telephone communications services under either title II of the 
Communications Act or § 706 of the 1996 Act. 
Section 706 of the 1996 Act expressly directs the FCC to “encourage 
the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced 
telecommunications capability to all Americans . . . by utilizing . . . price 
cap regulation, regulatory forbearance, measures that promote competition 
in the local telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that 
remove barriers to infrastructure investment.”234  Electronic messaging and 
video conferencing are both classified as “advanced communications 
services” under the Act and thus fall within the scope of § 706.235  The D.C. 
Circuit has characterized § 706 as a grant of authority,236 and the FCC relied 
on this jurisdiction when issuing its 2015 Open Internet Order.237  Even 
 
233.  See generally Nathaniel Meyersohn, There are still 100,000 pay phones in 
America, CNN Money (Mar. 19, 2018), https://money.cnn.com/2018/03/19/news/companies/ 
pay-phones/index.html. 
234.  47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2015). 
235.  47 U.S.C. § 153(1) (2010). 
236.  Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 637 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“The question, then, is this: 
Does the Commission’s current understanding of section 706(a) as a grant of regulatory 
authority represent a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute?  We believe it does.”). 
237.  In the Matter of Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN Docket. 14-28 
at 273-282, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601,5721-5724 (Feb. 26, 2015); but see In the Matter of Restoring 
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during the brief period when the FCC reclassified internet service as a title 
II service, the Commission nonetheless eschewed rate regulation and other 
affirmative intervention in favor of substantial regulatory forbearance, 
consistent with the policy expressed in § 706.238  Unlike broadband internet 
access, for which there is a competitive (if highly concentrated) market, the 
FCC has already found that ICS markets are not competitive and therefore 
need regulation to correct market failures.239  Section 706’s reference to 
making advanced communications available to “all Americans” should be 
interpreted for the benefit of incarcerated people, since Congress clearly 
had incarcerated users in mind when drafting the inmate phone provision of 
§ 276, which was part of the same legislation that enacted § 706.  
Accordingly, the FCC already has statutory authority to impose price caps 
on new ICS technologies like video visitation and electronic messaging. 
Advanced technologies are also susceptible to regulation as a 
telecommunications service under title II of the Act.  ICS carriers make the 
self-interested argument that ICS offerings are information services, 
because federal policy (both before and after enactment of the 1996 Act) 
has been to avoid regulation of such services.240  But the FCC already 
determined that ICS telephone service is not an information service, and the 
same reasoning should be applied to advanced technologies.  The essential 
defining characteristic of telecommunications service is “the transmission 
of information between or among points with no ‘change in the form or 
content.’”241  The mutually-exclusive category of information service 
encompasses products that store, retrieve, and process information.242  Of 
course, ICS telephone service involves extensive computer storage, 
retrieval, and processing of information, but in denying the carriers’ 
requests to classify ICS as an information service, the FCC concluded that 
such features were merely used to support the provision of 
 
Internet Freedom, WC Docket. No. 17-108, Declaratory Ruling, Report and Order, and 
Order 267, 33 FCC Rcd. 311, 470 (Jan. 4, 2018) (“We find that provisions in section 706 of 
the 1996 Act directing the Commission to encourage deployment of advanced 
telecommunications capability are better interpreted as hortatory rather than as independent 
grants of regulatory jurisdiction.”). 
238.  Id. at 434-542. 
239.  Id. 
240.  The categories “communications service” and “information service” were first 
developed in the FCC’s Computer Inquiries, and subsequently enacted as statutory 
definitions as part of the 1996 Act. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 153(24), (50), and (53) (definitions); 
Nat’l Cable & Telecommc’ns Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs, 545 U.S. 967, 975-977 
(2005); See Comments of Prison Policy Initiative, In the Matter of Rates for Interstate 
Inmate Calling Services, WC Docket No. 12-375, at 4, n.19 (Feb. 8, 2016). 
241.  Peter W. Huber, Michael K. Kellogg & John Thorne, Federal 
Telecommunications Law § 12.2.3 (2d ed. 2018) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 153(50)). 
242.  47 U.S.C. § 153(24) (2010). 
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telecommunications service, and therefore should not be treated as 
information services.243  The same can be said for emerging technologies: 
the end-user pays to transmit an unmodified message (either text-based or 
video) from point to point.  The carrier’s use of information services is 
incidental to the provision of telecommunications service, and the facility’s 
use of extensive computerized security features (which may qualify as 
information services) is an entirely separate product. 
Although the FCC has assiduously avoided regulating new 
technologies under title II, market analysis should lead to a different 
result in the case of service in correctional facilities.  Even Chairman 
Pai, who objected to the extent of the FCC’s new ICS rules, admitted 
that the ICS market is riddled with failure and cannot be left to the 
whims of monopoly carriers.244  Title II and § 706 allow the FCC to 
regulate wireline services regardless of the specific technology utilized, 
and the Commission can use these powers (informed by the court’s 
decision in the Global Tel*Link case) to craft a regulatory regime that is 















243.  In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Ruling by the Inmate Calling Services 
Providers Task Force, RM-8181, Declaratory Ruling at 28-32, 11 FCC Rcd. 7362, 7374-
7377 (Feb. 20, 1996) (“[E]nhanced services do not include the functionality between the 
subscriber and the network for call set-up, routing, cessation, caller or calling party 
identification, or billing and accounting.”). 
244.  First Report & Order, supra note 38 at 111-131 (Ajit Pai, dissenting) (“I believe 
that the government should usually stay its hand in economic matters and allow the price of 
goods and services to respond to consumer choice and competition.  But sometimes the 
market fails.  And when it does, government intervention carefully tailored to address that 
market failure is appropriate.  The provision of inmate calling services (ICS) is one such 
market. . . .  [W]e cannot necessarily count on market competition to keep prices for inmate 
calling services just and reasonable.”).  
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2. The New Cross-Subsidies 
Modern regulatory theory generally favors unbundling of services.245  
Yet bundled contracts that combine regulated and unregulated services are 
common in the ICS sector,246 giving rise to a new twist on the longstanding 
problem of cross-subsidies.  Historically, U.S. telecommunications law has 
focused on one type of cross-subsidy: an incumbent provider using 
revenues from regulated services to subsidize unregulated services and 
charge below-market rates, thereby undercutting competition.247  The 
probable cross-subsidies in the 
current ICS market are different: 
carriers are most likely using 
excess revenues from unregulated 
video and electronic messaging 
service to compensate for the rents 
they can no longer collect through 
telephone charges.  This dynamic 
is not merely hypothetical—
Securus has pitched potential investors by touting the fact that 65% of its 
2015 corporate revenues came from unregulated business lines in 2015, up 
from 0% in 2007.248 
The dynamics of the new cross-subsidies are novel, but they are not 
unheard of.  In his comprehensive categorization of cross-subsidies, 
economist D.A. Heald acknowledged that regulated activities could be 
subsidized by competitive products, but he characterized such an 
arrangement as “uncommon.”249  This type of cross-subsidy cannot be 
sustained in the long term, to the extent that the “economy outside the 
 
245.  Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of 
Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1340 (1998) (“Under the new 
paradigm, . . . carriers are required to unbundle . . . end-to-end service into constituent parts 
in order to allow end-users to mix and match different service elements to suit their own 
needs and tastes.”). 
246.  See Comments of Prison Pol’y Initiative, In the Matter of Rates for Interstate 
Inmate Calling Services, WC Dkt.No. 12-375 (Jan. 19, 2016).  
247.  In the Matter of Separation of Costs of Regulated Telephone Service from Costs 
of Nonregulated Activities, CC Docket. No. 86-111, Report & Order 33, 2 FCC Rcd. 1298, 
1304 (Feb. 6, 1987); see also PETER TEMIN, THE FALL OF THE BELL SYSTEM: A STUDY IN 
PRICES AND POLITICS 179-190 (1987) (discussion of Congressional action to address cross-
subsidization in the Bell system). 
248.  Securus Lender Presentation, supra note 98, at 26 (“By investing in businesses 
that are not regulated by the FCC/PSC/PUCs, Securus has successfully decreased its 
exposure to potential rate of return regulation.”). 
249.  D. A. Heald, Public Policy Towards Cross Subsidy, 68 ANNALS OF PUB. & 
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regulated sector is competitive.”250  Of course, because unregulated prison 
communication services are offered on a monopoly basis, the unregulated 
market is not competitive, and this unusual breed of cross-subsidy can 
likely be perpetuated indefinitely. 
When the FCC 
designed rules to 
prevent incumbent 




framed the issue as 
one of ensuring that 
regulated rates 
remained just and reasonable.251  The same concerns apply to the new type 
of ICS cross-subsides, even though the flow of funds is inverted.  The FCC 
set ICS rate caps in reference to carrier costs.  Although the underlying cost 
data are confidential, the FCC calculated the 2015 rate caps with the goal of 
allowing carriers to operate profitably.  Assuming this means net revenues 
roughly in line with the overall telecommunications industry,252 and using 
purely hypothetical numbers, a carrier’s profitability for a given contract 
could look something like the data shown in Table 2, and the profit margin 
can be considered reasonable and just.  But if that contract was actually 
awarded on a bundled basis for phone service, electronic messaging, and 
video visitation, then the carrier’s profit under the contract—including all 
revenue and redistributed fixed network costs—could resemble Table 3.  
Under this scenario, it is difficult to say that the telephone rates are just and 
reasonable when they are an integral, indispensable part of a contract that 
yields profits over three times the industry average. 
The FCC can easily head off this problem by regulating rates charged 
for new technologies, as advocated in the previous section.  In the absence 
 
250.  Id. 
251.  Joint Cost Order, supra note 227 at 37, at 1303 (“We reaffirm that protecting 
ratepayers from unjust and unreasonable interstate rates is the primary purpose behind the 
accounting separation of regulated from nonregulated activities, just as it is the purpose 
behind all of our accounting and cost allocation rules. Our commitment to cost-based rates 
demands close attention to the manner in which the costs a company uses to support its 
[regulated offerings] are separated from the other costs of the company.”). 
252.  For illustrative purposes, Prof. Aswath Damodaran of the Stern School of 
Business at New York University reports that after-tax unadjusted operating margin for the 
telecommunications services sector is 16.59% (as of January 2018).  See Aswath 
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of this preferable resolution, any attempts to regulate telephone rates will 
prove to be illusory unless accompanied by robust data collection that 
covers all bundled services.  Although the D.C. Circuit invalidated the 
FCC’s attempts to collect data on video visitation revenue and costs,253 the 
court did so based on an inadequate record, not on an outright lack of 
jurisdiction, thus leaving the door open for a renewed attempt at 
comprehensive, technology-neutral regulation of communications service in 
correctional facilities. 
3. Advocacy and Activism 
The history of activism on behalf of families of incarcerated people in 
the United States is long and storied.254  The modern face of organizing 
against commercial exploitation of incarcerated people and their families is 
the coalition of individuals and organizations that initiated the Wright 
rulemaking and state-level campaigns throughout the country.  One 
unintentionally positive byproduct of the FCC’s years of inaction is that by 
the time the Commission finally promulgated rules, a broad coalition of 
organizations had found common cause with the Wright petitioners and 
joined in the calls for reform.255  Consumer advocacy in the ICS realm has 
consisted of litigation, legislative campaigns, and participation in regulatory 
proceedings.  This work has laid the foundation for the next round of the 
fight for fair telecom rates. 
Title II of the Communications Act requires “just and reasonable” rates, 
and provides consumer with a private cause of action to sue for 
violations.256  But exercising this private right can be difficult.  Many courts 
(including, most obviously, the district court that heard the Wright case257) 
have invoked the doctrine of primary jurisdiction when faced with 
challenges to rates.258  While this doctrine does not necessarily bring about 
 
253.  See GTL, supra note 223. 
254.  Ruth Wilson Gilmore, You Have Dislodged A Boulder: Mothers and Prisoners in 
the Post Keynesian California Landscape, 8 TRANSFORMING ANTHROPOLOGY 12 (1999) 
(examining grassroots family responses to mass incarceration). 
255.  Second Report & Order, supra note 40 at 12926 (in addition to numerous 
advocates for the rights of incarcerated people, comments were submitted by religious 
communities, disability-rights activists, the American Bar Association, immigrant 
communities, the Minority Media and Telecommunications Counsel, and the National 
Association of State Utility Consumer Advocates). 
256.  47 U.S.C. § 201(a)(1938); 47 U.S.C. § 207(1934); Global Crossing 
Telecomm’cns v. Metrophones Telecomm’cns, 550 U.S. 45, 53-54 (2007) (explaining private 
cause of action).  
257.  See Wright v. Corr. Corp of Am., supra note 207. 
258.  Madeleine Severin, Is There a Winning Argument against Excessive Rates for 
Collect Calls from Prisoners? 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1469, 1490-1494 (2004). 
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the conclusive end of a legal challenge, it can result in decades of delay, as 
the Wright Petitioners can attest.  Courts have also used the filed rate 
doctrine to dispose of consumer litigation, although that doctrine is 
increasingly inapplicable in deregulated markets.259 
At least three class action suits regarding ICS rates have been certified 
in recent years.  The district court in Fayetteville, Arkansas certified a class 
action against Secruus and GTL in 2017, when plaintiffs challenged the 
legality of site commissions under title II of the Communications Act and a 
claim for common-law unjust enrichment.260  But after the D.C. Circuit 
vacated the FCC’s attempts to rein in site commissions, the court 
decertified the class and dismissed the named plaintiffs’ claims.261  A 
similar suit in New Jersey has faired better.  Filed in 2013, plaintiffs 
challenged ICS rates under title II, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, New Jersey’s 
consumer protection act, and a theory of unjust enrichment.262  Plaintiffs 
ultimately chose to seek class certification on only two of their claims: 
violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”), and violations 
of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause (actionable via § 1983).  The court 
certified both claims over GTL’s objections.263  The New Jersey court 
granted class certification on August 6, 2018, and in early 2019 the parties 
commenced voluntary mediation.  While the New Jersey case is arguably 
the most successful ICS litigation since the Wright lawsuit, it is entirely 
retrospective—in 2016, the New Jersey legislature prohibited site 
commissions, cracked down on ancillary fees, and capped call rates at 11¢ 
per minute.264  Accordingly, the class action only concerns rates charged 
prior to the 2016 legislative fix.  Finally, a class action is currently pending 
in Massachusetts, alleging violations of that state’s consumer protection act 
 
259.  See Daleure v. Kentucky, supra note 130. 
260.  In re Glob. Tel*Link Corp., No. 14-cv-5275, 2017 WL 471571 (W.D. Ark.  
Feb. 3, 2017); Mojica v. Securus Tech., No. 14-cv-5258, 2018 WL 3212037 (W.D. Ark.  
June 29, 2018). 
261.  Mojica v. Securus Tech., No. 14-cv-5258, 2018 WL 3212037 (W.D. Ark.  
June 29, 2018). 
262.  Complaint, James et al. v. Global Tel*Link, et al., No. 13-cv-4989 (D.N.J.  
Aug. 20, 2013).  
263.  James v. Global*Tel Link, No. 13-cv-4989, 2018 WL 3727371 (D.N.J. Aug. 6, 
2018) (opinion re: motion to certify class) (Among other things, the court distinguished the 
plaintiffs’ New Jersey CFA claims from the unjust enrichment claims in the Arkansas case, 
noting that the common law of unjust enrichment depends heavily on plaintiffs’ 
individualized circumstances, (contravening the commonality requirement of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23(a)(2)), whereas a CFA claim was based on the overall reasonableness of 
GTL’s rates, and did not require adjudication of any facts specific to plaintiffs’ specific 
situations.); Id. at 11. 
264.  N.J. Stat. § 30:4-8.12 (2016). 
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based on Securus’s payments of site commissions to local jails.265 
While litigation is an important tool for advocates, legislative reform 
has the potential for more widespread and proactive relief from excessive 
telecom rates.  As the result of sustained public campaigns, several state 
and local governments have taken significant steps to curb abuses in the 
ICS industry.  Such steps can take various forms, including legislatively-
imposed rate caps.266  Alternatively, some states have passed more general 
mandates, directing correctional facilities to bring ICS rates in line with 
non-prison phone services.267  Other jurisdictions have avoided direct rate 
regulation, but have eliminated site commissions in an effort to bring down 
costs.268  Most promising is the advent of jurisdictions that have committed 
to provide phone calls completely free of charge.269 
Over several decades, activists have gained enough experience in 
litigating ICS issues that this advocacy work is now paying dividends.  
While much work remains to be done in the telecommunications area, 
advocacy organizations should also prioritize litigation and regulatory 
advocacy in other legal fields, as discussed in the following sections. 
B. Financial Services Law, Money Transmitters, and Prepaid Accounts 
The phrase “correctional banking” is a bit of a legal misnomer, given 
that the actual law of banking is implicated only at the periphery of the 
industry.  Although inmate trust funds are typically held in some kind of 
depository account, the incarcerated person with equitable title to the 
money has no direct customer relationship with the depository institution.  
 
265.  See Pearson v. Hodgson, infra note 338. 
266.  Id. (New Jersey rate caps of 11¢ per minute); 730 Ill. Compiled Statute 5/3-4-1(a-
5) (7¢ per minute rate caps). 
267.  R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-56-38.1(b) (“No telephone service provider shall charge a 
customer rate for calls made from a prison in excess of rates charged for comparable calls 
made in non-prison settings.  All rates shall reflect the lowest reasonable cost to inmates and 
call recipients.”); 2017 Mich. Pub. Act No. 107 (House Bill 4323) part 2, § 219 (provision  
in appropriations bill requiring that any new ICS contracts “shall include a condition that fee 
schedules for prisoner telephone calls . . . be the same as fee schedules for calls placed from 
outside of correctional facilities.”). 
268.  S.C. Code § 10-1-210 (“The State shall forego any commissions or revenues for 
the provision of pay telephones in institutions of the Department of Corrections and the 
Department of Juvenile Justice for use by inmates.”); Nebr. Dept. of Corr. Admin. Reg. 
205.03 ¶¶ IX and XII (requiring “rates and surcharges that are commensurate with those 
charged to the general public for like services,” and foregoing commissions from ICS 
revenue). 
269.  “NYC Makes Calls from Jail Free, 1st Major US City to Do So,” New York 
Times (May 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2019/05/01/us/ap-us-free-jail-
phone-call s.html?searchResultPosition=4 (allowance of 21 minutes of free calling time 
every three hours). 
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The job of a correctional banking vendor is simple: receive deposits and 
facilitate payments on behalf of a customer population who are not allowed 
to use cash, checks, or payment cards.  As a non-bank entity that uses 
technology to facilitate payments by or for the benefit of incarcerated 
people, correctional banking vendors are a niche type of financial 
technology (or “fintech”) firm.270  But even in an economic sector generally 
known for over-hyping its transformative nature,271 correctional banking 
fintechs do not provide any type of innovative or valuable service that 
justifies the high prices they charge. 
One of the few issues in the correctional banking sector to have 
received extensive judicial attention provides an informative illustration of 
current trends, although for reasons other than those discussed by the 
courts.  Four circuit courts of appeals have addressed the question of 
whether incarcerated people are entitled to interest earned on their trust 
account balances,272 with only one court holding that the beneficiary has a 
property right to earned interest.273  Given the small balances in most 
incarcerated peoples’ trust accounts, and today’s low interest rates, this may 
seem like an academic debate.  But the most recent appellate opinion to 
address the issue contains an important factual detail. 
Young v. Wall involved a challenge to Rhode Island’s 2001 decision to 
stop paying interest on trust accounts, when the Department of Corrections 
“decided to outsource management of a wide swath of back-room 
systems.”274  According to the court, the repeal of the previous interest 
policy was the result of “[c]omments from prospective vendors” who 
sought the contract to manage Rhode Island’s correctional banking 
system.275  The plaintiff in Young did not prevail, and the opinion stands as 
an illustration of the prison-retail economy as applied to correctional 
banking: accounts that had previously been held and invested by the state 
treasurer (with earned interest remitted to beneficiaries) were now 
controlled by a vendor and interest income was retained for the benefit of 
 
270.  See Adam J. Levitin, “Written Testimony before the U.S. House of 
Representatives, Comm. on the Fin. Servs., Subcomm. on Fin. Institutions & Consumer 
Credit” at 4 (Jan. 30, 2018), https://perma.cc/SNH7-PU6G (defining a fintech as a nonbank 
financial service company that uses “some sort of  digital technology to provide financial 
services to consumers”). 
271.  Id. (“[D]espite the regular use of buzzwords like ‘transformative’ and ‘disruptive’ 
in discussions about fintechs, there really isn’t anything particularly transformative or 
disruptive about them.”). 
272.  See Emily Tunink, Note, Does Interest Always Follow Principal?: A Prisoner’s 
Property Right to the Interest Earned on His Inmate Account under Young v. Wall, 642 F.3d 
49 (1st Cir. 2011), 92 NEB. L.REV. 212, 213 (2013) (discussing circuit split). 
273.  Schneider v. Cal. Dept. of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). 
274.  Young v. Wall, 642 F.3d 49, 52 (1st Cir. 2011). 
275.  Id. 
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the DOC.276  This fact pattern is echoed in many correctional-banking 
contracts, which seem to prioritize bureaucratic convenience over the best 
interests of the incarcerated accountholders. 
This section examines the sources of law that can apply to common 
problems in the world of correctional banking, starting with prepayments 
and moving on to contemporaneous payments.  The section concludes with 
a detailed consideration of prepaid debit cards issued to people upon their 
release from custody. 
1. Categorizing Prepayments 
As alluded to previously, prison retail payments can be sorted into two 
major types: prepayments for goods or services and contemporaneous 
payments or fund transfers.  In the case of prepayment, an incarcerated 
person or a family member transfers funds to a vendor who agrees to apply 
the amount toward future purchase.  Often the vendor will refer to such 
prepaid amounts as creating an “account,” but this terminology is 
misleading.  Prepayments held by vendors are simply unsecured contractual 
obligations of the vendor, and should not be analogized to deposit 
accounts.277  Making matters even more confusing for consumers, many 
correctional banking vendors collect trust account deposits and retail-
transaction prepayments, which can cause some consumers to confuse the 
two types of transactions (see Figure 1). 
Even though prepayments are often disadvantageous to consumers, they 
remain common in prison due to a combination of factors. First, facility 
instructions or vendor marketing materials may encourage customers to use 
prepayment options without fully explaining available alternatives.  Second, 
incarcerated people may voluntarily prefer prepayments in an effort to 
avoid routing funds through trust accounts, where money can be subject to 
levies for fees, fines, restitution, or civil judgments.278 
Prison-retail prepayments raise the same concerns that are implicated in 
many types of consumer prepaid products, specifically merchant insolvency 
and loss of prepaid funds through forfeiture provisions.279  Merchant 
 
276.  Joint Stmt. of Facts, Young v. Wall, No. 03-220S (D.R.I. Sept. 9, 2005), ECF No. 
71. 
277.  See Eniola Akindemowo, Contract, Deposit or E-Value? Reconsidering Stored 
Value Products For a Modernized Payments Framework, 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 275, 
278 (2009) (“[Stored value products] are technology-enabled contractual constructs rather 
than deposits, and . . . the use of deposit analogies to analyze them is generally 
inappropriate.”). 
278.  See Mushlin, supra note 30. 
279.  Norman I Silber & Steven Stites, “Merchant Authorized Consumer Cash 
Substitutes,” Hofstra Payments Processing Roundtable, at 3 (Mar. 14, 2018), http://ssrn.com/ 
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insolvency should be a major concern for customers because prison retailers 
tend to be closely-held firms whose financial health is difficult to gauge.  In 
the event of an insolvency event, customers with prepaid accounts would 
hold (likely worthless) unsecured claims.280 
Pernicious forfeiture provisions can result in substantial unfairness to 
customers, by eating away at prepaid balances through “service” or 
inactivity fees. Some vendors will refund prepaid amounts upon an 
incarcerated customer’s release from custody, while others do not.  Some 
vendors have even advertised prepaid products as a way for correctional 
agencies to avoid unclaimed property laws.281  These provisions are entirely 
a creature of private contract and could easily be prohibited through the 
terms of the vendor-facility contract.  Thus far, few facilities have shown 
any interest in protecting consumers by ending such confiscatory practices. 
2. Financial Services Law and Prison-Related Transfers 
Laws that can potentially apply to contemporaneous payments and 
transfers include the common-law of trusts, the Electronic Fund Transfer 
Act (“EFTA”),282 state money-transmitter statutes, and the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act (“GLBA”).283  To the extent a transaction involves an inmate 
trust account, the first step for consumer advocates should be to analyze 
whether the account is a bona fide trust, and if so, whether the trustee (most 
likely the correctional system or another government agency) has breached 
its fiduciary duty by, for example, allowing a vendor to diminish trust 
property by charging unreasonable fees.  The trust classification will 
depend on the law or administrative policy that creates the inmate trust 
system.  Although the name “inmate trust account” by itself is not 
dispositive, such accounts are often governed by generally applicable trust 
law.284  If the general law of trusts applies, beneficiaries may be able to 
 
abstract=3161453 (describing merchant insolvency and the absence of standard terms as 
“universal problems”). 
280.  Outside of bankruptcy, the consumer holding a prepayment claim against an 
insolvent merchant is likely to receive nothing.  In bankruptcy, the consumer may, as a best 
case scenario, receive a priority unsecured claim under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7).  See Justin R. 
Alberto & Gergory J. Flasser, “Solving the Gift Card Conundrum,” AM. BANKRUPTCY 
INSTITUTE JOURNAL (Dec. 2016), at 32. 
281.  See Prison Pol’y Initiative, supra note 46, at 5, n.22. 
282.  15 U.S.C. § 1693, et seq. 
283.  Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 
1338 (1999) (codified as scattered sections of titles 12, 15, 16, and 18, U.S. Code). 
284.  E.g., Matson v. Kansas. Dept. of Corr., 301 Kan. 654 (2015) (“[W]e have no 
difficulty finding the plain language of the applicable statutes establishes the inmate trust 
fund is, in fact, a trust subject to the [Kansas Uniform Trust Code].”); Washington v. Reno, 
35 F.3d 1093, 1101-1102 (6th Cir. 1994) (ruling that people incarcerated in Federal Bureau 
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challenge transaction fees to the extent the fees are not commercially 
reasonable.285  The determination of commercial reasonableness will be 
fact-specific and will likely involve a close examination of the purpose of 
the inmate trust fund, as defined by the enabling statute or other 
applicable authority.286  In addition, if a correctional agency acts as trustee 
of an inmate trust and receives commissions from a third-party 
administrator, then the agency may be vulnerable to a charge of breaching 
its duty of loyalty.287 
The EFTA, as implemented by Regulation E,288 likely applies to many 
transfers of money by family members, particularly debit-card payments,289 
but its actual substantive protections are minimal.  From the perspective of 
the incarcerated account holder, if an inmate trust account is a bona fide 
trust, then it is excluded from the EFTA’s definition of an “account.”290  In 
any event, even to the extent that EFTA applies to a particular party or 
transaction, the law is largely concerned with preventing unauthorized 
transactions, which does not appear to be a widespread problem in prison 
retailing.  Rather, the primary problem is exorbitant fees, but EFTA 
 
of Prisons could challenge the Bureau’s allegedly improper disbursements from the 
commissary trust fund, citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 199-200 (1959)).  The 
federal Bureau of Prisons maintains two trust funds (the Inmate Trust Fund and the 
Commissary Trust Fund).  The Department of Justice has taken the position that the Bureau 
is subject to different fiduciary duties with respect to the two different funds.  See Fiduciary 
Obligations Regarding Bureau of Prisons Commissary Fund, 19 Op. O.L.C. 127 (1995). 
285.  E.g., Upp v. Mellon Bank, N.A., 799 F. Supp. 540, 544-545 (E.D. Pa. 1992) 
(finding a breach of fiduciary duty by trustee who incurred bank fees not justified by cost or 
results), vacated for lack of diversity jurisdiction sub nom. Packard v. Provident Nat’l Bank, 
994 F.2d 1039 (3d Cir. 1993). 
286.  See, e.g., E. Armata, Inc. v. Korea Commercial Bank of NY, 367 F.3d 123, 133-
134 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that trustee of statutory trust created by the Perishable 
Agricultural Commodities Act did not breach fiduciary duties by holding trust funds in 
a bank account subject to fees because “maintaining a checking account with 
‘commercially reasonable’ terms may facilitate, rather than impede, the fulfillment of a 
PACA trustee’s duty to maintain trust assets so that they are freely available to satisfy 
outstanding obligations to sellers of perishable commodities” (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted)). 
287.  Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 78(2) (2007) (“[T]he trustee is strictly prohibited 
from engaging in transactions that involve self-dealing or that otherwise involve or create a 
conflict between the trustee’s fiduciary duties and personal interests.”). 
288.  12 C.F.R. pt. 1005. 
289.  12 C.F.R. § 1005.3(b)(1)(v). 
290.  12 C.F.R. § 1005.2(b)(3) (Regulation E’s definition of “account” excludes “an 
account held by a financial institution under a bona fide trust agreement.”); see also 12 
C.F.R., pt. 1005, appx. B ¶ 2(b)(2), cmt. 1 (“The term ‘bona fide trust agreement’ is not 
defined by the Act or regulation; therefore, financial institutions must look to state or other 
applicable law for interpretation.”). 
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contains little direct regulation of fees,291 instead favoring disclosure of 
costs under the premise that consumers will make informed choices.  In the 
context of correctional banking, the EFTA’s emphasis on disclosure is an ill 
fit, since consumers have no meaningful choice in financial companies. 
If a contractor facilitates transfers into or out of an inmate trust account, 
the contractor is most likely governed by state-level money transmitter 
laws.292  These laws vary greatly by state.293  The Uniform Money Services 
Act covers businesses that “receiv[e] money or monetary value for 
transmission,”294 but does not apply to a merchant that collects prepayments 
for future transactions.295  While the Uniform Act exempts state and local 
governments from its coverage, there is no exemption for an agent of a 
government296—a feature that should be retained if calls for a federal 
money transmitter license are developed.297 
The GLBA likely applies to several aspects of correctional banking, 
although publicly available evidence suggests that correctional banking 
vendors give little thought to complying with the law.298  The provisions 
most relevant to correctional banking are the privacy provisions found in 
title V of the GLBA.  These rules are applicable to entities that engage in 
“financial activities,” including transferring and safeguarding money.299  As 
 
291.  One of the few provisions of the EFTA that regulates fees is an amendment added 
by the CARD Act of 2009, which prohibits dormancy and service fees in connection with 
gift cards and general-use prepaid cards.  15 U.S.C. § 1693l-1.  These rules do not apply to 
most prison-retail prepayments, because the statute excludes stored-value products that are 
“reloadable and not marketed or labeled as a gift card or gift certificate.”  15 U.S.C. § 1693l-
1(a)(2)(D).  Nor does this provision appear to apply to release cards.  Humphrey v. Stored 
Value Cards, 355 F. Supp.3d 638, 643-644 (N.D. Ohio 2019) (holding that release cards are 
not general-use prepaid cards because they are not “marketed to the general public”). 
292.  But see Prison Pol’y Initiative, supra note 46, at 11, n.54 and accompanying text 
(discussing JPay’s unverified allegation that “few” correctional money services business 
comply with applicable state regulations). 
293.  Tunink, supra note 272, at 86, n. 44. 
294.  Id. at § 102(14). 
295.  Id. at § 102, cmt. 12 (“[O]nly stored value that consists of a medium of exchange 
evidence in electronic record would qualify as stored value for purposes of regulation.  A 
medium of exchange needs to be something that is widely accepted.  Closed-end systems, as 
mere bilateral units of account, therefore would be excluded from regulation.”). 
296.  Id. at § 103(3); see also Id. at § 201(a)(2) (licenses are not required for an agent 
of a licensee, but the Act contains no comparable provision for an agent of an exempt entity). 
297.  E.g., Levitin, supra note 270 at 16 (“A federal money transmitter license, coupled 
with some sort of federal insurance for funds held by money transmitters . . . would be a 
simple move that would help reduce unnecessary regulatory burdens.”). 
298.  The one exception is JPay, which briefly mentions GLBA’s data protection 
provisions in its privacy policy.  Despite this terse reference to the law, JPay does not appear 
to address GLBA compliance in its bid proposals, nor is there any mention of the consumer 
disclosure and opt-out procedures. 
299.  15 U.S.C. § 6809(3); 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(A). 
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a covered entity that is not overseen by a bank regulator, correctional 
banking vendors are covered by the GLBA implementing regulations issued 
by the FTC.300  The GLBA privacy provisions that can potentially benefit 
incarcerated consumers include notification of privacy practices and the 
ability to opt out of certain information sharing.301  Covered entities must 
also develop a data security plan, which must include certain elements 
designated by the FTC.302  Although noncompliance cannot be addressed 
through private litigation (GLBA does not include a private cause of 
action), a consumer who can show injury resulting from a covered entity’s 
failure to comply with the GLBA standards, may be able to bring a UDAP 
claim on that basis.303 
3. Legal Issues Related to Release Cards 
The area of correctional banking that is most clearly covered by the 
EFTA is the use of prepaid debit cards (“release cards”) to pay amounts due 
to incarcerated people upon their release from custody.304  The cards are 
open-loop stored value cards that can be used on the MasterCard payment 
network.  Although EFTA’s general applicability to release cards has been 
unclear in the past, the CFPB clarified matters in its latest amendments to 
Regulation E.  Effective April 1, 2018, Regulation E’s definition of 
“account” includes prepaid accounts,305 and the CFPB’s commentary 
explaining the amended rule specifically cites release cards as a type of 
prepaid product that is covered by the new definition.306  While the CFPB’s 
decision to expressly include release cards within the scope of Regulation E 
is an improvement, more work remains to determine the precise extent of 
the rights conferred by this change in regulation. 
Regulation E prohibits payers from requiring a consumer to use a 
certain financial institution (including a specific prepaid card) for receipt of 
wages or government benefits.307  During the CFPB’s last EFTA 
rulemaking, several advocacy groups requested that the Bureau extend the 
 
300.  16 C.F.R. § 313.1(b). 
301.  Id. at §§ 313.5 (annual privacy notices), 313.7 (opt-out procedure). 
302.  Id. at § 314.4. 
303.  NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., Fair Credit Reporting § 18.4.1.14 (9th ed. 2017). 
304. See generally, Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, Rules Concerning 
Prepaid Accounts Under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (Regulation E) and the Truth in 
Lending Act (Regulation Z), 83 FED. REG. 6364, 6449 (2018). 
305.  Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 12 C.F.R. § 1005.2(b)(3) (2018). 
306.  Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, Prepaid Accounts under the Electronic 
Fund Transfer Act (Regulation E) and the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z),” [hereinafter 
Regulation E Amendments] 81 FED. REG. 83934, 83968 (Nov. 22, 2016). 
307.  Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 12 C.F.R. § 1005.10(e)(2). 
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compulsory-use prohibition to release cards.308  Although the Bureau 
declined to adopt these requested changes, it did note that “to the extent 
that . . . prison release cards are used to disburse consumers’ salaries or 
government benefits . . . such accounts are already covered by 
§ 1005.10(e)(2) and will continue to be so under this final rule.”309  This 
“clarification” actually creates some uncertainty, because it does not specify 
whether a payroll disbursement must be contemporaneous with the 
employee’s earning of the underlying compensation.  When someone is 
released from prison, they might receive disbursement of accumulated 
wages earned during the term of their incarceration.  To the extent that the 
compulsory-use prohibition applies to delayed disbursements of wages, 
then Regulation E would prohibit mandatory use of release cards to make 
such payments. 
Consumer litigation concerning release cards holds promise.  
Encouragingly, most courts have held that arbitration provisions in release-
card contracts are unenforceable, given the inability of consumers to 
realistically withhold their consent.310  The outlier case, where an arbitration 
agreement was held enforceable, is a case from Florida where the district 
court found the plaintiff had been given a clear choice of receiving his 
funds via debit card or check.311  Claims under the EFTA have met with 
mixed success: one court has dismissed a class-action claim alleging that 
release cards charge fees in violation of the EFTA’s stored-value card 
provisions.312  Another court granted summary judgment in favor of 
 
308.  See RAHER, supra note 68, at 8-9. 
309.  Regulation E Amendments, supra note 304, at 83985. 
310.  Reichert v. Keefe Commissary Network, No. 17-cv-5848-RBL, 2018 WL 
2018452, *2 (order denying motions to compel arbitration) (W.D. Wash. May 1, 2018) (“All 
contracts, including those to arbitrate disputes, must have mutual assent, and Defendants’ 
‘contract’ to arbitrate is unenforceable and unconscionable under Washington law.”); Brown 
v. Stored Value Cards, Inc., No. 15-cv-01370-MO, 2016 WL 755625, 4 (order denying 
motion to compel arbitration) (D. Or. Feb. 25, 2016) (“[Plaintiff] had to take the card and 
had to work through the Defendants’ system in order to get her money back. . . .  It is not 
clear that Plaintiff was presented with a meaningful choice, as such I DENY the Motion to 
Compel.”); see also Regan v. Stored Value Cards, Inc., 85 F. Supp.3d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2015), 
aff’d 608 FED. APPX. 895 (11th Cir. 2015) (defendants argued that plaintiff had impliedly 
accepted or ratified the cardholder agreement through his use of the release card; court 
denied motion to compel arbitration and ordered an evidentiary hearing on whether a 
contract had been formed; case settled before evidentiary hearing).  
311.  Pope v. EZ Card & Kiosk, LLC, No. 15-cv-61046, 2015 WL 5308852 (S.D. Fla. 
Sept. 11, 2015). 
312.  Brown v. Stored Value Cards, Inc., No. 15-cv-01370-MO, 2016 WL 4491836, at 
*1-2 (D. Or. Aug. 25, 2018) (dismissing claim that release-card fees are levied in violation 
of 15 U.S.C. § 1693l-1(b), based on holding that the stored-value card provision does not 
apply to cards that are not “marketed to the general public.”  See 12 C.F.R. § 1005.20(b)(4)), 
appeal docketed No. 18-35735 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 2018). 
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plaintiffs who allege that compulsory issuance of release cards violates 
EFTA’s prohibition on unauthorized issuance of access devices.313  Finally, 
the district court for the Western District of Washington has certified a class 
of Washington residents asserting violations of both the stored-value card 
fee provision and the compulsory-issuance provision (the same court 
deferred deferring ruling on a motion to certify a national class pursuing the 
same claims).314  Most release-card class-actions have also included general 
claims such as Fifth Amendment takings, unjust enrichment, conversion, or 
violations of UDAP statutes.  These types of claims have frequently 
survived a motion to dismiss or led to an advantageous settlement.315 
C. UDAP Statutes 
Statutes in every state prohibit the use of unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices (“UDAP”) in consumer transactions.  In the past, UDAP laws 
have been of limited relevance in prison because incarcerated people 
engaged in relatively few commercial transactions.  With the rise of prison 
retailing, however, these laws are becoming increasingly salient.  Prison-
retail vendors often employ tactics that are deceptive, unfair, or 
unconscionable for purposes of consumer protection law.  Notably, UDAP 
statutes not only allow enforcement by state attorneys general, but 
frequently provide a private cause of action as well.316  The private 
enforcement option is critically important because attorneys general are 
unlikely to aggressively promote the rights of incarcerated people, since 
doing so would typically be met with consternation by agencies that are 
 
313.  Humphrey v. Stored Value Cards, 355 F. Supp.3d 638, 642-643 (N.D. Ohio 2019) 
(denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment on claim that unsolicited issuance of 
release cards violates 15 U.S.C. § 1693i); Humphrey v. Stored Value Cards, No. 18-cv-1050, 
2019 WL 1439771 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 1, 2019) (granting sua sponte summary judgment on 
plaintiff’s § 1693i claim, and certifying the decision for interlocutory appeal). 
314.  Reichert v. Keefe Commissary Network, No. 17-cv-5848-RBL, 2019 WL 2022678 
(W.D. Wash. May 8, 2019) (Order on Motion for Class Certification). 
315.  See Reichert, 2018 WL 2018452, at *3 (denying motion to dismiss plaintiff’s 
conversion and unjust enrichment claims, as well as claims under the Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment (actionable through § 1983) and the Washington Consumer Protection 
Act); Humphrey v. Stored Value Cards, No. 18-cv-1050, 2018 WL 6011052 (N.D. Ohio 
Nov. 16, 2018) (certifying class claims for conversion and unjust enrichment); Brown v. 
Stored Value Cards, Inc., No. 15-cv-01370-MO, 2016 WL 4491836, at *4-5 (D. Or. Aug. 
25, 2016) (denying motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for conversion and unjust 
enrichment); see generally, First Amended Complaint, Adams v. Cradduck, No. 5:13-cv-
05074-PKH, ECF No. 6 (W.D. Ark. May 9, 2013), (pleading Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment violations (actionable through § 1983), conversion, and trespass to chattels 
316.  See generally, Dee Pridgen, The Dynamic Duo of Consumer Protection: State and 
Private Enforcement of Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Law, 81 ANTITRUST L.J.  
911 (2017). 
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either clients of the attorney general (in the case of state prison systems) or 
at the very least are ideologically aligned with the state’s chief law 
enforcement officer (in the case of county jails). 
As defined by the FTC, a deceptive practice requires a false or 
misleading material claim or omission that is likely to mislead a 
consumer.317  Although deception is prohibited under the UDAP statutes in 
most states,318 not all jurisdictions follow the FTC’s definition.  In most 
states deception is akin to common-law fraud, but with more flexibility (for 
example, most states do not require proof of reliance to prove deception).319  
Advertisements, promotional materials, and product descriptions published 
by prison retailer vendors frequently contain deceptive claims.320  For 
example, the suggestion that a computer tablet has functions that it lacks in 
reality could be deceptive.321  As could advertised phone rates that do not 
adequately disclose or explain fees.322 
Not all states recognize claims for unfair or unconscionable practices, 
and of the states that do, not all provide consumers with a private cause of 
action.323  Under the FTC Act, a practice is unfair if it is “likely to cause 
substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by 
consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to 
consumers or to competition.”324  Other jurisdictions have employed even 
more expansive definitions of unfairness which seek to root out all manner 
 
317.  Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 1984 WL 565319, at *37 (1984) (“[T]he 
Commission will find an act or practice deceptive if, first, there is a representation, omission, 
or practice that, second, is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the 
circumstances, and third, the representation, omission, or practice is material.”). 
318.  NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES: A 50-STATE 
EVALUATION OF UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE PRACTICES LAWS, at 12-14 (Mar. 2018) (48 states 
plus D.C. have broadly worded prohibitions on deception). 
319.  NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 152 at § 4.2.3.1. 
320.  See, e.g., POM Wonderful v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 777 F.3d 478, 490 (D.C. Cir. 
2015) (“In determining whether an advertisement is deceptive in violation of section 5 of the 
FTC Act, the Commission engages in a three-step inquiry, considering: (i) what claims are 
conveyed in the ad, (ii) whether those claims are false, misleading, or unsubstantiated, and 
(iii) whether the claims are material to prospective consumers.”). 
321.  See In re Sony PS3 Other OS Litigation, 551 Fed. Appx. 916, 921-922 (9th Cir. 
2014) (misleading statements about computer functionality and operating life were 
actionable under California False Advertising Law). 
322.  Schnall v. Hertz Corp., 78 Cal. App. 4th 1144, 1163-1164 (2000) (company’s 
imposition of lawful fees was nonetheless actionable as deceptive practice because company 
failed “to make it clear to customers that an avoidable charge is considerably higher than the 
retail rate for an item or service, which in the absence of contrary information many would 
expect to apply”). 
323.  NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 318, at 15 (44 states plus D.C. broadly 
prohibit unfairness and/or unconscionability, although 5 of these do not always provide a 
private cause of action). 
324.  15 U.S.C. § 45(n)(2012). 
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of inequitable conduct.325  Unconscionability is typically defined by 
reference to various nonexclusive factors that focus on whether a merchant 
took advantage of  consumer’s vulnerability or knowingly structured a 
transaction in a particularly egregious manner.326  Prison-retail customers 
often have actionable claims for unfair or unconscionable practices because 
of their inability to avoid injury: prison retailers sell essential goods (food, 
clothing) or services (communication with family) through state-created 
monopolies, and if these vendors employ unfair tactics, customers have no 
alternative.  As one court found, families who pay exorbitant phone rates do 
so “out of sheer desperation for contact with their loved ones.”327 
Different types of consumer injuries are discussed in the following 
subsections.  It is first necessary to acknowledge that prison-retail 
customers are often severely impaired in their ability to vindicate their legal 
rights, due to contractual prohibitions on class adjudication.  In many ways, 
the enforcement of arbitration provisions and class-adjudication bans in the 
prison-retail realm stretches the legal justification of “consent” to its 
limits.328  Without diminishing the impact of arbitration provisions, it is 
nonetheless important to acknowledge and explore the frequent facial 
violations of UDAP statutes, in the form of unreasonable prices, oppressive 
contract terms, and efforts to evade sellers’ duties under article 2 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code. 
1. Prices 
Consumers who challenge prices should take care to highlight the ways 
in which prison-retail pricing resembles practices that have previously 
formed the basis for valid UDAP claims.  Specifically, practices such as use 
of monopoly power to extract excessive fees,329 or paying kickbacks to the 
 
325.  NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 146, at § 4.3.3.1. 
326.  Id. § 4.4.2; see also Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act § 4 (factors 
determining unconscionable practices). 
327.  James v. Global*Tel Link, No. 13-cv-4989, 2018 WL 3727371, at *2 (D.N.J. 
Aug. 6, 2018) (opinion re: motion to certify class). 
328.  See Reichert v. Keefe Commissary Network, No. 17-cv-5848-RBL, 2019 WL 
2022678, at *5 (W.D. Wash. May 8, 2019) (“According to Defendants [correctional banking 
vendors], voluntary deposits necessarily subject the inmate to the facility’s terms and 
conditions for distribution of the funds [including arbitration provision].  But Defendants 
gloss over the fact that inmates have no other means of using funds while in prison, making 
the ‘voluntariness’ of a deposit not so different from when cash is confiscated.”). 
329.  E.g. Ford v. ChartOne, Inc., 908 A.2d 72 (D.C. App. 2006) (consumer pleaded a 
valid claim for unconscionably high prices under the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures 
Act, where plaintiff’s only way to obtain copies of his own medical records was to pay $6.36 
per page to contractor selected by the medical provider). 
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issuer of a government contract.330  Some jurisdictions may recognize 
unreasonably high prices as unconscionable in and of themselves.331  Other 
jurisdictions may require some type of independent wrongdoing in addition 
to unreasonably high prices.332  In a class action, a finding of 
unconscionable prices need not be made customer-by-customer, but rather 
can be based on judicial comparison of end-user prices to the seller’s 
average costs.333  In addition to base prices, transaction fees may be unfair 
or deceptive, depending on how they are portrayed and what (if anything) 
the consumer receives in return for payment of the fee.334 
In the context of prison-retailing, consumers have used UDAP statutes 
to challenge inflated monopoly prices charged by ICS carriers.  For 
example, plaintiffs in Arkansas challenged Securus’s intrastate rates under 
that state’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act.335  The district court concluded 
that plaintiffs’ allegations that Securus “improperly exploit[ed] economic 
leverage resulting from exclusive-provider contracts” formed the basis for 
an actionable claim of unconscionability.336  In a still-pending New Jersey 
 
330.  Stalker v. MBS Direct, No. 10-11355, 2011 WL 797981, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 
1, 2011) (plaintiffs properly stated a claim under the Michigan Consumer Protection Act by 
alleging that 4-11% commissions that book vendor paid to school districts unreasonably 
inflated cost of textbooks sold to students); class cert. denied 2012 WL 6642518 (E.D. Mich. 
Dec. 20, 2012). 
331.  Via Christi Regional Med. Ctr. v. Reed, 298 Kan. 503, 527-528 (2013) (hospital’s 
use of superior bargaining power to charge inflated prices was actionable; the fact that such 
pricing was common in the industry held not to be a defense); Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 
522, 545-547 (1971) (defendant’s targeting low-income consumers with sales of “practically 
worthless” educational materials for two-and-a-half times a reasonable market price was 
unconscionable). 
332.  E.g., Galvan v. Northwest Memorial Hosp., 382 Ill. App.3d 259, 265 (2008) 
(“Charging an unconscionably high price, by itself, is generally insufficient to establish a claim 
[under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practice Act] for unfairness.  
Instead, ‘the defendant’s conduct must [also] violate public policy, be so oppressive as to leave 
the consumer with little alternative except to submit to it, and injure the consumer.’” (citation 
omitted)); Hatke v. Heartland Homecare Servs., No. 90,117, 2003 WL 22283161 (Kan. App. 
Oct. 3, 2003) (per curiam) (high price not actionable under Kansas Consumer Protection Act 
absent deceptive bargaining conduct or unequal bargaining power). 
333.  ChartOne, 908 A.2d at 90-92. 
334.  Byler v. Deluxe Corp., 222 F.Supp.3d 885 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (plaintiffs adequately 
pled deceptive trade practice under California, Illinois, Missouri, and Massachusetts law, 
based on company’s shipping fees (ranging from $8 to $49.60 per order), which bore no 
reasonable relationship to company’s actual shipping costs); Martin v. Heinold Commodities, 
163 Ill.2d 33, 50-52 (broker’s imposition of a “foreign service fee” was deceptive because it 
inaccurately implied that the fee was charged to recover costs, when in fact it was simply an 
additional sales commission). 
335.  Antoon v. Securus Tech., No. 5:15-cv-5008, 2017 WL 2124466 (W.D. Ark. May 
15, 2017). 
336.  Id. at *6. 
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class action, the district court denied GTL’s motion to dismiss claims under 
the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, holding that plaintiffs had stated a 
claim of unconscionability based on the anticompetitive way in which rates 
were imposed upon a vulnerable population (further holding that a separate 
act of deception was not required).337  Most recently, the district court for 
Massachusetts denied Securus’s attempt to dismiss a class action claim 
under Massachusetts consumer protection law, finding that the plaintiffs 
were families of limited means who had no reasonable alternative but to pay 
prices that Securus had inflated in order to pay commissions to the 
sheriff.338 
2. Terms and Conditions 
Adhesive contracts with oppressive terms are often actionable for either 
of two interrelated reasons: complex contract language can deceive 
consumers into misunderstanding the terms of a bargain, and an inability to 
negotiate terms leaves consumers with no meaningful choice.339  These dual 
concerns are particularly acute in the prison-retail setting, where terms and 
conditions are unusually oppressive and merchants enjoy a legal monopoly.  
Terms and conditions that are difficult to understand may be deceptive, 
while terms that are overwhelmingly exculpatory may be actionable as 
unfair or unconscionable.340 
Deceptive practices in prison-retailing can include advertising services 
as achieving a specific purpose (e.g., communicating with a loved one) but 
forcing consumers to assent to contract terms that excuse the vendor from 
 
337.  James v. Global*Tel Link, No. 13-cv-4989, 2018 WL 3736478, at *7 (D.N.J. 
Aug. 6, 2018) (Unconscionability claim is “not solely about excessive rates, but also about 
the manner in which those rates were established—through site commissions and ancillary 
fees.  From the end user’s perspective, there was no marketplace.  GTL enjoyed a monopoly 
over individuals held captive by a government agency.” (citation and internal quotation mark 
omitted; emphasis in original)). 
338.  Pearson v. Hodgson, No. 18-cv-11130-IT, 2018 WL 6697682, *8-9 (D. Mass. 
Dec. 20, 2018). The plaintiffs’ theory in this case relies on an earlier state-court ruling, 
Souza v. Sheriff of Bristol County, 455 Mass. 573 (2010), which held sheriffs may only 
impose and collect fees that are specifically authorized by statute.  The Pearson plaintiffs 
argue that the sheriff has violated Souza by collecting fees (site commissions) that are not 
authorized by statute, and that Securus has violated Massachusetts’ UDAP statute by 
assisting the sheriff in this unlawful activity. 
339.  NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR.,  supra note 146 at § 4.3.2.3.4. 
340.  E.g., Barrett-O’Neill v. Lalo, LLC, 171 F.Supp.3d 725, 740-741 (S.D. Ohio 2016) 
(requiring a consumer to enter into a “substantially one-sided transaction” can constitute 
unconscionable practice under Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act); Goodwin v. Hole No. 4, 
LLC, No. 2:06-cv-679, 2006 WL 3327990, *8 (D. Utah Nov. 15, 2006) (contract that gave 
seller the “unilateral ability to defeat the contract (and the [customers]’ justified 
expectations) rings of substantive unconscionability”). 
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actually providing the advertised service.341  The same goes for goods that 
are advertised as fulfilling specific functions, but which come with terms 
stating that the product is not warranted to operate without failure.342  Other 
problematic terms and conditions include purported waivers of duties 
imposed by law.  For example, JPay’s terms of service for money transfers 
state that JPay “will not be liable for a Payment sent to the incorrect inmate 
account.”343  This blanket exculpatory term ignores the numerous situations 
in which JPay could be liable for an erroneous transfer due to its own 
negligence.344  JPay also claims (perhaps as part of its efforts to redirect 
customers to high-fee electronic payment channels) that it is “not 
responsible” for money orders that it receives at its designated mailing 
address, but which do not reach the intended recipient of funds.345  This 
provision is not only unfair, but is likely unenforceable as an attempt to 
evade the common-law duties of a bailee.346 
Vendors’ privacy policies also contain troublesome provisions, 
especially when it comes to law-enforcement use of customer data.  
Securus’s Threads product collects data from numerous sources for 
distribution to anyone “connected to” a public law enforcement agency or 
private investigative firm.347  Securus apparently has some awareness that 
such data sharing implicates privacy laws, because law enforcement 
customers that subscribe to Threads must sign a form contract promising to 
 
341.  See Jpay, supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
342.  Id. 
343.  JPay, Inc., “Payment Terms of Service” ¶ 2, https://www.jpay.com/LegalAgree 
mentsOut.aspx (accessed Jan. 7, 2019). 
344.  Most obviously, a customer paying by credit card could have valid grounds to 
initiate a chargeback if JPay negligently misdirected deposited funds.  See MasterCard, 
Chargeback Guide 47, 222 (May 1, 2018) (description of chargeback message reason codes 
4853, 53, and 79). 
345.  JPay, supra note 138 at ¶ 7. 
346.  JPay’s terms and conditions state that this disclaimer is designed for situations 
where “there is a problem with the deposit.”  Id.  Although a money transfer is not a 
bailment, in the case of an attempted payment by negotiable instrument that cannot be 
consummated, the recipient most likely holds the instrument as a constructive bailee.  See 
Bayview Loan Servicing v. CWCapital Asset Management (In re Silver Sands R.V. Resort), 
636 FED. APPX. 950, 952 (9th Cir. 2016) (recipient of overpayment held excess funds as 
constructive bailee); see also 8A Am. Jur. 2d Bailments § 12 (2009) (“A ‘constructive 
bailment’ or ‘involuntary bailment’ arises where . . . a person has lawfully acquired the 
possession of personal property of another and holds it under circumstances whereby he or 
she should, on principles of justice, keep it safely and restore it or deliver it to the owner.”).  
Although parties to a bailment may alter their respective rights and obligations by contract, 
attempts to eliminate a bailee’s liability for loss arising from its own misconduct are 
typically held void as against public policy.  Id. § 86 (2009). 
347.  See generally, O’Neil, supra note 168, Price, supra note 169, and Securus, supra 
note 175. 
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“comply with all [applicable] privacy, consumer protection, marketing, and 
data security laws and government guidelines.”348  Yet Securus’s customer-
facing terms of service require customers to “agree that [communications 
data] will be . . . assigned, sold, transferred and distributed by [law 
enforcement]” and customers must further “agree that Securus assumes no 
responsibility for the activities, omissions or other conduct of any member 
of Law Enforcement.”349  In other words, Securus uses form contracts to 
require law enforcement to observe to certain laws, while simultaneously 
requiring the effected consumers to waive the protections of those same 
laws.  Because the agency-facing contract evidences Securus’s knowledge 
of applicable privacy laws, the company’s consumer-facing terms seem 
particularly vulnerable to a challenge as unfair or unconscionable. 
Finally, although it would be novel, a UDAP claim could be brought in 
cases where vendors have made materially different representations and 
warranties to facilities versus consumers.  As an example, in a typical 
contract for video visitation, Securus agrees to provide functioning video 
service, with specified features, and subject to detailed technical 
specifications.350  Yet, the customer-facing terms and conditions for the 
same service provide that Securus does not warrant that the system will 
work “properly, completely, or at all.”351  Such a stark disparity could form 
the basis for a claim of unfairness in that the disparity between the vendor-
facility contract and the vendor-customer contract reflects the extent to 
which vendors use their disproportionate power to craft one-sided 
consumer-facing contracts. 
3. Sales of Goods 
Sales of goods such as food, toiletries, clothing, and electronic 
hardware (including tablets) implicate both UDAP statutes and consumers’ 
rights under article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”).  The 
rights of buyers regarding defective goods is likely to become more relevant 
to the extent that computer tablets of questionable quality become more 
common.352  Because prison retailers tend to offer the most parsimonious 
 
348.  Master Services Agreement, supra note 120, at 5, ¶ 1. The contract also requires 
agencies to agree to implement eight specific practices, including restricting access to 
properly authorized employees, using personal information only for lawful purposes, and 
limiting the further dissemination of personal information.  Id. ¶ 2. 
349.  Securus T&C, supra note 117, Privacy Policy §§ II(J) & (K). 
350.  E.g., MASTER SERVICES AGREEMENT, supra note 120, at Exh. A §§ 29 and 33. 
351.  See Serucus T&C, supra note 117. 
352.  Although not a consumer-law issue, one tablet user in South Dakota has raised the 
ongoing malfunctioning of computer tablets as a Sixth Amendment issue, since that state 
removed prison law libraries and replaced it with a tablet-based Lexis Nexis app.   
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express warranties imaginable, consumers will often have to rely on the 
implied warranty of merchantability available under UCC article 2.353  The 
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose354 may also arise in 
situations where a seller encourages consumer misconceptions, such as 
leading customers to believe that a tablet performs a specific function, (e.g., 
accessing educational content), when in fact it does not.355 
Prison retailers routinely impose terms and conditions that misleadingly 
purport to “disclaim” all implied warranties.356  The enforceability of such a 
provision is questionable. In addition, if a merchant does use a broad 
disclaimer, they are required to advise consumers that they may have 
greater rights under state law—a requirement that is routinely ignored by 
prison retailers.357  Even if a disclaimer of implied warranty is allowed 
under state law, it may be unenforceable under the Magnuson-Moss 
Warranty Act,358 which prohibits a supplier from disclaiming an implied 
warranty if it “makes any written warranty to the consumer with respect to 
such consumer product.”359  Given the FTC’s broad definition of a “written 
warranty,” many goods sold in a commissary will fall under this 
provision.360 
Although merchants are generally able to limit the duration of 
warranties, prison retailers frequently use warranty periods that are so short 
or otherwise burdensome that they may be actionable either under either the 
Magnuson-Moss Act361 or the UCC’s “manifestly unreasonable” 
standard.362  For example, Union Supply Company sells computer tablets 
 
353.  U.C.C. § 2-314(AM LAW. INST. 2017). 
354.  U.C.C. § 2-315(AM LAW. INST. 2017). 
355.  See supra notes 157-158 and accompanying text. 
356.  E.g., UNION SUPPLY GROUP, TERMS OF USE (2018) https://californiainmatepack 
age.com/Catalog/MenuCatalogPages/ManageStaticPage.aspx?pageid=TermsOfUse 
(disclaiming “any and all warranties, express or implied, for any merchandise offered”). 
357.  16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a)(7-9)(2012). 
358.  Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. 
No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183, (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 2301, et seq. (2012)). 
359.  15 U.S.C. § 2308(a)(2012).  A “supplier” is broadly defined in the Magnuson-
Moss Act to mean “any person engaged in the business of making a consumer product 
directly or indirectly available to consumers.”  15 U.S.C. § 2301(4)(2012). 
360.  16 C.F.R. § 701.1(c)(1)(2012) (written warranty includes “[a]ny written 
affirmation of fact or written promise made in connection with the sale of a consumer 
product by a supplier to a buyer which relates to the nature of the material or workmanship 
and affirms or promises that such material or workmanship is defect free or will meet a 
specified level of performance over a specified period of time.”). 
361.  15 U.S.C. §§ 2308(b)(2012) (seller may limit an implied warranty only if the 
duration is reasonable and the limitation itself is conscionable) and 2310(d)(2012) (private 
cause of action). 
362.  U.C.C. § 1-302(b)(AM LAW. INST. 2017); NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra 
note____at § 7.7.4.6 (parties may vary terms such as a warranty duration, by contract, but 
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that are covered by a three-month warranty.363  The procedure for invoking 
one’s warranty rights under the Union Supply policy is also troublesome.  If 
a defective item is returned for a warranty claim, it must be accompanied by 
an original receipt and all of the original accessories and packaging.364  This 
could be a consumer trap even in a regular free-world transaction, but is 
particularly onerous for someone in prison, where customers may not even 
be allowed to keep the packaging.365  After imposing intricate and 
burdensome rules for warranty claims, Union Supply claims to reserve to 
itself the sole discretion to determine whether a returned item is eligible for 
warranty service.  If it determines a return is ineligible, the company has the 
sole discretion to decide whether or not to return the item to its owner.366 
The use of oppressive warranty terms is not unique to Union Supply.  
The warranty for GTL’s tablets lasts twelve months, but repairs can take up 
to one month to complete (or “21 working days”), and GTL has the sole 
discretion to determine whether “conditions of the warranty are met.”367  If 
GTL determines the product is not eligible, the customer has no appeal 
rights, does not receive the original device back, and his only recourse is “to 
purchase a new tablet.”368 
Tactics that render warranty coverage illusory can be actionable as 
either a deceptive or an unfair practice.369  In addition, the Magnuson-Moss 
 
such variations may not be manifestly unreasonable). 
363.  See Securus T&C, supra note 117 and accompanying text.  The warranty period is 
technically 180 days, but after 60 days, a repair fee is imposed that may prevent many 
customers from effectively making warranty claims.  Notably, although the company’s 
website terms include a description of the warranty coverage, it also states that complete 
warranty terms are available only in the tablet package, a practice that likely violates of the 
Magnuson-Moss Act.  15 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1)(A)(2012) (requiring warranty terms to be 
“made available to the consumer (or prospective consumer) prior to the sale of the product to 
him.”). 
364.  UNION SUPPLY GROUP, supra note 143. 
365.  The Union Supply tablets are specifically marketed for people incarcerated in the 
California prison system, which limits personal property to items on a preapproved list (a list 
that does not include used packaging) and caps the volume of allowable possessions at six 
cubic feet per person.  Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3190(e); Calif. Dept. of Corr. and 




366.  UNION SUPPLY GROUP, supra note 143. 
367.  PENN.-GTL CONTRACT, supra note 48, appx. G at Requirement #103.  Even 
though the tablets are warranted for twelve months, the batteries (which are presumably a 
critical component) are only warranted to last three months.  Id. at p. 415 (GTL Genesis 116-
PA spec sheet). 
368.  Id. at Requirement #103. 
369.  See Roelle v. Orkin Exterminating Co., No. 00AP-14, 2000 WL 1664865, *6-7 
(Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2000) (guarantee that promises effective services but is negated by 
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Act allows the FTC or the Attorney General to sue when “the terms and 
conditions of [a written warranty] so limit its scope and application as to 
deceive a reasonable individual;”370 there is not, however, a private cause of 
action under this provision. 
D. Antitrust 
Because prison retailers are able to use their market power to inflict 
harm on consumers, many industry trade practices are potentially subject to 
a private action under section 4 of the Clayton Act.371  Specific aspects of 
prison-retailing that are relevant to such claims include vendor exercise of 
monopoly power, the oligopoly in the correctional telecommunications 
market, and collusion between vendors and facilities in setting prices.  Due 
to the specialized nature of antitrust litigation, this article does not explore 
such actions in greater depth; however, recent developments in public 
enforcement do warrant a brief mention. 
ICS carrier Inmate Calling Solutions, LLC (doing business as 
ICSolutions) is a wholly owned subsidiary of commissary company Access 
Corrections.  ICSolutions is the third largest ICS carrier in the market,372 
and claims to have a captive customer base of approximately 268,000 
incarcerated people in over 400 facilities.373  In June 2018, Securus filed an 
application under § 214 of the Communications Act, seeking FCC 
permission to acquire ICSolutions.374  Moody’s Investors Service noted that 
the acquisition was “costly” for Securus, but it would “eliminate[] an 
aggressive competitor in the smaller facility space comprised of local and 
 
other components of the same contract is a deceptive practice under the Ohio Consumer 
Sales Practices Act). 
370.  15 U.S.C. § 2310(c)(2012). 
371.  15 U.S.C. § 15(2012). 
372.  Wagner, supra note 56, lists ICSolutions’ market share as fourth, behind 
CenturyLink.  But CenturyLink is likely not a true independent competitor in the ICS 
marketplace.  CenturyLink, an incumbent local exchange carrier with operations 
concentrated in western and midwestern states, is a nominal holder of many ICS contracts, 
but its bid proposals indicate that CenturyLink simply provides transmission lines, while ICS 
carriers such as Securus or GTL are responsible for all operational details, such as software, 
billing functions, and customer support.  See e.g., CenturyLink, Response to Georgia Dept. 
of Corrections Solicitation No. 46700-GDC0000669, attch. K (Jun. 9, 2015) (on file with 
author).  
373.  ICSolutions, Response to Request for Proposals for Providing Inmate 
Communication Services for the Harrison County Jail Facilities, Gulfport, Mississippi, at 1 
(July 28, 2017) (on file with author). 
374.  Joint Application, In the Matter of Joint Application of TKC Holdings, 
ICSolutions, and Securus Technologies for Grant of Authority, WC Dkt. No. 18-193 (June 
12, 2018). 
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county jails.” 375  For this reason, Moody’s reaffirmed Securus’s bond 
rating, citing the company’s “small scale, niche industry focus, aggressive 
financial policy, and strong competitive pressures in a largely duopolistic 
and mature end market.”376 
The acquisition was challenged by the Wright petitioners and others.377  
After an extended review by the FCC and the U.S. Department of Justice, 
Securus and ICS terminated the transaction.378  Although the abandonment 
of the merger was announced as a voluntary action by the parties, the public 
statement of FCC Chairman Pai indicates that the Commission was 
genuinely skeptical about the deal.379 
The demise of the ICSolutions acquisition indicates that regulators are 
aware of the acute consolidation within the ICS marketplace and the 
resulting lack of competition.  Yet even with this positive development, it 
may not be realistic to expect a resurgence of competition in a market that 
has become consistently less robust over the span of several decades. 
V. Policy Recommendations 
Although prison-retail customers have some protections, as discussed in 
the previous section, these scattered ex post remedies are inefficient and 
less-than-comprehensive.  Meaningful protection must come through a 
deliberately designed system of ex ante regulation that respects legitimate 
security needs while vigorously protecting the interests of incarcerated 
people as consumers. 
Central to the current lack of consumer protections is the failure of any 
government agency to take responsibility for broadly protecting the rights 
of incarcerated people and their families as captive customers.  Time and 
 
375.  MOODY’S SAYS SECURUS’ RATINGS UNCHANGED FOLLOWING ADD-ON TO TERM 
LOAN, https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-says-Securus-ratings-unchanged-follow 
ing-add-on-to-term—PR_383221 (May 7, 2018) (emphasis added). 
376.  Id. 
377.  Aleks Kajstura, “Families and advocates ask FCC to stop phone giant’s further 
expansion,” PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE BLOG (July 17, 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy. 
org/blog/2018/07/17/securus-merger/. 
378.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Antitrust Div., Securus Technologies 
Abandons Proposed Acquisition of Inmate Calling Solutions after Justice Department and 
the Federal Communications Commission Informed Parties of Concerns (Apr. 3, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/securus-technologies-abandons-proposed-acquisition-inmate-
calling-solutions-after-justice.  
379.  Press Release, Fed. Comm’cns Comm., Chairman Pai Statement on Decision by 
Inmate Calling Services Providers to Withdraw Merger Application (Apr. 2, 2019), 
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-356836A1.pdf (“FCC staff concluded that this 
deal posed significant competitive concerns and would not be in the public interest.  I 
agree.”).  
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time again, concerns about abusive monopolist business practices are 
dismissed by policymakers who claim that correctional agencies take these 
matters into account when awarding exclusive vendor contracts.  This is not 
a sufficient answer, given the agencies’ divided loyalties. 
This section explores proactive actions that legislatures, regulatory agencies, 
and correctional facilities can take.  Because the majority of incarcerated people 
are held in state or local facilities, this section begins with state- and local-level 
policy proposals and then considers potential federal action. 
A. State and Local Governments 
The basic problem of prison retailing can be summarized as follows: 
growing prison populations have led to unsustainable correctional budgets, 
which has led agencies to seek out so-called “no cost” contracts (in reality, 
this simply means shifting costs from the public sector to incarcerated 
people).  The ultimate solution to this quandary is for states to reduce the 
use of incarceration and acknowledge that the state must assume the 
financial costs when it chooses to incarcerate people.  In the absence of this 
large-scale normative change, consumer rights can be protected through 
reforms that are more incremental, but which nonetheless creatively change 
the ways in which society addresses the burdens of incarceration. 
1. Reimagine Procurement Practices 
Opening up aspects of the procurement process to oversight is one part 
of a multilayered approach to addressing the problematic aspects of prison 
retailing.380  This can be accomplished through numerous changes, ranging 
from major overhauls to minor tweaks.  To begin, families and 
representatives of incarcerated people must have a meaningful role in the 
procurement process.  Incarcerated people and their families are 
increasingly well organized, and as the experience of the Wright petitioners 
teaches, this is a constituency that is entirely qualified to bring valuable 
insights to complex regulatory matters.  Accordingly, legislatures should 
require that any panel of reviewers evaluating bids for prison-retail 
contracts must include a qualified delegate from an organization that 
represents the interests of people incarcerated by the agency that has 
solicited bids.381 
 
380.  See Gibbons and Katzenbach, supra note 84, at 78 (The key, many people told the 
Commission [on Safety and Abuse in America’s Prisons], is never to rely on any single 
mechanism of oversight and accountability, but rather to take what Professor Michele Deitch 
calls a ‘layered approach.’”). 
381.  Allowing advocates to sit on procurement committees is no more revolutionary 
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Corrections agencies should also take the lead by reforming 
procurement practices to address the unnecessarily abusive practices that 
are common in the industry.  There are numerous targeted reforms that 
agencies could achieve simply by modifying contracts or the terms of 
requests for proposals.  For example, agencies should: 
 Protect consumers from the potentially disastrous effects of a money-
transmitter insolvency by requiring vendors to post a surety bond or 
hold prepaid revenue in a segregated account that cannot be pledged 
as collateral. 
 Refuse to consider or enter into bundled contracts. 
 Allow all incarcerated customers to designate a third party 
representative (e.g., a trusted family member) for purposes of 
accessing account data and interacting with vendor customer-service 
staff.382 
 Require all vendors providing financial services to formulate a data 
protection plan and comply with the consumer data provisions of the 
GLBA. 
 Prohibit vendors from disclaiming the implied warranties of 
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. 
 Require public posting (accessible both in- and outside of prison) of all 
vendor policies and fees, as well as disclosure of any compensation 
received by the correctional agency. 
 Prohibit forfeiture of prepayments and require that all unused 
prepayments be refunded upon a customer’s release from custody.  If 
any refund cannot be completed, the credit balance should be 
administered under the state’s unclaimed property law. 
2. Foster Competition 
Part of the reason why retail offerings like commissary and telephone 
service are delivered through monopoly contracts is that correctional 
facilities want tight control over the security practices of vendors.  In the 
 
than the numerous insurance regulatory systems that allow intervention of consumer 
advocates in ratemaking proceedings.  See Daniel Schwarcz, Preventing Capture through 
Consumer Empowerment Programs; Some Evidence from Insurance Regulation, in 
PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 
365 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss, eds., 2014). 
382.  This third-party authorization system can be modeled after the CFPB’s 
“Consumer Protection Principles: Consumer-Authorized Financial Data Sharing and 
Aggregation” (Oct. 18, 2017), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_consumer-
protection-principles_data-aggregation.pdf (“Consumers are generally able to authorize 
trusted third parties to obtain [account-related] information from account providers to use on 
behalf of consumers, for consumer benefit, and in a safe manner.”). 
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case of digital content delivered via tablets, the security-related justification 
for a monopoly provider is not particularly compelling.  Companies like 
Apple and Spotify have spent considerable resources amassing enormous 
catalogs of music, and developing sophisticated content-delivery platforms.  
Moreover, these companies have invested substantial money (almost 
assuredly more than has been invested by prison-retail firms) in designing a 
secure network that can prevent malicious misuse.  Any computer network 
used by incarcerated people must be established by the facility, subject to 
necessary security features.  The costs of establishing that network can be 
funded through correctional budgets or (if necessary) through reasonable user 
fees.  But providing software and content that operates on this closed network 
need not be the exclusive province of a monopoly provider.  Free-world 
platforms can be modified and offered in prisons, allowing customers to 
select providers in a truly competitive market.  There are two reasonable 
security concerns about allowing such free-world digital platforms in a 
correctional facility: (1) potentially objectionable content in books, music, or 
other digital material,383 and (2) certain features like user reviews, which 
could be used to facilitate unauthorized communications.  Correctional 
administrators who are truly committed to innovation could work with 
technical experts on modifying existing platforms to address these concerns.  
For example, if facilities want to control the types of songs available (due to 
violent or sexual content), then how could various corrections departments 
collaboratively curate and share a database of acceptable songs, while 
simultaneously providing users explanations of why certain music has been 
censored?  Or if prison administrators balk at iTunes because user reviews 
allow communication with the outside world, could the software be modified 
to disable to the review feature for incarcerated users? 
In the case of tangible goods, security concerns are more 
understandable, but some level of competition is nonetheless possible.  In 
fact, the ability to introduce competition comes from an unlikely source.  
There is a robust national network of independent community organizations 
that send free books to incarcerated people.384  Prison systems sometimes 
attempt to squelch these sources of donated books by prohibiting 
incarcerated people from receiving mailed books unless they come from one 
 
383.  Even though it is generally obvious that prisons should have the power to screen 
out objectionable content, prison officials have repeatedly proven themselves unreasonably 
overzealous in exercising this power.  Perhaps the most notorious example are the numerous 
books which have been prohibited in prisons for implausible, nonsensical, or obviously 
pretextual grounds.  See Banned Books List, BOOKS TO PRISONERS, http://www.booksto 
prisoners.net/banned-book-lists/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2019) (collecting examples).  This is a 
real problem, but one that is simply beyond the scope of this paper. 
384.  See, e.g., Lucy Parson Center, National Prisoner Resource List, PRISON BOOK 
PROGRAM (Feb. 2019), https://prisonbookprogram.org/wp-content/uploads/NPRL.pdf. 
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of a small number of approved vendors.385  While approved-vendor policies 
have rightly been criticized (in the context of book shipments) as needless 
censorship, such policies serve as a key piece of evidence when it comes to 
confronting the monopoly of prison commissaries.  Prison administrators, 
when it suits their purpose, admit that the supply chain of a national company 
like Amazon or Barnes and Noble is secure enough to serve incarcerated 
people (supplemented, of course, by screening in the facility mail room).  If 
the supply chain is secure enough in the case of books, then family members 
should be allowed to use the same vendors to purchase toothpaste, batteries, 
or socks for incarcerated loved ones.  Such an arrangement would require 
some kind of coordination between facilities and approved vendors (most 
notably to determine what inventory items are allowed under facility rules), 
but the logistics should not be insurmountably difficult. 
3. Conduct Rulemaking Proceedings to Protect Consumers 
Absent congressional action, some subset of telecommunications 
services will remain under the supervision of state public utilities 
commissions (“PUCs”).  So long as this regulatory dichotomy continues, it 
is critical for PUCs to ensure reasonable ICS rates.  Intrastate rate 
regulation is particularly important for people incarcerated in local jails, 
because they are generally more likely to make local calls (to family or 
counsel in the vicinity who can provide immediate help) and do not have 
the ability to use VoIP routing to obtain the most favorable rates.386  When 
setting rates, PUCs must obtain carriers’ comprehensive financial 
information in order to prevent carrier manipulation of cost data 
UDAP statutes are another critical protection that can extend to all 
types of prison retailing, not just telecommunications.  Because these 
statutes prohibit very broad categories of behavior, many states allow 
attorneys general or consumer-protection agencies to promulgate rules 
defining certain unfair or deceptive practices in greater detail.387  UDAP 
regulations could provide greater clarity by addressing issues specific to 
prison retailing.  The first issue to address is arbitration provisions.  
Because prison-retail consumers have no ability to choose sellers, their 
consent to an arbitration clause is not truly voluntary.  To mitigate this 
situation, states should issue regulations making it an unfair trade practice 
for any prison retailer doing business in that state to impose mandatory 
arbitration or prohibit class adjudication.  States should also conduct other 
 
385.  Christopher Zoukis, “Censorship in Prisons and Jails: A War on the Written 
Word,” PRISON LEGAL NEWS, v.29, n.12, 1, at 6-7 (Dec. 2018). 
386.  See generally GTL, supra notes 223. 
387.  NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 146 at § 3.4.4.2. 
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UDAP rulemakings after surveying incarcerated people and their families 
and identifying the problems most in need of remediation. 
4. Provide Protection for Trust Account Balances 
As discussed previously, families will sometimes utilize prepayment 
options with unfair terms in an effort to avoid depositing funds into a trust 
account where they can be subject to mandatory deductions.  Some of these 
deductions can take the form of irregular seizures, such as a writ of 
garnishment.  Other jurisdictions have made mandatory deductions more 
systematic.  For example, a 2017 Oregon law directs the Department of 
Corrections to deduct 15% of all incoming funds (including wages or gifts), 
to pay any outstanding compensatory finds, restitution, court-appointed 
attorney fees, child support, or civil judgments.388  To illustrate the impacts of 
this law, consider a hypothetical mother who wishes to support her son in the 
Oregon prison system.  If, every month, the mother wants her son to have 
enough money to purchase five prepaid mailing envelopes, a months’ supply 
of dental floss, deodorant, toothpaste, a bar of soap, and enough to pay for 
two 20-minute phone calls, she would need to send $19.88 per month.389  The 
impact of the new law is that she now needs to send $22.86 per month for her 
son to have the same buying power.  The increased monthly deposit also 
increases the applicable transaction fee (charged by Securus subsidiary JPay) 
by $3 per month.390  Between increased transfer amounts and applicable fees, 
the mother’s increased costs would be approximately $72 per year. 
Defenders of such mandatory deductions are quick to emphasize the 
importance of paying court-ordered financial obligations.  But these 
arguments miss the fact that all states have enacted statutory exemptions for 
judgment debtors based on the realization that everyone needs minimal 
financial resources to live, and federal law generally limits the maximum 
wage garnishments to the lesser of 25% of disposable earnings or the amount 
by which disposable wages exceed thirty-times the federal minimum wage.391 
One simple way that states could protect incarcerated people and their 
families from predatory prepayment schemes would be to exempt a 
reasonable amount of monthly trust account deposits from seizure under 
mandatory deduction laws.  Despite the predictable counter-arguments that 
 
388.  Or. Rev. Stat. § 423.105. 
389.  The cost of the phone call is based on applicable prices published by GTL 
subsidiary Telmate, at http://www.gettingout.com (accessed Oct. 21, 2019).  All other items 
are based on commissary price list provided by the Oregon Department of Corrections (on 
file with author). 
390.  Based on transfer confirmation screens at http://www.jpay.com (on file with 
author). 
391.  15 U.S.C. § 1673(a)(2012). 
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would come from proponents of zero-sum criminal justice, such a policy 
need not diminish the importance of repaying court-ordered debts.  Rather, 
just like a wage-garnishment exemption, it is an acknowledgment that 
people in prison are expected to pay for basic necessities, and to do so, they 
must have some degree of protection from involuntary payments. 
5. Develop Independent ADR Systems 
Another important issue that should be seriously addressed in prison-
retail systems is the existence and structure of customer dispute resolution 
processes.  A creative form of alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) in 
prison retailing is sorely needed.  Vendors do not operate in a competitive 
market and therefore have little incentive to seriously respond to consumer 
complaints.  Meanwhile, disputes in prisons are typically funneled to 
grievance systems which are notoriously biased, unfair, and ineffective.392 
Often the problems with internal grievance systems can be traced to 
staff skepticism regarding the validity of complaints coming from 
incarcerated people.  In some ways, this is the correctional system’s version 
of Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants (the “McDonald’s hot coffee case”), 
a highly publicized case that has led to many strongly-held opinions based 
on misinformation.393  The equivalent case in the correctional sector was a 
real lawsuit (many details of which have been lost to the sands of time) 
involving a purchase of peanut butter from a prison commissary.  Senator 
Bob Dole described it as a suit over “being served chunky peanut butter 
instead of the creamy variety” during Senate debate of the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act.394 The case became a widely-cited example of frivolous prison 
litigation, and has become a shorthand method of dismissing the complaints 
of incarcerated people.  Yet when Chief Circuit Judge Jon O. Newman 
unearthed the original complaint from the case, he discovered that Senator 
Dole’s characterization was not entirely accurate: yes, the plaintiff had 
received the incorrect type of peanut butter, but he filed the suit because he 
 
392.  See e.g., Prison Just. League, A “Rigged System”: How the Texas Grievance 
System Fails Prisoners and the Public, PRISON JUST. LEAGUE 1, 5 (2017) (54% of survey 
respondents reported never having a grievance satisfactorily resolved during their time in 
Texas prison, 91% reported that the system was not effective); Confronting Confinement, 
supra note 84 at 93 (“Nearly every prison and most jails have a procedure for receiving 
prisoners’ grievances.  However, the Commission heard that many are ineffective.”). 
393.  See FindLaw.com, “The McDonald’s Hot Coffee Case,” https://injury.findlaw.co 
m/product-liability/the-mcdonald-s-coffee-cup-case-separating-mcfacts-from-mcfiction.html 
(accessed Jan. 10, 2019). 
394.  Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Hearing on S.1279, 152 Cong. Rec. 
S14413 (daily ed. Sep. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bob Dole, Senate Majority Leader). 
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returned the incorrect jar and never received the refund he was promised.395  
As Judge Newman remarked, the $2.50 cost of the peanut butter may seem 
trivial to some, “but out of a prisoner’s commissary account, it is not a 
trivial loss, and it was for loss of those funds that the prisoner sued.”396 
The mythology of the peanut butter case is representative of many 
correctional administrators’ hostility toward grievances.  Accordingly, the 
best way to ensure an effective and innovative ADR mechanism for prison 
retail transactions is to remove it from the correctional system entirely.  To 
accomplish this, legislatures should consider creative ways of requiring 
prison retailers to utilize outside ADR mechanisms.  The details of such 
systems will vary, but should be commensurate with the needs of any given 
prison-retail operation and should leave litigation as an option.  The most 
critical component is an independent evaluator such as an ombudsperson 
who works outside of the correctional agency,397 or a contractor who is 
tasked with adjudicating disputes.  A new ADR system could utilize 
technology to obtain necessary information from the consumer, analyze 
vendor data to identify problematic products or practices, and provide 
performance data to the correctional agency for use when deciding whether 
to renew a contract.  Such novel solutions will likely require legislative 
action, because they will be effective only to the extent the ADR neutral has 
access to transactional details and vendor records—something to which that 
vendors will not likely acquiesce unless required by law. 
B. Federal 
1. CFPB Regulation of Correctional Banking 
Under title X of the Dodd-Frank Act,398 the CFPB is authorized to 
prohibit unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices (“UDAAP”).  The CFPB 
should use these powers to comprehensively regulate the entire field of 
correctional banking.  Title X grants the CFPB the authority to prohibit 
UDAAP by “covered persons,” which are defined as persons or entities 
“engage[d] in offering or providing a consumer financial product or 
service.”399  Correctional banking vendors transmit funds, provide payment 
services, accept deposits for the purpose of facilitating transfers, and act as 
custodians of stored value, all of which are statutorily defined as consumer 
 
395.  Jon O. Newman, Not All Prisoner Lawsuits Are Frivolous, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, 
v.7, n.4 Apr. 1996, at 6. 
396.  Id. 
397.  Arthur L. Alarcón, A Prescription for California’s Ailing Inmate Treatment 
System: An Independent Corrections Ombudsman, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 591 (2006). 
398.  Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
399.  12 U.S.C. § 5481(6)(A)(2012). 
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financial products or services for purposes of title X.400 
The UDAAP provision in § 1031 of the Dodd-Frank Act includes 
statutory definitions of the terms “unfair” and “abusive.”  Unfair practices 
are defined using the same definition as the FTC Act, requiring a likelihood 
of substantial injury, unavoidable by the consumer, which is not 
outweighed by countervailing benefits.401  Trust fund transfers, prepayment 
products, and release cards routinely injure consumers by imposing supra-
competitive fees and unfair terms and conditions.  The customers in these 
transactions receive no corresponding benefit as a result of these practices, 
nor do consumers have access to a competitive market. 
Section 1031 contains several definitions of abusive practices, one of 
which is an act or practice that “takes unreasonable advantage of . . . the 
inability of the consumer to protect the interests of the consumer in 
selecting or using a consumer financial product or service.”402  Again, 
correctional banking products easily fit this definition because of the 
complete lack of consumer choice and the exploitative fees that are levied 
on vulnerable consumers. 
Using its § 1031 powers, the CFPB should conduct an open-ended 
rulemaking to address common practices in the correctional banking 
industry.  Such a rulemaking should include fee regulation and extension of 
Regulation E’s compulsory-use prohibition to release cards.  The Bureau 
should also directly regulate correctional banking fees.  While this level of 
intervention would be somewhat unusual, even those who lean toward 
market-oriented methods of fee regulation acknowledge that context 
matters.403  In the case of correctional banking, the facility is the party that 
evaluates bids and awards exclusive contracts.  Transaction costs should 
therefore be internalized and borne by the facility, which is in the best 
position to minimize such costs. 
2. Congressional Action 
The most important step that Congress can take is to clarify FCC 
 
400.  Id. §§ 5481(5), (8)(C), and (15)(A)(iv), (v) & (vii)(2012). 
401.  Id. § 5531(c)(1)(2012) (defining unfairness as an act or practice that is “likely to 
cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers,” and 
such injury is not “outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition”). 
402.  Id. § 5531(d)(2)(B)(2012); see also Adam Levitin, “CFPB ‘Abusive’ 
Rulemaking?” Credit Slips Blog (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/ 
2018/10/cfpb-abusive-rulemaking.html (arguing that the abusive prong under the CFPB’s 
enabling statute is basically duplicative of unfairness and deception). 
403.  Liran Haim & Ronald Mann, Putting Stored-Value Cards in Their Place, 18 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 989, 1016 (2014) (“In our view, the question of fee regulation [for 
prepaid cards] should be largely contextual.”). 
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jurisdiction over emerging technology.  This issue is already on the 
legislative radar screen.  In 2017, Senator Tammy Duckworth introduced 
legislation to clarify the FCC’s jurisdiction over ICS telephone service and 
video visitation, regardless of whether such communications are inter- or 
intrastate.404  The bill was assigned to committee and languished without 
any further action.  Due to technological changes in telecommunications, 
the traditional dichotomy between intra- and interstate communications 
makes little sense.The Duckworth bill should be reintroduced in the current 
congress and advocacy organizations should make passage a priority. 
3. Wright Petition, Post-Remand 
After the FCC took up the matter of ICS rate regulation, the 
Commissioners fractured on the appropriate regulatory fix.  But even 
Chairman Pai, who led the dissent, admitted that government intervention 
in the ICS market is appropriate given the documented market failure.405  
Now that the D.C. Circuit has vacated portions of the FCC’s 2015 rule, the 
ball is once again in the FCC’s court.  Recall, however, that title II’s 
requirement of just and reasonable rates can be enforced via private 
litigation.  The matter ended up before the FCC because courts were 
receptive to ICS carriers’ citation to the primary jurisdiction doctrine.  That 
rule is a prudential doctrine, which some courts have declined to apply in 
situations where “the agency is aware of but has expressed no interest in the 
subject matter of the litigation.”406  If the FCC does not promptly take up 
the Wright rulemaking now that it has been remanded, then courts should 
interpret this as a lack of agency interest, and decline to invoke the primary 
jurisdiction doctrine in future cases. 
As for the substance of the rulemaking, the FCC should promulgate 
new price caps for interstate ICS rates using a methodology that will satisfy 
judicial review.  The Commission should also reissue the same restrictions 
on ancillary fees that were contained in the 2015 rules, but this time 
specifically invoke § 152(b)’s “impossibility exception” as grounds to apply 
the rules to intrastate calling.407 
The Commission must also address ICS carriers that invoke their use of 
 
404.  Video Visitation and Inmate Calling in Prisons Act of 2017, S. 1614, 115th Cong. 
(2017). 
405.  See generally, In the Matter of Rates, supra note 243. 
406.  Astiana v. Hain Celestial Group, 783 F.3d 753, 761 (9th Cir. 2015). 
407.  See, e.g., Minn Pub. Utils Comm’n v. Fed. Comm’cns Comm’n, 483 F.3d 570, 577 
(8th Cir. 2007) (impossibility exception “allows the FCC to preempt state regulation of a 
service which would otherwise be subject to dual federal and state regulation where it is 
impossible or impractical to separate the service’s intrastate and interstate components”); see 
also supra note 224 (describing impossibility of segregating ancillary fees by call type). 
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VoIP technology to evade state regulation.  When vacating the FCC’s caps 
on intrastate rates, the D.C. Circuit relied on § 152 of the Communications 
Act, which creates a presumption that states will regulate intrastate 
communications.408  The purpose of § 152 is to respect the dual sovereignty 
of federal and state regulators.  To the extent that the industry is successful 
in evading state regulation, then § 152 is no longer in play. 
The Commission should also regulate emerging technologies such as 
video visitation and electronic messaging.  This may seem infeasible given 
the current political makeup of the FCC, but it should not be.  The 
Commission can maintain a general agenda of deregulation and still 
recognize the sui generis market failure that has occurred in prison 
telecommunications.  The novelty of the products should not obscure the 
fact that customers are purchasing “mere transmission” of text, voice, or 
video messages, the hallmark of communications services subject to 
regulation under title II.409  Those services suffer from the same market 
failures that the FCC identified in connection with telephone service in 
correctional facilities, and basic rate caps and restrictions on abusive fees 
would benefit consumers. 
VI. Conclusion 
Prison retailing is a predictable result of an age of runaway carceral 
growth coupled with legislative demands for fiscal austerity.  While 
common business practices in the industry regularly run afoul of existing 
laws, substantial roadblocks make it difficult for injured customers to 
exercise what rights they may have.  Meanwhile, correctional 
administrators, who are in the best position to guard against industry 
abuses, have largely indicated a lack of interest in consumer protection. 
As discussed in the previous section, legislative and administrative 
bodies have numerous tools at their disposal to address the problems of 
prison retailing.  A world without the parasitic companies that dominate the 
industry is achievable, but given the profitability of current business 
practices, pushback will be intense as companies defend their ability to 
extract profits from captive customers.  Accomplishing meaningful change 
will thus require concerted effort by advocates and a willingness on the part 
of policymakers to see incarcerated people and their families as consumers 
entitled to the same protections that are enjoyed by most people every day. 
 
408.  Global Tel*Link v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 866 F.3d 397, 409 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 
(“§ 152(b) of the 1934 Act erects a presumption against the Commission’s assertion of 
regulatory authority over intrastate communications.”). 
409.  See Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 240, at ¶ 6 and 33 FCC Rcd. at 313 
(describing information services as those that “offer more than mere transmission”). 
